\begin{frame}{Bitcoin Mining Market Structure}
	\begin{block}{Revenue}
		\begin{equation}
		R_{i,t}=\eta_{t}\cdot\frac{q_{i}}{Q^{-i}_{t}}
	\end{equation}
\end{block}
Where \(R_{i,t}\) is the revenue of miner \(i\in I\), at time t. \(q_{i}\) is the hash power of a miner i, and \(Q^{-i}_{t}\) is the hash of all other miners. The miner reward is \(\eta\)

	\begin{block}{Revenue change from t to t+1}
		\begin{align}
%		R_{i,t+1}-R_{i,t}=\eta \cdot\frac{q_{i}}{Q^{-i}_{t+1}-Q^{-i}_{t}}
%		\\
			\%\Delta R=\%\Delta P_{btc}(1-\epsilon)
	\end{align}
\end{block}
If the Bitcoin price elasticity of hash \(\epsilon\) is greater than one (elastic), than a decrease in price will \alert{increase profits} for the low marginal cost producers, like the miners using flared gas.
\end{frame}
