diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 02d2546..4c5effe 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ # ---> LaTex +*.bcf +*.run.xml *.aux *.glo *.idx diff --git a/CREP_Interaction.tex b/CREP_Interaction.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de234ea --- /dev/null +++ b/CREP_Interaction.tex @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ + + +% ======================== Set up the environment to read the SLV Hedonic paper +\documentclass{article} +% ------------------------------------------------- Packages & Setup + +\usepackage{svg} +\usepackage{pdflscape,array} +\usepackage{array} % For inserting large multi-page tables +\usepackage{longtable} +\usepackage{calc} +\usepackage{multirow} +\usepackage{dcolumn} +\usepackage{threeparttable} % to insert the notes +\usepackage{float} +% \usepackage{caption} +\usepackage[tableposition=top]{caption} +% \usepackage{subcaption} +\usepackage{ragged2e} +\usepackage{placeins} +\usepackage{tabularx,booktabs} +\usepackage{subfig} +\usepackage{graphicx} +\usepackage{setspace} +\usepackage{amssymb} +\usepackage{quoting} +\usepackage[style=apa,natbib=true]{biblatex} +\usepackage{tikz} +\usepackage{pdflscape} % For inserting landscape-mode objects +\usepackage{amsmath} % For matrices +\usepackage{listings} % For inserting programming code +\usepackage{rotating} % For inserting sideways tables and figures +\usepackage{soul} % for the command \hl +% To allow ifdef checking +\usepackage{etoolbox} +\usepackage{paralist} +\usepackage[inline]{enumitem} +\usepackage{blindtext} +\usepackage[printonlyused]{acronym} +\usepackage{nameref} % For referencing chapters numbers in main abastract +\usepackage{hyperxmp} +\usepackage[hidelinks]{hyperref} % For referencing though out the document. Can change, look at user manual how to change +\usepackage{cleveref} +% ========================Other formating +\graphicspath{{Figures}} +\setlength\bibitemsep{\baselineskip} +\addbibresource{supporting-files/FinalThesis.bib} + +% ==========================Title Setup + +\title{Policy Interactions of Water Conservation Programs. Is Efficiency Always Efficient?} +\author{Alexander Gebben} +\author{Steven Smith} +\date{\today} + +% =======================Documents Start +\begin{document} +\maketitle +\begin{abstract} + \input{body/abstract} +\end{abstract} +\newpage +\input{supporting-files/symbols-and-abbreviations} +\newpage +% ========================Main Body +\input{body/Intro} +\input{body/background} +\input{Sections/Data.tex} +\input{Sections/Strategy.tex} +\input{Sections/Results.tex} +\input{body/conclusion} +% ==========================Appendices +\newpage +\printbibliography +\newpage +\input{appendix.tex} +\end{document} diff --git a/Figures/CREP_CROP.jpeg b/Figures/CREP_CROP.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d633f67 Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/CREP_CROP.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/CREP_GROUP_TRENDS.jpeg b/Figures/CREP_GROUP_TRENDS.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2e5887 Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/CREP_GROUP_TRENDS.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/OTHER_CROP.jpeg b/Figures/OTHER_CROP.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0f3e74 Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/OTHER_CROP.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/POLICY_COUNTER_FACT.jpeg b/Figures/POLICY_COUNTER_FACT.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d3a816 Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/POLICY_COUNTER_FACT.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/Policy_Bar_Graph.jpeg b/Figures/Policy_Bar_Graph.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..857453f Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/Policy_Bar_Graph.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/Pumping_Rates.jpeg b/Figures/Pumping_Rates.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ab419d Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/Pumping_Rates.jpeg differ diff --git a/Figures/SBD1_CROP.jpeg b/Figures/SBD1_CROP.jpeg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bce44c3 Binary files /dev/null and b/Figures/SBD1_CROP.jpeg differ diff --git a/Sections/A_All_Years_2011_Reg.tex b/Sections/A_All_Years_2011_Reg.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2ca9b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_All_Years_2011_Reg.tex @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +\section{Yearly Response Since 2011} +In this appendix the \ac{ATT} of \ac{SBD1} policies is provided as an event study, with the average response of wells in \ac{CREP} reported independently from other \ac{SBD1} wells\footnote{Wells are only eligible for \ac{CREP} if they are in \ac{SBD1}.}. This provides a picture of how \ac{CREP} wells responded to \ac{SBD1} policies. Since the response to the pumping fee of \ac{CREP} wells is significantly different from other \ac{SBD1} wells there is evidence that wells were not enrolled in \ac{CREP} randomly. Rather wells were selectively placed into \ac{CREP} based on groundwater yield after maximizing farm profits in response to the pumping fee\footnote{The probit model of \cref{REG:SELECT_PROBIT} finds the response to the pumping fee to be a significant contributing factor to \ac{CREP} enrollment after controlling for other factors which may induce enrollment, such as crop choice.}. + +\cref{2011CREPVSBD1} provides the regression table of this exercise. \cref{FIG:SBD1ALL} and \cref{FIG:CREPALL} are graphical representation of the results from \cref{2011CREPVSBD1}. + +\input{Tables/REG_PRE_CREP_EVENT.tex} + +\cref{FIG:SBD1ALL} is a coefficient plot which includes only the \ac{SBD1} year interactions, providing a graphic representation of how the average \ac{SBD1} well responded to the mix of conservation policies across time. +\begin{figure} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{PRE_CREP_SBD1.pdf} + \caption{Subdistrict policy effect on non-CREP wells} + \label{FIG:SBD1ALL} +\end{figure} + +\FloatBarrier + +\cref{FIG:CREPALL} is a coefficient plot of only the additional response of \ac{CREP} wells. These are the yearly coefficients in \cref{2011CREPVSBD1} and are in addition to the \ac{SBD1} average effect of \cref{FIG:SBD1ALL}. +\begin{figure} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{PRE_CREP_CREP.pdf} + \caption{Subdistrict policy effect on CREP wells} + \label{FIG:CREPALL} +\end{figure} + +Of note is the time path of \ac{CREP} extraction reductions. In every year with a pumping fee \ac{CREP} wells extract less water than other \ac{SBD1} wells. In 2011, the pumping fee came into effect at \$45 dollars per \ac{AF}. In this year \ac{CREP} wells pumped 12.21 fewer \ac{AF} than other \ac{SBD1} wells. In the following year, the pumping fee was raised to \$75 per \ac{AF} and \ac{CREP} wells further lowered pumping rates by 33 \ac{AF} compared with other \ac{SBD1} wells. On average the initial pumping fee reduced \ac{SBD1} well pumping by 0.13 \ac{AF} per dollar, and \ac{CREP} wells by 0.409 \ac{AF} per dollar. In 2012 the \ac{SBD1} wells reduced groundwater extraction by 0.578 \ac{AF} per dollar, and \ac{CREP} wells by 1.03 \ac{AF} per dollar. + +The decline of water use continued after 2016, which is the first year of the \ac{CREP} program. By 2020, all \ac{CREP} wells are entered in the program and the water applied to land constitutes the allowable volumes for approved cover crops. diff --git a/Sections/A_CREP_All_Reg.tex b/Sections/A_CREP_All_Reg.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ebccee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_CREP_All_Reg.tex @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +\section{\ac{CREP} Program Yearly Estimates} +To illustrate how the effects of the \ac{CREP} program policy have changed over time, the yearly estimates from an event study are provided in \cref{REG_CREP_PERIODS}. This helps assess pre-trend variation and provides a rich description of the dynamic policy outcomes. + +\input{Tables/REG_CREP_PERIODS.tex} diff --git a/Sections/A_CREP_Goals.tex b/Sections/A_CREP_Goals.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eed3023 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_CREP_Goals.tex @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +\section{\label{A_CREP_GOALS}Goals of the Federal Fallowing Incentives CREP Program} +The main goals of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) within the subdistricts are (\cite{sbd12013a}): +\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)] + \item Enroll 40,000 acres of cropland. + \item Reduce irrigated water use by 60,060 acre-feet per year. + \item Reduce annual fertilizer and pesticide application from enrolled acres by approximately 3,650 tons per year. + \item Restore and enhance a minimum of 750 acres of degraded temporary and permanent wetlands. + \item Increase streamflows in streams associated with the watershed within the project area. + \item Reduce energy consumption over the 15-year term of the CREP contract's two hundred million kW-hours. + \item Reduce the percentage of groundwater test wells containing nitrogen (NO\textsubscript{3}) levels above EPA standards. + \item Enable recovery of the groundwater levels in the unconfined aquifer of the closed basin by reducing consumptive withdrawals. +\end{enumerate} diff --git a/Sections/A_CREP_To_Near_Reg.tex b/Sections/A_CREP_To_Near_Reg.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..679f83d --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_CREP_To_Near_Reg.tex @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +\section{Number of Neighboring Wells to CREP Wells} +%\cref{REG:FITNEIGHBOR} provides an analysis of how adding wells into \ac{CREP} changes the number of wells that are in the neighborhood of a \ac{CREP} well. This rate changes the cumulative \ac{CREP} neighborhood affect. The individual affect on a neighboring well is estimated in \cref{MAINREGTBL}. \cref{REG:FITNEIGHBOR} is a regression which predicts the number of wells within a half mile of a \ac{CREP} well in each year of \ac{CREP}. The results are reported without any transformation, as a log-linear model, and a log-log model. This rate combined with the individual neighboring well effects can be used to identified the total average affect on pumping from adding a new \ac{CREP} well. +\cref{REG:FITNEIGHBOR} provides an analysis of how adding wells into \ac{CREP} changes the number of wells that are in the neighborhood of a \ac{CREP} well. This rate changes the cumulative \ac{CREP} neighborhood affect. The individual effect on a neighboring well is estimated in \cref{MAINREGTBL}. \cref{REG:FITNEIGHBOR} is a regression which predicts the number of wells within a half mile of a \ac{CREP} well in each year of \ac{CREP}. The results are reported in three formats: without any transformation, using a log-linear model, and using a log-log model. This rate, combined with the effects of individual neighboring wells, can be used to identify the total average effect on pumping from adding a new \ac{CREP} well. + +\input{Tables/NEIGHBOR_FIT.tex} + +These results indicate that on average, adding one new \ac{CREP} well induces 10.64 additional neighboring wells, or that a 1\% increase in the number of \ac{CREP} wells adds 1.3\% more neighborhood wells. This is completed to find the average additionality of the neighborhood effect from \ac{CREP} enrollment. However, the average effect differs from the marginal affect. These results are useful to explain the total policy effects from \ac{CREP} when including spillover effects. However, they cannot be used to estimate the marginal effect of adding a new \ac{CREP} well under current enrollment levels. For this, refer to \cref{FIG:BOX}. diff --git a/Sections/A_Distance_Reg.tex b/Sections/A_Distance_Reg.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81fc491 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_Distance_Reg.tex @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +\section{Neighborhood Effect Estimates at Various Radii} +\label{A:RAD} +The neighborhood pumping effect of \ac{CREP} enrollment for various radii are estimated in \cref{REGRAD}\footnote{The year number is the time after a \ac{CREP} is first enrolled at the specified distance. For example, if a well is enrolled in \ac{CREP} in 2015, wells that are within a half mile of the \ac{CREP} well are in \(Year=0\) in 2015, \(Year=5\) in 2020, and \(Year=-5\) in 2010.}. This provides a robustness check of the radius selected. The values are reported as an event study, showing how the coefficients vary over time. +\input{Tables/REG_DIFF_RAD.tex} +The results of \cref{REGRAD} suggest that the neighborhood effect is sensitive to the radius of impact selected. The half mile radius shows the most consistent policy effect, with a statistically significant decline in well extraction in the first year of the program. Generally, this effect peaks two years after the policy begins, and then dampens in magnitude and statistical significance after this point. + +It is somewhat surprising that the smaller quarter mile radius has a less consistent policy effect, with only the peak period of the policy effect (two years after enrollment) showing a significant negative neighborhood effect. This can be explained in a few ways. + +From a data perspective, doubling the radius of impact includes four times the area\footnote{\(4=\frac{\pi\cdot (2r)^{2}}{\pi\cdot r^{2}}\)}. The small radius therefore reduces the data set of the neighborhood effect by more than half. This lower data availability results in more noise in the estimate, preventing the effect from being picked up. + +There are also causal explanations of this result. For example, cones of depressions around a well are present at close distances. At the quarter mile radius, the reduction in pumping of \ac{CREP} wells will raise the water table by more than wells at one half mile. As a result, the cost of pumping groundwater decreases more for close wells, creating an incentive to increase pumping. This generates an incentive counter to the pro-social generalized pumping reductions seen at farther distances. On net, very close wells may reduce extraction rates by less than more distant wells, with closer wells pumping about the same as before \ac{CREP} enrollment but with a lower operating cost. + +A second causal explanation is that using too small of a radius shifts treated wells into the control group. If the neighborhood pumping effect is approximately constant across the effected radius, then using a small radius will bias the results towards zero. For example, if the driver of decreased pumping is having a line of sight to the \ac{CREP} well, then a well within a quarter mile will reduce pumping at a similar rate as a well at a half mile. In that case, going from a half mile radius down to a quarter mile radius shifts approximately four-fifths of treated wells to the control group. In turn, this attributes some of policy impact to year fixed effects and the results lose significance. Due to these factors, the lower magnitude of neighborhood effects at the quarter mile radius is not viewed as a major concern in the model outcomes. + +At the one-mile radius, the average neighborhood effect appears to be close to a random process, which is expected when the radius of impact is identified correctly. There are four years at the two-mile radius where the results are significant, and generally positive. Most years are not significant, these results are attributed partially to random variation. However, as can be seen in \cref{FIG:MAP}, nearly all wells in \ac{SBD1} are within two miles of a \ac{CREP} well. As a result, the two-mile year interaction coefficients represent the pumping change relative to a small set of wells that are at the far edges of \ac{SBD1} or at the center. diff --git a/Sections/A_Fallow_Prog.tex b/Sections/A_Fallow_Prog.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abc429b --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_Fallow_Prog.tex @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +\section{Fallow Program Estimates} +\label{A:FALPROG} +This appendix presents event study estimates for the \ac{SBD1} four-year fallowing program, comparable to the results provided in \cref{FIG:EVENTCREP} and \cref{FIG:EVENTNEAR} for the \ac{CREP} policy outcomes. + +\cref{FIG:EVENTFAL} provides the coefficient plot of the four-year fallowing program for wells enrolled in the program. Pre-trend cannot be rejected, although there is a strong response to the policy initiation\footnote{Year=0}. It is not clear why pumping rates increase in the year following entrance into the program. The most likely explanation is that the farmers rotate fallowed fields. The program allows farmers to rotate which fields are fallowed. After a well is enrolled in the contract that well may be permitted to reactivate in the following year, so long as a new well is enrolled. This would explain the large confidence intervals in year one. +\FloatBarrier +\begin{figure}[h] + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{FALLOW_EVENT_STUDY.pdf} + \caption{Fallow program event study} + \label{FIG:EVENTFAL} +\end{figure} + +\cref{FIG:FALPROGNEAR} provides the coefficient plot for the neighborhood spillover effects of the four-year fallowing program. These results are not significant, and the hypotheses that there is not a neighborhood spillover effect cannot be rejected. This can be explained by the shorter contract term. Neighboring wells should not adjust long-run expectations of neighboring pumping based on the entrance into this temporary program. + +\FloatBarrier +\begin{figure} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{CLOSE_FAL_EVENT_STUDY.pdf} + \caption{Fallow program neighbor well event study} + \label{FIG:FALPROGNEAR} +\end{figure} +\FloatBarrier diff --git a/Sections/A_Policies_CI.tex b/Sections/A_Policies_CI.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..754da43 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/A_Policies_CI.tex @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +\begin{landscape} +\section{Total Policy Estimates} +\label{A:CI_TBL} +The results of \cref{RESTBL} are provided in \cref{RESTBLCI} with the inclusion of 95\% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals provide context for the sensitivity of the policy conservation outcomes, but they are reported separately to improve legibility. +\input{Tables/Policy_Estimates_CI.tex} +\end{landscape} + diff --git a/Sections/Abstract.tex b/Sections/Abstract.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99a9ad0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/Abstract.tex @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +\begin{abstract} + Previous studies of groundwater management through fallowing have focused on isolated effects and single fallowing contract types. We identify fallow spillover effects that adjust expected property right surety along with policy interactions at the local and federal level. We focus on the application of federal fallowing incentives (CREP) for farmers in San Luis Valley, Colorado. Farmers in this environmentally sensitive region had previously self-organized to impose pumping fees that curb pumping and reduce externalities. These pumping fees are found to be highly effective in groundwater consumption but also dampen the effect of CREP. Farmers with the largest response to the subdistrict policies are found to self-select into the CREP program. Consequently, CREP conserves 33.4\% less water while program costs rise by 46.7\%. Changes to spillover effects for neighboring wells due to long-run expectations are estimated by leveraging variations in fallow contract length. Neighbors are found to reduce pumping rates the most if wells are permanently retired, with only one-fourth the reductions for wells with a 15-year contract, and insignificant increases in pumping when fallowing a four-year term. +\end{abstract} diff --git a/Sections/Data.tex b/Sections/Data.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa0c85b --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/Data.tex @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\section{Data} +The data used in the empirical analysis come primarily from \ac{CDSS}, through the HydroBase \ac{API} tools. This dataset is provided by the Colorado Division of Natural Resources and includes well attributes and pumping records, as available. \ac{SLV} wells were required by law to install pump monitors starting in 2009. This means that the pumping records for each well in the \ac{SLV} is available with two years of pre-pumping fee data available. Irrigated crop parcels are provided in geospatial files as part of this system, as well as \ac{CSV} files with the attributes of those parcels. The crop parcel is not a spatially fixed unit. Instead, it is defined as a contiguous piece of land using a unique crop type and irrigation technology combination in a given year\footnote{For example, if a particular legal parcel grows alfalfa on one half of the field and small grains in another the data set includes two different parcels for that year. If the legal parcel switches from flooding to sprinklers the next year, this too creates new crop parcel entries.}. However, wells are linked to crop parcels so the crop choice of wells can be assessed. There is some error in these estimates since the percentage of water applied to each crop is assumed to equal the crop distribution of the parcel. + +Geospatial data is used to generate a distance matrix between each well, this is used to identify the distance of wells from those that serve parcels enrolled in \ac{CREP}. Maps of the \ac{SLV} were used to manually create geospatial shape files of the subdistrict boundaries. Overlaying this layer with the map of wells allows the subdistrict wells to be identified. The distance is used as a cutoff radius for determining if a well is a neighbor to \ac{CREP}, which is determined by the geology of the \ac{SLV}. \cref{FIG:MAP} provides a visual summary of the distances from \ac{CREP} calculated for each well. + +%\FloatBarrier% +\begin{figure} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=0.85\textwidth]{CREP_DIS_MAP} + \caption{Distance of wells from an enrolled \ac{CREP} well} + \label{FIG:MAP} +\end{figure} +%\FloatBarrier% + + A one-half mile distance was selected for the primary results. Previous analysis in Kansas had used a larger radius of two miles based on local geologic conditions \citep{rouhirad2021}. Using such a large distance is not feasible in the \ac{SLV} since nearly all subdistrict wells are within a two-mile radius. This could lead to downward bias in the neighborhood policy estimates since some of the \ac{CREP} spillover will be attributed to the general \ac{SBD1} effect. Mitigating this is the lower permeability and separate closed basin of the \ac{SLV}. Furthermore, any neighborhood effect should be strongest closer to the well. A robustness check running neighborhood effects at each considered radius is provided in appendix \cref{A:RAD}. + +%\FloatBarrier + + +A list of wells tied to farms enrolled in \ac{CREP} is provided by the subdistrict, and the unique groundwater ID are used to link them with pumping data \citep{sbd12023}. The unit of investigation is the well, so well level fixed effects are included to remove confounding factors. In order to observe any potential selection issues, summary statistics for wells were acquired by linking permits in the \ac{CDSS} system to wells. These statistics are provided in \cref{SUMSTAT}. + +%\FloatBarrier +\input{Tables/Summary_Stats_Wells.tex} +\FloatBarrier + +Upon comparison, many attributes in \ac{CREP} and subdistrict wells are in the same range. The largest discrepancy is in the pumping rate, which is found by testing the capacity of the well. These tests are not uniform and can occur anywhere from before completion to months after operation. This contributes to the large standard deviation in the \ac{CREP} group. This may suggest that wells with higher operating costs were entered into \ac{CREP} before more productive wells. + +Comparing subdistrict wells to other control wells suggests that the control group uses older and deeper wells, with larger production zones. This could create concerns that the control can respond asymmetrically upwards compared to the smaller subdistrict wells. However, due to the policy change bringing wells within the prior appropriations system, the legal well permits tend to create the pumping ceiling and not the maximum pumping rate. While there is still some potential for error, well level fixed effects will remove the effect of this capacity difference on the average, and such errors likely only occur in years with extremely high pumping rates. diff --git a/Sections/Results.tex b/Sections/Results.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..427e9f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/Results.tex @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ + +\section{Results} + +We cover the results sequentially in time, first estimating the response of \ac{CREP} wells to the pumping fee that begins in 2011 in \cref{SEC2011} then estimating the water reductions of \ac{CREP} in \cref{SECCREP}. + +\subsection{2011 Pumping Fee and Subdistrict Policies} +\label{SEC2011} +The results of the \ac{DID} for the pumping rate effect in 2011 are provided in \cref{REG2011}. These results provide strong statistical evidence that wells which eventually enroll in \ac{CREP} have a heightened response to the pumping fee. On average, wells in the subdistrict reduce output by 30.9 \ac{AF} per year while wells in \ac{CREP} reduce groundwater use by 62.0 \ac{AF} per year, more than double that of other wells. +\newpage +\input{Tables/REG2011.tex} + +Given the safeguards intended to prevent entry by farmland with low levels of water use, it is worth discussing how the \ac{CREP} wells could have lower levels of water use than other subdistrict wells. To be able to enter \ac{CREP} at least one-half \ac{AF} must be applied to the cropland for four out of the six years from 2008 until 2013. The pumping fee was \$45 per \ac{AF} in 2011 and raised to \$75 in 2012. This means that pumping choices optimized with the \$75 fee were only made for two of the six years. Each groundwater user faced higher cost for those two years, but conservation effort benefits and cost can vary across groundwater users due to aquifer, well, and land characteristics \citep{manning2019,rouhirad2020,guilfoos2013,ekpe2021}. Wells that became sub-economic to operate due to the higher pumping fee in 2012 can still be enrolled in \ac{CREP} since, prior to this, they pumped more than the average. According to the policy criteria, these wells are eligible for enrollment even though there is a reasonable expectation that the reduction in water use is a permanent shift caused by new pumping costs. + +The effectiveness of the pumping fee interacts with the \ac{CREP} effect, significantly reducing the net gains of the program. Taking the assumption that each \ac{CREP} well would have ended up under the same steady state water use, with or without the subdistrict policies, then the 62.0 \ac{AF} per year reduction is lost from the \ac{CREP} program. This assumption is within reason, the \ac{CREP} program requires the land be managed in a particular way, only allowing cover crop to be planted. The water required to maintain this type of fallowing is independent of historic pumping rates, so each \ac{CREP} well will reach the same final steady state. + +Past research has identified pumping fees as being a more cost-efficient way to manage water than paying farmers to fallow \citep{rosenberg2020,hendricks2012}. This is a unique case where the water savings identified from \ac{CREP} enrollment can be estimated while a pumping fee is in place. It is in fact the effectiveness of the pumping fee that lowers the effectiveness of \ac{CREP}. If subdistrict wells had not responded to the pumping fee through significant reductions, then the \ac{CREP} program would have a large direct effect on conservation. This highlights the need for policymakers to not only consider the well-established benefits of conservation programs, but to include a broader policy overlap. + +These results also highlight the risk of overestimating policy gains by applying historic trends to the enrolled wells. In this case, there was a clear natural experiment where a policy shift created a sudden and widespread change in pumping costs. This makes the selection effect easy to identify empirically. However, this selection effect can be present even without a policy change. Whenever there are unobservable local cost changes then farms that were already on a trajectory to reduce water are more likely to enter the program. Any number of scenarios could arise that cause this local variation in costs. Opportunity costs may rise due to changes in input prices or alternative uses of land. Factors such as urbanization, soil quality, and changes to water stock have been found to significantly affect the enrollment into \ac{CREP} and \ac{CRP} \citep{parks1997,suter2008}. These factors can change at a farm level and on a yearly level. Farms that face higher production costs within two years of the program's start are more likely to enroll into \ac{CREP}, all else equal. In other settings there has been evidence of \ac{CREP} wells lowering water output before enrollment takes place \citep{rosenberg2020}. While these are much milder reduction than is seen in the \ac{SLV}, this farm level selection effect could explain the declines. + +Another policy factor worth considering is that the \ac{CREP} program does benefit farmers who face extreme adversity due to pumping costs. Even though the pumping fee is effective at reducing water use, there are uneven distributions of costs and equity concerns \citep{grabenstein2022,ekpe2021}. The selection effect found also means that farms bearing the highest cost of water reduction receive some compensation. The \ac{CREP} program allows for an off-ramp from farming that lets farm owners receive compensation for foregone returns. It would be difficult to craft a payment scheme that can equitably distribute funds based on the costs of the pumping fee. Self-reporting would lead to overestimation of damages, and paying farmers based on the fee paid would undo the fee. Farmers who enter \ac{CREP} must give up producing the land, and so the revealed preferences indicate that they were more affected by the program than other subdistrict users. Since they must fallow the land to enter \ac{CREP}, this compensation does not undo the pumping fee effects on groundwater extraction. While not a stated goal of \ac{CREP}, the compensation of farmers in this manner can even out the costs of the water reduction program. + +\subsection{CREP Effects} +\label{SECCREP} + +Turning to the effects of the \ac{CREP} program, the estimates from \cref{EQ:SUNAB} are provided in \cref{REGCREP}, with yearly estimates provided graphically in \cref{FIG:EVENTCREP} and \cref{FIG:EVENTNEAR}\footnote{Regression results used to create these figures are provided in \cref{A_CREP_ALL_REG}.}. +\input{Tables/REG_CREP.tex} +The \ac{ATT} of wells that enroll in \ac{CREP} is a reduction of 38.7 \ac{AF} per year. This implies that only 38.4\% of the total well reductions are attributable to entering \ac{CREP}, with the other 61.6\% of reductions attributable to the subdistrict policies. \cref{FIG:EVENTCREP} presents the results as a response across time. There is an immediate reduction of groundwater use of 10 \ac{AF} in year one, but the major reductions do not occur until the second year of the program. Much of the initial program costs are subsidized through the \ac{FSA}, including the cost of planting new native crop cover. This one-year delay reflects the higher necessary water use as farmers are transferred to sustainable fallowing practices. The overall policy response remains large but does drift over time. + + +This can be explained in a few ways. First, as the subdistrict increases conservation efforts the difference between the subdistrict wells and the \ac{CREP} wells decreases. If the State of Colorado shut down all wells not enrolled in \ac{CREP} then the program would actually increase groundwater use, as \ac{CREP} wells can still apply small amounts of water to maintain crop cover. A second possibility is that farmers in \ac{CREP} are reallocating groundwater over time. While the rights must be retired on the field, adjacent fields may apply the groundwater from the \ac{CREP} wells to meet their appropriated water volume. We do not distinguish between these possibilities, but in either case the volume of water from the \ac{CREP} wells is maintained well below the counterfactual with the net volume of water dropping by over 95\% of historic levels. + +\begin{figure} + \includegraphics[width=0.95\textwidth]{Figures/CREP_EVENT_STUDY.pdf} + \caption{Event study of \ac{CREP} wells} + \label{FIG:EVENTCREP} +\end{figure} + +Similar to \cite{rouhirad2021} evaluating \ac{CREP} in Kansas, we are able to identify a policy effect of \ac{CREP} causing neighboring wells to reduce output of pumping. The estimate of a reduction of 2.79 \ac{AF} per year equates to a 3\% reduction in water use of affected wells\footnote{Assuming the yearly average neighbor pumping rate of 92 \ac{AF} per year.}, with a total effect of 3,928 \ac{AF} per year. This compares with the direct \ac{CREP} effect on 5,960 \ac{AF} per year and 40\% of the overall reduction in groundwater pumping come from the spillover effects. + +However, this estimate is an average over the entire \ac{CREP} program, but there is a dynamic component to the reduction outcome. \cref{FIG:EVENTNEAR} presents the neighborhood effects as an event study with adjustments in policy effects over time. Just as in the Kansas \ac{CREP} program, there is a clear decay of \ac{CREP} response with the estimate being statistically insignificant from zero after five years. + +\begin{figure} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=0.95\textwidth]{Figures/CLOSE_CREP_EVENT_STUDY.pdf} + \caption{Event study of neighboring \ac{CREP} wells} + \label{FIG:EVENTNEAR} +\end{figure} + +The direction of the effect on neighboring well pumping is not knowable a priori. \ac{CREP} retirements lead to higher water table levels, which in turn reduces pumping costs and creates an incentive to pump more water. This \emph{rebound effect} has been explored in groundwater settings and could cause the \ac{CREP} fallowing to increase the pumping rate of neighbors \citep{jevons1865,pfeiffer2014}. + +Working in the other direction, lowering extraction pressure on a common-pool resource allows the remaining users to manage a large share of the resource, encouraging a Nash equilibrium with jointly lower extraction rates \citep{negri1989,provencher1993,libecap1984}. Another mechanism for lowered neighborhood groundwater use is social norms and ground up informal rule enforcement, leading to a cooperative equilibrium \citep{edwards2021,smith2018,javaid2015,ostrom1989}. The results in \cref{REGCREP} show that neighbors respond in-kind, lowering groundwater use after nearby \ac{CREP} wells stop pumping. This is evidence that the social norms, and cooperative equilibriums dominate these outcomes. However, these pro-social effects interact with the opportunity cost of pumping more water when pumping costs decrease. The decline in neighbor well response as seen in the event study is explained by the increasing opportunity cost of pumping. As the water table rises due to both \ac{CREP} and neighbor wells reduction in pumping, the financial benefit of pumping rises. This leads to users increasing pumping rates on the margin, even if not back to pre-\ac{CREP} levels. This interplay of incentives explains both the initial large decline in well usage and the gradual rebound. + +\subsection{CREP Self-Selection} +Next, the effect of the \ac{SBD1} pumping fee on enrollment numbers in \ac{CREP} is explored. By changing the incentives to farm, the pumping fee can induce additional enrollment in the program. The findings in \cref{SEC2011} and \cref{SECCREP} show that water conservation of each well enrolled in \ac{CREP} is 62\% less due to the prior reductions made to manage costs under the pumping fee. This is only one part of the overall effect of the pumping fee. Since the pumping fee increased fallowing in marginally economic farms, the pumping fee reduces the payment threshold needed to make a \ac{CREP} contract a viable alternative to farming. Farmers decide to enroll land into \ac{CREP} if the opportunity cost of farming is lower than the \ac{PES} amount. By increasing the cost of operating a farm, the fee can lower this opportunity cost, causing some farms to enter \ac{CREP} that would otherwise continue farming. On the other hand, the pumping fee can improve the profitability of farming by controlling externalities. Informed by the pumping statistics, it is argued that reduced water use correlates to reduced farm production and gross revenue. Reducing water as an input to crops means that fewer crops are grown, or less water intensive crops have been substituted. However, the total reduction due to the policy provides an estimate of relative value of water as an input, compared to the externality cost of pumping. Wells that reduce pumping less than the average are able to use an \ac{AF} of water to produce more profit than the typical well. The reduction of water applied after the pumping fee begins can be used to rank the relative costs of the fee to farms. While water intensive farmland that does not shift water faces higher operating costs, these farms are not near the margin where a \ac{CREP} fee could induce fallowing. For other farms, a large response suggested the fee added a higher cost relative to farm productivity. + +To predict the shift in \ac{CREP} enrollment due to the pumping fee, the reduction of groundwater extraction by a well after the pumping fee begins is used in a probit model. For each well, the average volume of water pumped between 2011 and 2013 is subtracted from the average water extracted in 2009 and 2010. This coefficient indicates if a strong response to the pumping fee drives membership into \ac{CREP}. Ditch fixed effect controls are included to capture the effect of access to surface water, and crop choice variables control for land quality. Crop choices are an indication of the water intensity required to optimize profits prior to the pumping fee implementation, and of soil characteristics. The water rights of wells are included, as possessing more water rights increases the value of a well. Wells providing water to marginally profitable cropland are expected to disproportionately enroll in \ac{CREP}, so water rights can reduce \ac{CREP} entrance. A probit model of \ac{CREP} enrollment is developed in \cref{REG:SELECT_PROBIT}. + +\input{Tables/Probit_mod2.tex} + +The direction of each coefficient matches expectations. A larger reduction in water extraction after 2011 makes a well more likely to enter \ac{CREP}. While overall pumping rate after the fee is implemented makes a well less likely to join \ac{CREP}, as shown in model two of \cref{REG:SELECT_PROBIT}. Ownership of water rights is found to decrease the probability of a well joining \ac{CREP}. This variable captures both the effect of access to water rights and well capacity. Data was collected on well pumping tests, but it was not included because the well yield was nearly collinear with water rights. Since water rights are based on historic use, high water rights are strongly correlated with the capacity of wells. Compared to small wells, large wells with more access to water rights are more efficiently employed in areas with high crop density, have lower marginal operating costs, and provide farmers with a stronger legal claim to continue pumping in times of drought. Each of these factors make a well less likely to be a marginal producer that will join \ac{CREP} independent of the pumping fee rate. Similarly, deep wells are less impacted by declines in the water table and correlate to higher capital investment. + +The percentage of cropland applied to potatoes prior to the subdistrict formation is also found to significantly decrease the probability of a well entering \ac{CREP}. The excluded fixed effect in the model is \emph{small grains} which is primarily barley within \ac{SBD1}. Compared to small grains, potatoes are drought intolerant and require a more precise soil mineral content \citep{rosen2021}. Furthermore, \ac{SLV} is a major producer of potatoes accounting for 90\% of all potatoes produced in Colorado \citep{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2019a}. In 2011, the year the pumping fee began, average gross revenues per acre in the \ac{SLV} were \$4,165 for potatoes\footnote{Assuming a yield of \(\frac{375 cut}{Acre}\) \citep{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2019a} and a price of \$9.2 per cut \citep{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2013}.} and \$2,943 for barley\footnote{Assuming 115 \(\frac{Bushels}{Acre}\) \citep{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2012} at a price of \$25.59 per bushel \citep{internationalmonetaryfund2024}.}. Because there is a higher potential profit per acre of potatoes, higher quality parcels are more likely to grow these crops. While the profitability of small grain farmers and potato farms cannot be compared based on revenues alone, farmland with the lowest operating costs are best used for growing high yield crops. Small grains can be grown where potatoes are planted, but the reverse is not true. The fact that potatoes are selected as a crop indicates that the soil is amenable to producing the higher net value crop. In turn, potato farms are less likely to enter \ac{CREP}. + +One of the drivers of this selection effect can be demonstrated using the results from Chapter I. The hedonic model of farmland identifies that crop choice is predictive of the value of land. As the cost of operating a well increases with respect to the pumping fee sequentially higher yield land is taken out of production. Further diseconomies of scale are identified so small segments of large plots tend to be retired before small parcels. + +Using the hedonic model each farm parcel in \ac{SBD1} is assigned a per acre land value. The retirement path of crop land in \ac{SBD1} is assessed by removing the lowest marginal parcel from the production in five acre increments. Once a segment of land is removed the marginal value of the remaining land in the parcel increases. The removal of five acre plots is repeated until all land is dropped from production. This is used to present a plausible retirement path of land, showing how the mix of crop changes along this path in \cref{FIG:FEE_CHNG}. +\begin{figure} + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figures/IRR_ACRES_EST_CHNG.pdf} + \caption{Expected retirements from pumping fees} + \label{FIG:FEE_CHNG} +\end{figure} +As more land is retired, the ratio of water-intensive potatoes changes relative to other crops. A heuristic for assessing the pumping fee is to assume that the inflection point of the least valuable land is the average operating cost of growing the crop. Applying this, the effect on crop mix and active farmland can be estimated using the average price of water applied to each acre of land. The vertical lines in \cref{FIG:FEE_CHNG} represent the average cost addition from the respective fee from the point of marginally profitable farms. The pumping fee retires higher rates of small grain and alfalfa, and these plots are enrolled in \ac{CREP} as the payments to fallow are now higher than the expected returns from irrigating the land. + + +Due to this observed selection effect there is likely spatial clustering of \ac{CREP} wells that changes the total neighborhood pumping effect. Using the predicted change in groundwater use from \cref{REG2011}, the probit model is estimated under the counterfactual that pumping rates do not change after 2011. The expected number of wells enrolled in \ac{CREP} decreases by 26.07\%, from 154 to 122 wells. The \ac{SBD1} pumping fee induces enrollment into the \ac{CREP}, thereby increasing total water savings. Combining the effect of reduced per well savings and the increase in enrollment, the overall \ac{CREP} water savings are estimated to be 32\% lower than the counterfactual. Compared to the counterfactual, 29.5\% more wells are added to the program. While conservation is increased by this inducement effect the program costs rise by the number of wells added because of the fee, while net conservation is lower. + +From the findings in \cref{FIG:EVENTNEAR}, the addition of new wells in \ac{CREP} can create additional neighborhood spillover effects worth considering in the overall policy effectiveness. The addition of 32 new wells in the program provides additional neighborhood effects, but this adjustment changes in a nonlinear way. Two factors contribute to the non-linearity. First, \ac{CREP} wells are not randomly distributed across the subdistrict. For example, potato farmers are less likely to join \ac{CREP}, and land that is ideal for growing potatoes is more alkaline than alfalfa. It follows that CREP enrollment is affected by soil acidity which leads to spatial clustering. Second, even if \ac{CREP} was perfectly random across the subdistrict then the number of untreated wells (farther than a half mile from \ac{CREP}) declines with \ac{CREP} enrollment. On one extreme, if every well in the subdistrict was adjacent to a \ac{CREP} well, adding one more well to \ac{CREP} will not change the number of wells near a well enrolled in fallowing. This means there is a declining marginal spillover effects across \ac{CREP} enrollment. The first well enrolled induces more spillover effect than the final well. + +Because the effect depends on regional attributes, and previous enrollment level, the coefficient cannot be applied to estimate this indirect effect. Instead, a Monte Carlo simulation was run using the probit results. For this process, each \ac{CREP} well is randomly assigned a value between zero and one. Then, the predicted probability of each well being in \ac{CREP} is estimated using the results from \cref{REG:SELECT_PROBIT}. This probability is subtracted by the randomly generated number, and then wells are ranked from largest to smallest. For the baseline results, 32 wells are removed from the sample. Then a distance matrix between the wells is used to calculate the counterfactual number of nearby wells. This is repeated 10,000 times to acquire the expected marginal effect on the number of neighboring wells due to the pumping fee inducement of 32 additional \ac{CREP} wells. This leads to an estimate of a 3.27\% increase in the number of wells nearby \ac{CREP}. These results demonstrate the importance of accounting for local characteristics when estimating spillover effects from a \ac{PES} program. Due to the clustering of wells likely to join \ac{CREP}, the 29.5\% increase in enrollment leads to only a minor change in spillover estimates. A policy implication is that the payment for enrollment should vary based on current enrollment. When accounting for spillover effects, the addition of a unit in a \ac{PES} program with many neighbors is more valuable than an addition near other program participants. + +To gain a better idea of how the nearby effects evolve with enrollment, the Monte Carlo is repeated assuming different starting enrollment levels of \ac{CREP}. This process is displayed in \cref{FIG:BOX} as a box plot. As enrollment increases, the rate of change of the number of added neighboring wells declines. If \ac{SBD1} had different characteristics, and was expected to have low enrollment absent intervention, the pumping fee would have had a more significant spillover effect than is estimated. For example, if only 14 wells were expected to enroll in \ac{CREP} prior to the pumping fee, the same addition of 32 wells would increase the number of neighboring wells by over 200. However, the actual addition of 32 wells is expected to add only 40 neighboring wells. + + +\begin{figure}[!htp] + \includegraphics[width=0.95\textwidth]{Figures/BOX_PLOT.pdf} + \caption{Number of wells within a half mile of \ac{CREP} based on total enrollment} + \label{FIG:BOX} +\end{figure} + +\cref{FIG:BOX} also demonstrates that the variance of outcomes is dependent on the number of enrolled wells. The general trend is for the spread of outcomes to converge as \ac{CREP} wells are added. However, low enrollment rates have less variance in outcome than moderate enrollment. When enrollment rates are low, any new addition is likely to pick up some new neighbors. As enrollment increases there is a higher chance that new additions to the program will be near existing \ac{CREP} wells, creating a downwards outlier. However, as enrollment becomes high, it becomes unlikely that a new addition will add any new wells creating a consistent set of outcomes. This evolution of variance is tracked through the box plot whiskers. + +These results are compared to a counterfactual of random enrollment in \ac{CREP} shown in \cref{FIG:BOX_RAND}. This counterfactual presents the expected number of wells that would receive a neighborhood spillover effect from \ac{CREP} if wells were not enrolled in the program based on physical characteristics, or response to the pumping fee but instead were randomly enrolled. This removes the spatial clustering of \ac{CREP} wells increasing the total treatment effect. Compared to a random selection process, the spatial clustering of enrollment minimizes the conservation induced by neighborhood effects. +\begin{figure}[!htp] + \includegraphics[width=0.95\textwidth]{Figures/BOX_PLOT_WITH_RANDOM.pdf} + \caption{Number of wells within a half mile of \ac{CREP} when randomly enrolled} + \label{FIG:BOX_RAND} +\end{figure} + + +\subsection{Contract Length} +Finally, the effect of varying the length of \ac{CREP} fallowing contracts is estimated. For neighboring wells, the extractive equilibrium may change along the margin of contract length. Of importance for policymakers, changing the terms of the contract will change which farmland is brought into the program. Adjusting the contract length is one way to home in on the most cost-effective allocation of \ac{CREP} payments. \cref{MAINREGTBL} presents the results of estimating \cref{EQ:SUNAB} for wells tied to land that is entered into a permanent contract, a 15-year \ac{CREP} contract, or a 4-year subdistrict fallowing contract. This is estimated for both the direct effect on wells in the retirement program and for neighboring wells within one-half mile. +\input{Tables/REG_ALL.tex} +The direct effect of fallowing programs is to reduce groundwater extraction in associated wells. However, the permanently retired contracts are linked to wells with much lower reduction in pumping rates than the shorter 15-year and 4-year terms. This is driven primarily by the well's fixed effects which have different means in each group. Prior to 2011, the average yearly extraction rate was 64.9 \ac{AF} for wells that enroll in the permanent contract, 175 \ac{AF} for wells enrolled in the temporary contract, and 133 \ac{AF} for wells that enroll in the 4-year program. This integrates with the \ac{CREP} literature in multiple areas. First, the short-term contracts do attract wells with a higher-than-expected pumping rate based on entry requirements, as has been found in other settings \citep{rosenberg2020}. However, the permanently retired wells have a pre-policy extraction rate much lower than the average. In survey settings a preference for short-term conservation contracts were found that go beyond expected time value of money considerations \citep{yeboah2015}. Theoretical models of \ac{CREP} incentives conclude that abatement costs increase when irreversibility is added to the \ac{CREP} terms \citep{yang2004}. The present analysis provides empirical justification that long-term contracts induce entrance by users that differ in economic incentives from those that enter short-term contracts. The fully irreversible contract was only entered into by farms that relied on wells with low productivity. + +This result is intuitive given the options available to farmers. There are long-run uncertainties about crop prices, input prices and legal threats. Fields that use large amounts of groundwater to grow crops have a disproportionately large added cost due to the pumping fees. However, such wells also have a larger uncertainty cost of being retired. If prices for crops which require a large volume of water\footnote{Such as potatoes.} rise, then profits of these fields will also increase. Under these uncertainties, permanent land retirement bears a larger cost to high-rate wells. In the short run the cost structure is more well known, and the risk of foregone profits is lower than over the long run. It is not a surprise then that the \ac{CREP} fee can induce large wells to enter into the short-term contracts when faced with higher water extraction costs, but not to enter into contracts that eliminate the option of ever restarting production. The irreversibility of the permanent contract matters more to farms that could foreseeably begin producing water rich crops in the future. + +The contract length may also affect the response of neighbor wells, although these results are less robust than the direct effects. The estimated water savings decrease along the margin of contract length. This is consistent with the theory that well neighbors optimize based on the expected game theoretic outcomes. If a field is permanently retired, neighbors can be assured that there will not be a rebound effect when the well enters back into production. More of the common-pool resource is captured by the remaining neighbor wells and a lower pumping rate equilibrium is achievable. In the short-term contracts of four years, neighboring well owners cannot rely on rules of \ac{CREP} to ensure a long-term non-prisoner dilemma outcome. The rebound effect may dominate at these shorter contract lengths since the higher water table provides an incentive to pump now, and nearby wells expect the tragedy of the commons equilibrium state to return once the well enters production. However, it should be noted that the results of the 15 and 4-year contract neighborhood effects are not robust to changes in the model specification\footnote{The 15-year contract has signs of pretend that suggest there could be a larger neighbor effect when including a year anticipation term.}\textsuperscript{, }\footnote{The four-year contract has noisy residuals that are sensitive to the number of lags the policy starts at. There are only two years of data for this contract type, so it is safer to say that there is no evidence of neighborhood pumping declines than to suggest the positive coefficient is definitive.}. diff --git a/Sections/Strategy.tex b/Sections/Strategy.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cf4502 --- /dev/null +++ b/Sections/Strategy.tex @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +\section{Strategy} + +\subsection{Pumping Fee and Subdistrict Policies} +To assess the outcome of the subdistrict's water conservation efforts, a \ac{DID} applying well fixed effects is employed. In this model, wells that join \ac{CREP} are treated as having a different response to the subdistrict policies than other wells in \ac{SBD1}. The \Ac{SBD1} policy interactions with the \ac{CREP} payments are of interest. Heterogeneous response to the pumping fee has been identified in the subdistrict \citep{ekpe2021}, this could change the effectiveness of \ac{CREP}. If the wells that enter \ac{CREP} faced the highest cost from the pumping fee, they may have already reduced water use prior to entering \ac{CREP}. In one extreme, if the pumping fee already induced the \ac{CREP} wells to shut off then the \ac{CREP} program will not reduce the water use of wells. In such a case, the program would provide welfare recovery to disproportionately affected farmers but would not directly assist in conservation efforts. Through a rebound effect, it is possible that \ac{CREP} wells will pump more than their counterpart subdistrict wells. The model estimates the \ac{ATE} of the pumping fee and other policies on both \ac{CREP} and subdistrict wells. This is expressed as a \ac{DID} model in \cref{EQ:2011DID}. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:2011DID} + Y_{w,t}=\alpha+\phi_{w}+\eta_{t}+\omega_{d,t}(w)+\gamma_{s,t}(w)+Sbd1 \cdot Post+CREP\cdot Post+\epsilon_{w,t} +\end{equation} +The dependent variable \(Y_{w,t}\) is the volume of water pumped in acre-feet for a well \emph{w} in year \emph{t}. The dummy variable \emph{Sbd1} is one if a well is in \ac{SBD1} and zero otherwise. The dummy variable \emph{CREP} is one if a well has ever been enrolled in \ac{CREP} and zero otherwise. All wells in \ac{CREP} are also in \ac{SBD1}, so the \emph{Sbd1} coefficient is one for all wells where \emph{CREP} is one. The dummy variable \emph{Post} is zero before 2011 and is one from 2011 forward. The interaction between \emph{Sbd1} and \emph{CREP} with \emph{Post} are the estimates of note. This interaction captures the average effect of \ac{SBD1} policies on wells and the \emph{CREP} interaction expresses any heterogeneous impact on \ac{CREP} wells. If \ac{CREP} wells behave similarly to other wells in the subdistrict, then the \emph{CREP} and \emph{Post} interaction will be statistically insignificant from zero, otherwise there is evidence that \ac{CREP} wells were affected differently. + +Fixed effects include \(\phi_{w}\) well, \(\eta_{t}\) year, \(\omega_{d,t}\) ditch-year, and \(\gamma_{s,t}\) subdistrict-year. The suite of fixed effects used removes much of the potentially omitted variable bias by controlling for time and space fixed attributes. The well's fixed effect absorbs any time invariant attributes, such as capacity, well appropriation date, and perforation depth. Importantly, they also remove unobserved spatial components such as permeability or local geologic features. The year fixed effects account for variations that affect all \ac{SLV} farmers. These include crop prices, changes in local non-water input prices, federal and state policies, and generalized rainfall. Subdistrict-year effects further capture variations in individual subdistrict policies. All six subdistricts began employing water reduction policies during the explored time periods, this fixed effect captures such changes without explicit controls for pumping fee rate changes. Finally, the ditch year effects incorporate surface water access changes that impact certain users. Based on the interaction of the yearly snow runoff levels with ditch priority, ditch users will have variations in the accessibility of surface water in a given year. This is true even when accounting for yearly average snowmelt and precipitation captured in the year fixed effect. This ditch interaction accounts for this and other ditch time-varying factors affecting demand for groundwater. + +The yearly subdistrict policy effects are presented with an event study design to highlight the yearly changes in the policy suite. The changes to the pumping fee and the addition of other conservation policies suggest that the treatment effect will vary over time. \Cref{EQ:2011DID} is rewritten as an event study in \Cref{EQ:2011EVENT}. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:2011EVENT} + Y_{w,t}=\alpha+\phi_{w}+\eta_{t}+\omega_{d,t}+\gamma_{s,t}+\sum_{t\not=2010}\left(\beta_{t}\cdot\rho_{w,t}\right)\left[Sbd1+CREP\right]+\epsilon_{w,t} +\end{equation} + +Where \(\rho_{w,t}\) is an indicator variable for a well \emph{w} being in year \emph{t}. We refer to the estimates as representing the subdistrict policies in general since there are many policy changes occurring simultaneously. The pumping fee is the spearhead policy, but the investment in well purchases, land expansion, and short-term fallowing all contribute to the subdistrict effect. + +\subsection{CREP Choice} +The decision of farmers to enroll their land in \ac{CREP} is treated as a simple comparison between the option values of the land. With land being enrolled if the condition in \cref{EQ:CREPCHOICE} is met. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:CREPCHOICE} + \theta_{0}+\sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{\theta_{CREP,t}\cdot A_{i}}{\left(r+1\right)^{t}} \ge \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{P_{\gamma}\cdot \gamma_{t}\cdot Q_{t,i}-C_{t,i}}{\left(r+1\right)^{t}} +\end{equation} +\(\theta_{0}\) being the initial sign up bonus payment per acre of \ac{CREP}, \emph{T} is the length of a \ac{CREP} contract, \(\theta_{CREP,t}\) is the yearly payment rate per acre, \(A_{i}\) is the area enrolled in \ac{CREP}, \(\gamma_{t}\) is the crop mix grown in a given year, \(P_{\gamma}\) is the weighted average price of the crop mix, \(C_{t,i}\) is the cost to operate the parcel, and \emph{r} is the discount rate. + +It follows from this model that the choice to enroll in \ac{CREP} depends on the relative attributes of soil. These attributes affect the crop choice \(\gamma_{t}\) and total yield \(Q_{t,i}\). In the probit model of \ac{CREP} selection, pre-policy crop choice is included to account for these parcel quality characteristics. The pumping fee affects the cost of operating \(C_{t,i}\), the magnitude of water reductions from the fee is used to capture the relative cost increase from the pumping fee. +\subsection{CREP and Spillover Effects} +The possibility of time varying heterogeneous group treatment effects should be considered when selecting an empirical strategy for evaluating the effects of \ac{CREP}. Since \ac{CREP} has staggered treatment periods, using treatment lags will bias the regression unless the cohort responses are identical, and there is no pre-trend \citep{sun2021,callaway2021,borusyak2021,goodman-bacon2021,dechaisemartin2020,gardner2022}. The complex nature of the policy implementations of \ac{SBD1} make this a potential issue. Ideally, if the \ac{CREP} participants were drawn randomly then such confounding interactions would be avoided \citep{athey2022}. This is unlikely to be the case since farmers can opt into the \ac{CREP} program, and the period farmers enter \ac{CREP} is contingent on subdistrict policies. \cref{FIG:CREP_GROUP_CHNG} groups wells that entered \ac{CREP} (treated wells) by the start of the \ac{CREP} contract year. The average pumping rate of these wells is calculated from 2009-2010, the range where no subdistrict policies had been implemented. If there are no group selection effects then the outcome variable (pumping) should be consistent prior to any treatment. + +\FloatBarrier +\begingroup +\begin{figure}[h] + \centering + \includegraphics[width=.8\textwidth]{CREP_GROUP_TRENDS.jpeg} + \caption{Pre-2011 groundwater use of wells grouped by \ac{CREP} start year} + \label{FIG:CREP_GROUP_CHNG} + % I THINK IS A CUT/PASTE ERROR- \label{FIG:STOR} +\end{figure} +\endgroup +\FloatBarrier + +There are large variations in average pre-pumping fee groundwater extraction rates across treatment cohorts. This suggests that an assumption of homogeneous group-time treatment effects would be violated. This is plausible in this dynamic policy scenario. Wells that entered the program at the initial sign-up would include any wells that are marginally profitable under earlier conditions. These wells entered when there was a higher water table, and when the fee was anywhere from \$45-\$75 per \ac{AF}. In this first wave of sign-ups some wells would have been entered even if there was not a pumping fee, while others were induced by higher prices. The pumping fee was later raised to \$150, at about this time the average pumping rate of wells entered into \ac{CREP} increases. The marginal cost of pumping being raised provides a new set of economic signals for farmers deciding if the \ac{CREP} lump sum is worth foregoing crop production. It is not surprising that the well attributes shift with this policy. Another possibility is that farmers learn from experience about the profitability of \ac{CREP}, and this new knowledge changes the type of farmers willing to enroll. + +Given that the well attributes change over time, the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects cannot be eliminated. To correct for this, a cohort weighted regression is used that results in an \ac{ATT} outcome \citep{sun2021}. The final equation to be estimated is presented in \cref{EQ:SUNAB}, but \cref{EQ:STG1} is the first step that accounts for covariates. This estimates the \ac{CREP} cohort\footnote{The cohorts in this case are the groups of wells that start a \ac{CREP} contract in a given year, there are unique cohorts from 2014-2021} \ac{ATE}. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:STG1} + Y_{w,d,t,s}=\alpha+\phi_{w}+\eta_{t}+\omega_{d,t}+\gamma_{s,t}+\sum_{e\not= \infty} \sum_{\ell\not=-1}\delta_{\ell,e}(\theta_{w,e}\cdot \rho_{w,t}^{\ell})+\epsilon_{w,d,t,s} +\end{equation} + +Where \(\rho_{w,t}^{\ell}\) is an indicator variable for a well \emph{w} being \(\ell\) periods away from treatment in the year \emph{t}, \(e\in E \) is the treatment cohort in this case the year a well enters \ac{CREP}, \(\theta_{w,e}\) is an indicator variable that is one if a well is in the \ac{CREP} treatment cohort \emph{e}. \(\delta_{\ell,e}\) is the coefficient of interest, being the treatments effect on the cohort \emph{e} with lag \(\ell\). The reference cohort is the never treated group \(e=\infty\), and the reference lag period is one year prior to treatment \(\ell=-1\). + +Next, weights are estimated which are used to predict the \ac{ATE} of \ac{CREP} from the cohort coefficients \(\delta_{\ell,e}\). These weights are the sample shares of cohorts in each lag period, as performed in \cref{EQ:STG2}. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:STG2} + \Phi_{e,\ell}=Pr \left\{E_{w}=e\ |\ E_{w} \in \left[-\ell,T-\ell \right] \right\} +\end{equation} +\Cref{EQ:STG2} calculates the probability that the treatment cohort of a well \(E_{w}\) is in the sample of wells treated after a number of lags \(\ell\). If \(\ell=0\) then this is the probability that the cohort of the well was ever treated, and if \(\ell=-2\) then this is the probability that the cohort of the well was treated in the range of two years prior to the first treatment of any well, and at least two years before the end of the sample period. + +With these weights, the coefficients of interests can be calculated with \cref{EQ:SUNAB}. +\begin{equation} + \label{EQ:SUNAB} + \widehat{CREP\ ATT}_{g}=\frac{1}{|g|}\sum_{\ell \in g} \sum_{e}\hat{\Phi}_{e,\ell}\cdot\hat{\delta}_{\ell,e} +\end{equation} +Where \emph{g} is the set of all lags \(\ell\). The final equation estimates the \ac{ATT}, by the sum of cohort treatment effects estimated in \cref{EQ:STG1} weighted by the cohort sample share in \cref{EQ:STG2} and scaled by the number of periods in the set \(|\)\emph{g}\(|\). This provides consistent coefficient estimates under time and group varying treatment effects, as is the case for the \ac{CREP} program. + +The previous equations are written with regard to the direct effect of \ac{CREP} on wells that are in the program. However, \cref{EQ:SUNAB} is applicable to neighborhood effects of \ac{CREP}. These spillover effects that capture the neighboring well responses to hydrologic shifts, and social norms driven by \ac{CREP} also utilize this model. In such a case the first treatment period is expressed as the first year that a well was within one-half mile of a well that entered \ac{CREP}. Furthermore, all wells in \ac{CREP} are removed from the dataset to avoid attributing direct \ac{CREP} effects to spatial overlap between \ac{CREP} wells. diff --git a/Tables/CREP_Reductions.tex b/Tables/CREP_Reductions.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..690d89d --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/CREP_Reductions.tex @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +% latex table generated in R 4.3.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package +% Wed Jul 5 15:21:38 2023 +\FloatBarrier +\begin{table}[ht] +\centering +\caption{Estimated CREP reductions} +\label{CREPRED} +\begin{tabular}{lccccc} + \hline +Year & Wells in CREP & Sbd.1 Policies & CREP & Total & Well \\ + \hline +2009 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2010 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2011 & 0 & -2835 & 0 & -2835 & -18 \\ + 2012 & 0 & -11860 & 0 & -11860 & -77 \\ + 2013 & 0 & -13263 & 0 & -13263 & -86 \\ + 2014 & 33 & -11750 & -355 & -12105 & -79 \\ + 2015 & 69 & -13262 & -1695 & -14958 & -97 \\ + 2016 & 104 & -10912 & -3630 & -14542 & -94 \\ + 2017 & 108 & -10274 & -5042 & -15316 & -99 \\ + 2018 & 129 & -15512 & -5691 & -21203 & -138 \\ + 2019 & 135 & -11436 & -5873 & -17309 & -112 \\ + 2020 & 144 & -14411 & -6051 & -20461 & -133 \\ + 2021 & 154 & -2906 & -5563 & -8468 & -55 \\ + \hline +\end{tabular} +\end{table} diff --git a/Tables/NEIGHBOR_FIT.tex b/Tables/NEIGHBOR_FIT.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..120752d --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/NEIGHBOR_FIT.tex @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{lccc} + \captionsetup{justification=raggedright,singlelinecheck=false} + \caption{Affected neighbors by adding CREP wells}\label{REG:FITNEIGHBOR}\\ + % \hline + % \hline + % Dependent Variable: & AF\\ + % Model: & (1)\\ + \endfirsthead + + % At top of each page + % \multicolumn{2}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable{} continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + + % End of table block + % Col 1 & Col 2 \\ + % \hline + +% MUST BE HERE- tells macro to update name for subsequent pages + \endhead + + % At end of page when a new one will start + % \hline \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % At end of etire table + % \hline + % \multicolumn{2}{l}{ + % {End of table}} \\ \hline % |r| + % \endlastfoot + + % \tabularnewline % \midrule \midrule + + Dependent Variables: & \multicolumn{3}{c}{Number of Neighboring Wells} \\ + & Linear & Log-Linear & Log-Log \\ +Model: & (1) & (2) & (3)\\ +\midrule +\emph{Variables}\\ +Num. CREP Wells & 10.64$^{***}$& 1,133.9$^{***}$ & 1.300$^{***}$\\ + & (1.099) & (105.3) & (0.1275)\\ +Constant & -197.9 & -4,316.1$^{***}$ & 0.7465\\ + & (135.6) & (501.9) & (0.6081)\\ + +\midrule +\emph{Fit statistics}\\ +Observations & 7 & 7 & 7\\ +R$^2$ & 0.94935 & 0.95869 & 0.95412\\ +Adjusted R$^2$ & 0.93922 & 0.95043 & 0.94494\\ + + % Footnotes + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{a) IID standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{b) Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + % \tabularnewline + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{c) One-half mile radius used}}\\ + + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + % \tabularnewline + + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Note:} a) Any data entry where a CREP well was in the CREP program was dropped.} \\ + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} A CREP well that entered in 2015 has data from 2009-2014.} \\ + + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} b) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.} \\ + + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} c) Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.} \\ + + % \multicolumn{4}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} d) CREP wells are removed once in the CREP program.} \\ + +\end{longtable} +\endgroup + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/Policy_Effects.tex b/Tables/Policy_Effects.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66b2884 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Policy_Effects.tex @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begin{table}[H] + \caption{Policy responses}\label{REGPOLICYRESPONSE} +\begingroup +\centering +\begin{tabular}{lccc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{3}{c}{AF}\\ + & \textbf{2011 Policy Model} & \textbf{Direct Effect} & \textbf{Neighbor Response} \\ + Model: & (1) & (2) & (3)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + Sbd.1-Post 2011 & -30.87$^{***}$ & & \\ + & (8.477) & & \\ + In CREP-Post 2011 & -31.17$^{***}$ & & \\ + & (7.072) & & \\ + Near to CREP-Post 2011 & -5.407$^{**}$ & & \\ + & (2.218) & & \\ + CREP Effect (ATT) & & -38.70$^{***}$ & -2.788$^{**}$\\ + & & (2.905) & (1.021)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed effects}\\ + Near CREP-Post CREP & $\checkmark$ & & \\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & & \\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Year & $\checkmark$ & & \\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Year-Ditch & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Subdistrict-Year & & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP After Treatment & & & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP-Year & & & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 48,563 & 49,439 & 49,439\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74535 & 0.74748 & 0.74705\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.00271 & 0.01114 & 0.00174\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ +\end{tabular} + +\par \raggedright +In model 1, all active CREP wells are removed. So a well that enters CREP in 2014 has data from 2009-2013.\\ +A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.\\ +Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ +Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ +CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses. +\par\endgroup +\end{table} + + diff --git a/Tables/Policy_Estimates.tex b/Tables/Policy_Estimates.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..985e85c --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Policy_Estimates.tex @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +% latex table generated in R 4.3.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package +% Sat Jul 1 18:41:03 2023 +\FloatBarrier +\begin{table}[ht] +\centering +\caption{Estimated policy effects} +\label{RESTBL} +\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc} + \hline + & &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{CREP}}& &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Subdistrict One}} & \\ \cmidrule{3-5} \cmidrule{7-8} + + Year &No Policies& Direct & Spillover & Expected && Fallow & Other Policies & Total \\ + \hline + 2009 & 262016 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2010 & 302356 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2011 & 343124 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & -26854 & -26854 \\ + 2012 & 383469 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & -129790 & -129790 \\ + 2013 & 371124 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & -147182 & -147182 \\ + 2014 & 354422 & -355 & -1010 & -2047 && 0 & -120684 & -122049 \\ + 2015 & 344911 & -1695 & -2271 & -4280 && 0 & -139511 & -143477 \\ + 2016 & 324888 & -3630 & -3824 & -6452 && 0 & -84525 & -91979 \\ + 2017 & 304553 & -5042 & -4062 & -6700 && 0 & -63698 & -72802 \\ + 2018 & 411357 & -5691 & -4524 & -8002 && 0 & -145097 & -155312 \\ + 2019 & 303262 & -5873 & -3473 & -8375 && 0 & -85370 & -94715 \\ + 2020 & 349048 & -6051 & -2768 & -8933 && -460 & -102379 & -111658 \\ + 2021 & 283098 & -5563 & -3213 & -9553 && -630 & -69106 & -78512 \\ + \hline +\end{tabular} +\end{table} diff --git a/Tables/Policy_Estimates_CI.tex b/Tables/Policy_Estimates_CI.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6b57a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Policy_Estimates_CI.tex @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{lccc|ccccc|cc} + \captionsetup{justification=raggedright,singlelinecheck=false} + \caption{Estimated policy effects with confidence intervals} + \label{RESTBLCI}\\ + % \hline + % \hline + % Dependent Variable: & AF\\ + % Model: & (1)\\ + \endfirsthead + + % At top of each page + % \multicolumn{2}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable{} continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + + % End of table block + % Col 1 & Col 2 \\ + % \hline + +% MUST BE HERE- tells macro to update name for subsequent pages + \endhead + + % At end of page when a new one will start + % \hline \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % At end of etire table + % \hline + % \multicolumn{2}{l}{ + % {End of table}} \\ \hline % |r| + % \endlastfoot + + % \tabularnewline % \midrule \midrule + + \hline + & &\multicolumn{5}{c}{\textbf{CREP}}& &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Subdistrict One}} & \\ \cmidrule{3-6} \cmidrule{8-10} + Year & A.F & Direct & CI 95\% & Spillover & CI 95\% && Fallow & CI 95\% & Other Policies & Total \\ + \hline + 2009 & 262016 & 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0,0 && 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2010 & 302356 & 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0,0 && 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2011 & 343124 & 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0,0 && 0 & 0,0 & -26854 & -26854 \\ + 2012 & 383469 & 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0,0 && 0 & 0,0 & -129790 & -129790 \\ + 2013 & 371124 & 0 & 0,0 & 0 & 0,0 && 0 & 0,0 & -147182 & -147182 \\ + 2014 & 354422 & -355 & -155,-555 & -1010 & -238,-1781 && 0 & 0,0 & -120684 & -122049 \\ + 2015 & 344911 & -1695 & -1236,-2155 & -2271 & -627,-3914 && 0 & 0,0 & -139511 & -143477 \\ + 2016 & 324888 & -3630 & -2874,-4386 & -3824 & -1311,-6337 && 0 & 0,0 & -84525 & -91979 \\ + 2017 & 304553 & -5042 & -4182,-5901 & -4062 & -1209,-6915 && 0 & 0,0 & -63698 & -72802 \\ + 2018 & 411357 & -5691 & -4671,-6711 & -4524 & -1024,-8024 && 0 & 0,0 & -145097 & -155312 \\ + 2019 & 303262 & -5873 & -4810,-6936 & -3473 & 277,-7223 && 0 & 0,0 & -85370 & -94715 \\ + 2020 & 349048 & -6051 & -4903,-7198 & -2768 & 1717,-7254 && -460 & -231,-688 & -102379 & -111658 \\ + 2021 & 283098 & -5563 & -4297,-6829 & -3213 & 1814,-8239 && -630 & 335,-1596 & -69106 & -78512 \\ + \hline + +\end{longtable} +\endgroup + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/Policy_Per_Est.tex b/Tables/Policy_Per_Est.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69bbe7e --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Policy_Per_Est.tex @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +% latex table generated in R 4.3.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package +% Sat Jul 1 19:55:25 2023 +\FloatBarrier +\begin{table}[ht] +\centering +\caption{Well level intensity of reduction} +\label{PERTBL} +\begin{tabular}{lccccccc} + \hline + &\multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Subdistrict One Policy Effects} }& &\multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{CREP Policy Effects}} & \\ \cmidrule{2-4} \cmidrule{6-7} + Year & Sbd1. Wells & CREP Wells & Fallow Prog. && CREP Wells & Close Wells & CREP Total\\ + \hline + 2009 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2010 & 0 & 0 & 0 && 0 & 0 & 0 \\ + 2011 & -0.08 & -0.14 & 0 && 0 & 0 & -0.14 \\ + 2012 & -0.34 & -0.53 & 0 && 0 & 0 & -0.53 \\ + 2013 & -0.40 & -0.61 & 0 && 0 & 0 & -0.61 \\ + 2014 & -0.34 & -0.53 & 0 && -0.05 & -0.03 & -0.58 \\ + 2015 & -0.41 & -0.55 & 0 && -0.10 & -0.03 & -0.66 \\ + 2016 & -0.27 & -0.40 & 0 && -0.18 & -0.04 & -0.58 \\ + 2017 & -0.22 & -0.41 & 0 && -0.22 & -0.04 & -0.62 \\ + 2018 & -0.36 & -0.52 & 0 && -0.17 & -0.05 & -0.69 \\ + 2019 & -0.29 & -0.57 & 0 && -0.15 & -0.04 & -0.73 \\ + 2020 & -0.30 & -0.72 & -0.74 && -0.10 & -0.03 & -0.82 \\ + 2021 & -0.25 & 0 & -0.46 && -0.34 & -0.03 & -0.59 \\ + \hline +\end{tabular} +\end{table} diff --git a/Tables/Probit.tex b/Tables/Probit.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..392f1e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Probit.tex @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{lc} % |c|c| + \caption{CREP self-selection -- NEED A CAPTION FOR THIS TABLE!}\label{tab:ProbitCREP}\\ + \hline + \hline + Dependent Variable: & In CREP\\ + & Probit \\ + Model: & (1)\\ + \endfirsthead + + % At top of each page + % \multicolumn{2}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable{} continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + + % End of table block + % Col 1 & Col 2 \\ + % \hline + \endhead + + % At end of page when a new one will start + % \hline \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % At end of etire table + % \hline + % \multicolumn{2}{l}{ + % {End of table}} \\ \hline % |r| + % \endlastfoot + + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + Pumping Change (A.F) & -0.0059$^{***}$\\ + & (0.0017)\\ + Capacity (A.F) & -0.0008\\ + & (0.0009)\\ + Crop Area (Acres) & 0.0002\\ + & (0.0019)\\ + Alfalfa (\%) & -0.4115$^{*}$\\ + & (0.2448)\\ + Small Grains (\%) & -0.3459\\ + & (0.2336)\\ + Potatoes (\%) & -1.669$^{***}$\\ + & (0.3078)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Ditch & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 2,456\\ + Squared Correlation & 0.13569\\ + Pseudo R$^2$ & 0.19602\\ + BIC & 967.27\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{a) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{b) Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{c) Ditch fixed effects includes indicators for the ten largest ditch systems}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{d) All Crop variables taken as the average from 2009 and 2010}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{e) \emph{Other Crops} excluded to avoid collinearity}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{f) \emph{Pumping Change} is the average extraction rate of a Well}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ from 2011 to 2013 minus the average pumping rate from 2009 to 2010}}\\ + + \tabularnewline +\end{longtable} +\endgroup + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/Probit_mod2.tex b/Tables/Probit_mod2.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fda3480 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Probit_mod2.tex @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ + +\begin{table} %[h] + \caption{Probit model of selection into CREP}\label{REG:SELECT_PROBIT} + \centering + \begin{tabular}{lcc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Well Enters CREP}\\ + Model: & (1) & (2)\\ + \midrule + \underline{\emph{Variables}}\\ + Change in Avg. Water Use (AF) & -0.0050$^{***}$ & \\ + & (0.0013) & \\ +Pre-Fee pumping (AF/year) & & 0.0049$^{***}$\\ + & & (0.0012)\\ + Post-Fee Pumping (AF/year) & & -0.0055$^{***}$\\ + & & (0.0018)\\ + Water Rights (AF) & -0.1928$^{***}$ & -0.1871$^{***}$\\ + & (0.0552) & (0.0536)\\ + Well Depth (log feet) & 0.1875$^{*}$ & 0.2213$^{**}$\\ + & (0.1030) & (0.1068)\\ + Potatoes (\%) & -1.267$^{***}$ & -1.257$^{***}$\\ + & (0.2452) & (0.2445)\\ + Alfalfa (\%) & -0.1998 & -0.1781\\ + & (0.1667) & (0.1680)\\ + Other Crops (\%) & 0.3271 & 0.3073\\ + & (0.2455) & (0.2481)\\ + \midrule + \underline{\emph{Fixed effects}}\\ + Ditch & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + + \midrule + \underline{\emph{Fit statistics}}\\ + Observations & 2,149 & 2,149\\ + Squared Correlation & 0.14192 & 0.14612\\ + Pseudo R$^2$ & 0.20896 & 0.20959\\ + BIC & 821.08 & 828.17\\ + \midrule \midrule + + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \midrule + \end{tabular} + + \par \raggedright + \hspace{2cm}Pre-Fee pumping rate is the average yearly AF extracted from 2009 to 2010.\\ + \hspace{2cm}Post-Fee pumping rate is the average yearly AF extracted from 2011 to 2013.\\ + \hspace{3cm}This excludes all years after \ac{CREP} is active (2014-2024)\\ + \hspace{2cm}\emph{Change in Avg. Water Use} is calculated by subtracting the Post-Fee variable\\ + \hspace{3cm} by the Pre-Fee variable. + +\end{table} diff --git a/Tables/REG2011.tex b/Tables/REG2011.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ddac3d --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG2011.tex @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{lc} % |c|c| + \caption{Response to 2011 pumping fee}\label{REG2011}\\ + \hline + \hline + Dependent Variable: & AF\\ + Model: & (1)\\ + \hline + \endfirsthead + + % At top of each page + % \multicolumn{2}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable{} continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + + % End of table block + % Col 1 & Col 2 \\ + % \hline + \endhead + + % At end of page when a new one will start + % \hline \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % At end of etire table + % \hline + % \multicolumn{2}{l}{ + % {End of table}} \\ \hline % |r| + % \endlastfoot + + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + Sbd.1-Post 2011 & -30.87$^{***}$\\ + & (8.477)\\ + In CREP-Post 2011 & -31.17$^{***}$\\ + & (7.072)\\ + Near to CREP-Post 2011 & -5.407$^{**}$\\ + & (2.218)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$\\ + Near CREP-Post CREP & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$\\ + Year & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 48,563\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74535\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.00271\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{a) Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{b) Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{c) CREP wells are only included before entering CREP. A well}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ that enters CREP in 2015 will have data from 2009-2014.}}\\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{d) The Sbd.1 dummy is 1 for all CREP wells, so the "In CREP" }}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ coefficient is added to the "Sbd.1" coefficient term for}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ the full effect on CREP wells.}}\\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{e) A well is "close" if it is within one-half mile of a CREP well.}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{f) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ fixed effect.}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{g) Subdistricts two through six included in the Subdistrict-Year}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{ fixed effect.}}\\ + + \tabularnewline +\end{longtable} +\endgroup + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/REG_ALL.tex b/Tables/REG_ALL.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce3620a --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_ALL.tex @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +\FloatBarrier +\begingroup +\begin{table}[ht] + \caption{Policy direct effects and spillover effects}\label{MAINREGTBL} + \centering + %\begin{adjustbox}{width = \textwidth, center} + \begin{tabular}{lccc|ccc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{6}{c}{AF}\\ + & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Direct Effect}} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\textbf{Neighbor Response}} \\ + Contract Length:& Perm. & 15-Year & 4-Year & Perm. & 15-Year & 4-Year \\ + Model: & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + \textbf{ATT} & -16.08$^{***}$ & -64.78$^{***}$ & -49.54$^{**}$ & -3.010$^{***}$ & -0.8047 & 2.062$^{*}$\\ + & (2.308) & (4.797) & (22.17) & (0.9125) & (1.001) & (1.033)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & \\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP-Year & & & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP After Treatment & & & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 48,594 & 48,282 & 49,439 & 47,437 & 47,437 & 48,563\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74727 & 0.74580 & 0.74674 & 0.74495 & 0.74489 & 0.74605\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.00149 & 0.01320 & 0.00106 & 0.00121 & 0.00096 & 0.00063\\ + \midrule \midrule + % \multicolumn{7}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + % \multicolumn{7}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \tabularnewline + \end{tabular} + + %\end{adjustbox} + + % \par \raggedright + %% \tiny + % A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.\\ + % Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ + % Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ + % CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses.\\ + % When estimating the direct effect of permanent/temporary CREP contracts, wells under the other contract type are dropped from the dataset. + + + \par \raggedright% + % \tiny + \noindent\hspace*{1cm}\begin{minipage}{\dimexpr\textwidth-1cm} + % Notes:\\ + a) Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses.\\ + b) Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1\\ + c) A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.\\ + d) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ + e) Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ + f) CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses.\\ + g) When estimating the direct effect of permanent/temporary CREP contracts, wells under the other contract type are dropped from the dataset. + + \end{minipage} +\end{table} +\endgroup \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/REG_CREP.tex b/Tables/REG_CREP.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94eb7eb --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_CREP.tex @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +\FloatBarrier +\begingroup +\begin{table}[h] + \centering + \caption{Estimated CREP treatment effect}\label{REGCREP} +\label{A_CREP_ALL_REG} + \begin{tabular}{lcc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{2}{c}{AF}\\ + & CREP Wells & Neighbor Wells \\ + Model: & (1) & (2)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + ATT & -38.70$^{***}$ & -2.788$^{**}$\\ + & (2.905) & (1.021)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP After Treatment & & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP-Year & & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 49,439 & 49,439\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74748 & 0.74705\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.01114 & 0.00174\\ + \midrule \midrule + % \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + % \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \tabularnewline + \end{tabular} + + \par \raggedright + % \tiny + \noindent\hspace*{2cm}\begin{minipage}{\dimexpr\textwidth-2cm} + % Notes:\\ + a) Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses\\ + b) Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1\\ + c) A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.\\ + d) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ + e) Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ + f) CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses.\\ + \end{minipage} +\end{table} +\endgroup diff --git a/Tables/REG_CREP_CLOSE_COHORT.tex b/Tables/REG_CREP_CLOSE_COHORT.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bddf181 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_CREP_CLOSE_COHORT.tex @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ + +\FloatBarrier +\begin{table}[H] + \caption{Neighbor CREP treatment effect by cohort}\label{REGCLOSECOHORT} + \centering + \begin{tabular}{lccc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{3}{c}{AF}\\ + & All CREP Wells & Permanent Contract & 15-Year Contract \\ + Model: & (1) & (2) & (3)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + cohort $=$ 2014 & -0.6622 & 2.736$^{**}$ & 0.5594\\ + & (1.423) & (1.184) & (1.585)\\ + cohort $=$ 2015 & -8.599$^{***}$ & -9.689$^{*}$ & -5.288$^{***}$\\ + & (1.583) & (5.200) & (1.273)\\ + cohort $=$ 2016 & 0.9955 & -9.086$^{***}$ & 8.166$^{**}$\\ + & (1.685) & (1.087) & (2.842)\\ + cohort $=$ 2017 & 0.2011 & & 1.266\\ + & (1.889) & & (1.831)\\ + cohort $=$ 2018 & -5.207$^{**}$ & & 1.379\\ + & (1.802) & & (1.363)\\ + cohort $=$ 2019 & -7.017$^{**}$ & & -5.941$^{*}$\\ + & (3.046) & & (2.729)\\ + cohort $=$ 2020 & 3.412 & 1.108 & \\ + & (2.165) & (1.358) & \\ + cohort $=$ 2021 & -15.70$^{***}$ & -3.931 & \\ + & (3.969) & (2.279) & \\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP After Treatment & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 49,439 & 47,437 & 47,437\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74705 & 0.74495 & 0.74489\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.00174 & 0.00121 & 0.00096\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \end{tabular} + + \par \raggedright + A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.\\ + Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ + Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ + CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses. +\end{table} + + diff --git a/Tables/REG_CREP_COHORT.tex b/Tables/REG_CREP_COHORT.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..467b35c --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_CREP_COHORT.tex @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ + +\begin{table}[H] + \caption{CREP treatment effect by cohort}\label{REGCREPCOHORT} + \centering + \begin{tabular}{lccc} + \tabularnewline \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{3}{c}{AF}\\ + & All CREP Wells & Permanent Contracts & 15-Year Contract \\ + Model: & (1) & (2) & (3)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + cohort $=$ 2014 & -23.34$^{***}$ & -5.335$^{**}$ & -51.72$^{***}$\\ + & (3.576) & (2.023) & (3.874)\\ + cohort $=$ 2015 & -36.66$^{***}$ & -27.48$^{***}$ & -40.23$^{***}$\\ + & (5.398) & (5.252) & (8.487)\\ + cohort $=$ 2016 & -39.24$^{***}$ & -21.80$^{***}$ & -89.55$^{***}$\\ + & (6.607) & (5.129) & (14.31)\\ + cohort $=$ 2017 & -195.0$^{***}$ & & -195.2$^{***}$\\ + & (28.43) & & (28.51)\\ + cohort $=$ 2018 & -39.53$^{***}$ & -2.431 & -62.04$^{***}$\\ + & (11.68) & (1.564) & (16.33)\\ + cohort $=$ 2019 & -134.0$^{***}$ & & -134.2$^{***}$\\ + & (20.66) & & (20.66)\\ + cohort $=$ 2020 & -32.75$^{***}$ & -31.23$^{***}$ & -44.29$^{***}$\\ + & (7.551) & (8.479) & (0.6819)\\ + cohort $=$ 2021 & -3.927 & -3.956 & \\ + & (11.75) & (11.77) & \\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 49,439 & 48,594 & 48,282\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74748 & 0.74727 & 0.74580\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.01114 & 0.00149 & 0.01320\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{4}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \end{tabular} + + \par \raggedright + Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.\\ + Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.\\ + CREP wells are removed from the dataset when estimating neighbor responses. +\end{table} + + diff --git a/Tables/REG_CREP_PERIODS.tex b/Tables/REG_CREP_PERIODS.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aff6e6d --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_CREP_PERIODS.tex @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +%\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{>{\raggedright}p{0.27\textwidth}>{\centering}p{0.2\textwidth}p{0.2\textwidth}} + % Start table header + \caption{Estimated CREP treatment effect, no aggregation}\label{REG_CREP_PERIODS} \\ % Not used-> + \hline + \hline + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{2}{c}{AF}\\ + & CREP Wells & Neighbor Wells \\ + Model: & (1) & (2)\\ + \endfirsthead + \hline + \endhead + \hline + +\emph{Variables} & &\\ +Year $=$ -12 & 60.03$^{***}$ & 4.022\\ + & (7.109) & (7.607)\\ +Year $=$ -11 & 43.44$^{***}$ & 21.13$^{***}$\\ + & (6.172) & (4.051)\\ +Year $=$ -10 & 51.01$^{***}$ & 10.61$^{**}$\\ + & (6.242) & (3.994)\\ +Year $=$ -9 & 58.42$^{***}$ & 9.114$^{*}$\\ + & (13.51) & (4.270)\\ +Year $=$ -8 & 50.33$^{***}$ & 8.025$^{*}$\\ + & (13.58) & (4.017)\\ +Year $=$ -7 & 40.78$^{***}$ & 4.332$^{*}$\\ + & (6.726) & (2.137)\\ +Year $=$ -6 & 25.67$^{***}$ & 0.5265\\ + & (5.526) & (1.831)\\ +Year $=$ -5 & 25.83$^{***}$ & 3.507$^{**}$\\ + & (4.107) & (1.385)\\ +Year $=$ -4 & 12.29$^{***}$ & 2.248\\ + & (3.712) & (1.374)\\ +Year $=$ -3 & 9.242$^{**}$ & 2.150$^{*}$\\ + & (3.169) & (1.063)\\ +Year $=$ -2 & 4.613$^{*}$ & 1.347\\ + & (2.290) & (0.7693)\\ +Year $=$ 0 & -10.77$^{***}$ & -2.040$^{**}$\\ + & (2.783) & (0.7153)\\ +Year $=$ 1 & -39.63$^{***}$ & -3.153$^{***}$\\ + & (3.352) & (1.021)\\ +Year $=$ 2 & -55.36$^{***}$ & -4.441$^{***}$\\ + & (3.905) & (1.238)\\ +Year $=$ 3 & -49.05$^{***}$ & -3.191$^{**}$\\ + & (3.798) & (1.155)\\ +Year $=$ 4 & -48.58$^{***}$ & -3.818$^{**}$\\ + & (3.723) & (1.531)\\ +Year $=$ 5 & -39.07$^{***}$ & -1.271\\ + & (3.578) & (1.362)\\ +Year $=$ 6 & -37.89$^{***}$ & -0.7069\\ + & (3.794) & (1.767)\\ +Year $=$ 7 & -24.56$^{***}$ & -2.999\\ + & (4.338) & (1.917)\\ + \hline + \emph{Fixed Effects} & & \\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP After Treatment & & $\checkmark$\\ + In CREP-Year & & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 49,439 & 49,439\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74748 & 0.74705\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.01114 & 0.00174\\ + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + % Notes... + \hline + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\emph{Note:} a) A well is considered a neighbor to a CREP or} \\ + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} Fallow Program well if they are within one-half mile.} \\ + + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} b) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the} \\ + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} Ditch-Year fixed effect.} \\ + + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} c) Subdistricts One through Six included in the} \\ + \multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.} \\ + +\multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} d) CREP wells are removed from the dataset when} \\ +\multicolumn{3}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} estimating neighbor responses.} \\ + \hline % \\[-1.8ex] + \end{longtable} + \endgroup \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/REG_DIFF_RAD.tex b/Tables/REG_DIFF_RAD.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98ad9c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_DIFF_RAD.tex @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begin{longtable}{>{\raggedright}p{0.21\textwidth}>{\centering}p{0.16\textwidth}>{\centering}p{0.16\textwidth}>{\centering}p{0.16\textwidth}p{0.16\textwidth}} + \endfirsthead + \hline + \hline +% Country & Capital & Continent\\\hline + \endhead + \captionsetup{justification=raggedright,singlelinecheck=false} + \caption{Neighbor response with changes in radius cutoff}\label{REGRAD} \\ + % \tabularnewline + \midrule \midrule + Dependent Variable: & \multicolumn{4}{c}{AF}\\ + & \textbf{One-Quarter Mile} & \textbf{One-Half Mile} & \textbf{One Mile} & \textbf{Two Miles} \\ + Model: & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Variables} & & & & \\ + Year $=$ -12 & -3.662 & 4.022 & 4.158 & \\ + & (4.846) & (7.607) & (4.559) & \\ +Year $=$ -11 & 11.81$^{**}$ & 21.13$^{***}$ & 11.38$^{***}$ & -8.510\\ + & (4.059) & (4.051) & (3.283) & (5.855)\\ +Year $=$ -10 & 3.620 & 10.61$^{**}$ & 2.824 & -19.84\\ + & (5.905) & (3.994) & (4.242) & (12.84)\\ +Year $=$ -9 & -0.3975 & 9.114$^{*}$ & 9.464$^{**}$ & 32.56$^{**}$\\ + & (6.802) & (4.270) & (4.307) & (12.35)\\ +Year $=$ -8 & 6.122 & 8.025$^{*}$ & -5.635 & 18.01\\ + & (5.372) & (4.017) & (4.751) & (15.49)\\ +Year $=$ -7 & -0.6433 & 4.332$^{*}$ & -0.0490 & 28.65$^{***}$\\ + & (2.946) & (2.137) & (2.309) & (4.396)\\ +Year $=$ -6 & -0.6307 & 0.5265 & -1.245 & 19.88$^{*}$\\ + & (2.661) & (1.831) & (2.250) & (9.392)\\ +Year $=$ -5 & -2.513 & 3.507$^{**}$ & 4.726$^{**}$ & 60.97$^{***}$\\ + & (2.327) & (1.385) & (2.163) & (16.01)\\ +Year $=$ -4 & -1.223 & 2.248 & 3.205 & 29.33$^{*}$\\ + & (1.815) & (1.374) & (2.105) & (14.96)\\ +Year $=$ -3 & -2.271 & 2.150$^{*}$ & -0.3262 & -20.77$^{**}$\\ + & (1.491) & (1.063) & (1.832) & (7.205)\\ +Year $=$ -2 & -2.238$^{*}$ & 1.347 & 1.895 & -20.43$^{**}$\\ + & (1.231) & (0.7693) & (1.627) & (6.959)\\ +Year $=$ 0 & 0.3256 & -2.040$^{**}$ & -0.3629 & 6.583$^{*}$\\ + & (1.149) & (0.7153) & (0.9964) & (3.186)\\ +Year $=$ 1 & 0.0610 & -3.153$^{***}$ & -2.008 & 22.02\\ + & (1.285) & (1.021) & (1.603) & (14.07)\\ +Year $=$ 2 & -3.699$^{**}$ & -4.441$^{***}$ & 1.670 & 11.34\\ + & (1.621) & (1.238) & (1.862) & (14.72)\\ +Year $=$ 3 & -1.135 & -3.191$^{**}$ & 3.513 & 20.60$^{***}$\\ + & (1.374) & (1.155) & (2.037) & (6.162)\\ +Year $=$ 4 & 0.2532 & -3.818$^{**}$ & 5.430$^{**}$ & 13.63$^{*}$\\ + & (1.695) & (1.531) & (2.219) & (6.771)\\ +Year $=$ 5 & 1.730 & -1.271 & -0.3170 & 43.53$^{**}$\\ + & (1.922) & (1.362) & (2.078) & (15.40)\\ +Year $=$ 6 & 2.777 & -0.7069 & 1.592 & 3.543\\ + & (2.545) & (1.767) & (2.490) & (6.994)\\ +Year $=$ 7 & 5.904$^{*}$ & -2.999 & -7.270$^{**}$ & -2.339\\ + & (2.982) & (1.917) & (2.762) & (5.597)\\ +\midrule +\emph{Fixed Effects} & & & & \\ +Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +In Fallow Program & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +In CREP After & & & & \\ +Treatment & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +Well & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +In CREP-Year & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$ & $\checkmark$\\ +\midrule +\emph{Fit statistics} & & & & \\ +Observations & 49,439 & 49,439 & 49,439 & 49,439\\ +R$^2$ & 0.74701 & 0.74705 & 0.74722 & 0.74768\\ +Within R$^2$ & 0.00158 & 0.00174 & 0.00238 & 0.00420\\ +\midrule \midrule +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\emph{Note:} a) All wells within the given radius are included, so the two-mile cutoff includes} \\ +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} all quarter-mile wells.} \\ + +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} b) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.} \\ + +\multicolumn{5}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} c) Subdistricts Two through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.} \\ + +\end{longtable} + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/REG_PRE_CREP_EVENT.tex b/Tables/REG_PRE_CREP_EVENT.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a94bf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/REG_PRE_CREP_EVENT.tex @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +\FloatBarrier + +\begingroup +\begin{longtable}{lc} % |c|c| + \captionsetup{justification=raggedright,singlelinecheck=false} + \caption{Pumping fee response of Subdistrict One and CREP wells}\label{2011CREPVSBD1}\\ + \hline + \hline + Dependent Variable: & AF\\ + Model: & (1)\\ + \endfirsthead + + % At top of each page + % \multicolumn{2}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable{} continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + + % End of table block + % Col 1 & Col 2 \\ + % \hline + +% MUST BE HERE- tells macro to update name for subsequent pages + \endhead + + % At end of page when a new one will start + % \hline \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % At end of etire table + % \hline + % \multicolumn{2}{l}{ + % {End of table}} \\ \hline % |r| + % \endlastfoot + + % \tabularnewline % \midrule \midrule + \midrule + \emph{Variables}\\ + In CREP:2011 & -12.21$^{***}$\\ + & (0.9757)\\ + In CREP:2012 & -33.64$^{***}$\\ + & (5.930)\\ + In CREP:2013 & -36.40$^{***}$\\ + & (6.479)\\ + In CREP:2014 & -35.62$^{***}$\\ + & (6.741)\\ + In CREP:2015 & -37.95$^{***}$\\ + & (6.835)\\ + In CREP:2016 & -43.42$^{***}$\\ + & (12.51)\\ + In CREP:2017 & -47.27$^{***}$\\ + & (10.68)\\ + In CREP:2018 & -52.00$^{***}$\\ + & (6.399)\\ + In CREP:2019 & -48.52$^{***}$\\ + & (8.736)\\ + In CREP:2020 & -62.83$^{***}$\\ + & (9.969)\\ + Sbd.1:2011 & -6.200\\ + & (6.310)\\ + Sbd.1:2012 & -43.37$^{***}$\\ + & (8.328)\\ + Sbd.1:2013 & -49.72$^{***}$\\ + & (8.453)\\ + Sbd.1:2014 & -40.68$^{***}$\\ + & (8.560)\\ + Sbd.1:2015 & -48.17$^{***}$\\ + & (5.237)\\ + Sbd.1:2016 & -27.44$^{***}$\\ + & (5.802)\\ + Sbd.1:2017 & -19.45$^{*}$\\ + & (9.732)\\ + Sbd.1:2018 & -48.73$^{***}$\\ + & (10.51)\\ + Sbd.1:2019 & -25.74$^{***}$\\ + & (6.772)\\ + Sbd.1:2020 & -30.75$^{**}$\\ + & (10.98)\\ + Sbd.1:2021 & -18.87\\ + & (11.57)\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fixed Effects}\\ + Subdistrict-Year & $\checkmark$\\ + Ditch-Year & $\checkmark$\\ + Year & $\checkmark$\\ + Well & $\checkmark$\\ + \midrule + \emph{Fit statistics}\\ + Observations & 48,563\\ + R$^2$ & 0.74589\\ + Within R$^2$ & 0.00486\\ + + % Footnotes + \midrule \midrule + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{Clustered (Well \& Year) standard errors in parentheses}}\\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1}}\\ + \tabularnewline + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\emph{Note:} a) Any data entry where a CREP well was in the CREP program was dropped.} \\ + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\hspace{1.46cm} A CREP well that entered in 2015 has data from 2009-2014.} \\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} b) Each of the 10 largest ditches are included in the Ditch-Year fixed effect.} \\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} c) Subdistricts One through Six included in the Subdistrict-Year fixed effect.} \\ + + \multicolumn{2}{l}{\hspace{1.0cm} d) CREP wells are removed once in the CREP program.} \\ + +\end{longtable} +\endgroup + +\FloatBarrier \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Tables/Summary_Stats_Wells.tex b/Tables/Summary_Stats_Wells.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..267ab38 --- /dev/null +++ b/Tables/Summary_Stats_Wells.tex @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +\begingroup +% \vspace*{-\baselineskip} +\begin{longtable}{lccc} + \caption{Summary statistics: well attributes}\label{SUMSTAT}\\ + + \hline\hline +% Column 1 & Column 2 & Column 3 & Column 4 \\ \hline +& Mean & S.d & Obs. \\ + \hline + \endfirsthead + + % \multicolumn{4}{c}% + % {{\bfseries Table \thetable\ continued from previous page}} \\ + % \hline + % Column 1 & Column 2 & Column 3 & Column 4 \\ \hline + \endhead + + % \hline \multicolumn{4}{|r|}{{Continued on next page}} \\ \hline + % \endfoot + + % \hline \hline + % \endlastfoot + + % \hline + % \multicolumn{4}{l} + % { + % {\emph{Notes:} When multiple permits exist for a single well the max value of the field is used, except for \emph{First Completed Date}, and \emph{Static Water Level} where the minimum value is used. The \emph{Producing Zone} was calculated by subtracting the maximum listed bottom perforation from the minimum upper perforation value.} + % } \\ \hline + % \endlastfoot + + & \multicolumn{3}{c}{CREP} \\ \cmidrule{2-4} + Number of Wells & & & 154\\ + Static Water Level (ft.) & 31.5& 2.1 & 2\\ + Pumping Rate (AF/Year) & 663 & 418 & 74\\ + Total Depth (ft.) & 130& 183& 152\\ + Bottom Perforation (ft.) & 124& 182& 152\\ + Producing Zone (ft.) & 87& 106& 152\\ + Elevation (ft.) & 7570& 99 & 2\\ + First Completed Date (M-Y) & 04-1977 & &78 \\ + Last Completed Date (M-Y) &03-1980 & & 78\\ + \hline + & \multicolumn{3}{c}{Subdistrict One} \\ \cmidrule{2-4} + Number of Wells & & & 2490 \\ + Static Water Level (ft.) & 27.1 & 14.4 & 58\\ + Pumping Rate (AF/Year) & 812& 386 & 985\\ + Total Depth (ft.) & 118& 160 & 2462\\ + Bottom Perforation (ft.) & 116 & 164& 2464\\ + Producing Zone (ft.) & 79 & 80 & 2457\\ + Elevation (ft.) & 6915 & 2218 & 95\\ + First Completed Date (M-Y) & 11-1974 & & 1019\\ + Last Completed Date (M-Y) & 11-1977 & & 1019\\ + \hline + & \multicolumn{3}{c}{Other Wells} \\ \cmidrule{2-4} + Number of Wells & & &1159\\ + Static Water Level (ft.) & 50.8 & 48.8 & 25 \\ + Pumping Rate (AF/Year)& 1067& 666 & 305\\ + Total Depth (ft.) & 417& 414&1090\\ + Bottom Perforation (ft.) & 412& 414 &1114 \\ + Producing Zone (ft.) & 247& 259& 1107 \\ + Elevation (ft.) & 6995& 2142& 36\\ + First Completed Date (M-Y) & 03-1968 & &318 \\ + Last Completed Date (M-Y) & 07-1971 & &318\\ + \hline + \hline +\end{longtable} + +\vspace*{-1.5\baselineskip} +\begin{tablenotes} + \begin{singlespace} + \item{\emph{Notes:} When multiple permits exist for a single well the max value of the field is used, except for \emph{First Completed Date}, and \emph{Static Water Level} where the minimum value is used. The \emph{Producing Zone} was calculated by subtracting the maximum listed bottom perforation from the minimum upper perforation value.} + \end{singlespace} +\end{tablenotes} +\vspace*{\baselineskip} +\endgroup + + +% latex table generated in R 4 3 0 by xtable 1 8-4 package +% Sun Jul 2 14:30:35 2023 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/appendix.tex b/appendix.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ebf4ab --- /dev/null +++ b/appendix.tex @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +\appendix +% ======================== Insert all of the appendix files +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_CREP_Goals.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_CREP_All_Reg.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_Distance_Reg.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_All_Years_2011_Reg.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_Policies_CI.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_Fallow_Prog.tex} +\FloatBarrier +\input{Sections/A_CREP_To_Near_Reg.tex} +\FloatBarrier diff --git a/body/Intro.tex b/body/Intro.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..714f2e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/body/Intro.tex @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +\section{Introduction} +Economists are interested in identifying the socially optimal management strategy of common-pool resources. In many cases, the theoretically preferred policy is not politically feasible, and conservation policies are evaluated in conjunction with political feasibility \citep{walter2020,barragan-beaud2018,lipsey1956}. This paper evaluates a case where a first-best policy, a tax on externalities, is followed by a politically feasible but second-best alternative, a \ac{PES}. Econometric results show that the existence of the fee substantially reduces the expected gains from the second-best alternative. The joint outcome of the two policies is not the sum of the expected resource conservation of each policy, as estimated independently. Rather, the pumping tax decreases the total direct water conserved by the \ac{PES} by 32\%. This conservation reduction comes from the interaction of two effects from the pumping fee, each enrolled well in the program already reduced water usage by 62 \(\frac{\ac{AF}}{Year}\), and the added cost of pumping encouraged 29.52\% more wells to enroll. This case study is relevant to policy design, economic outcomes of policies must be estimated with consideration to the existing resource management efforts. + +Groundwater resources have lacked clearly defined property rights resulting in externality costs of extraction. These include the cost to downstream surface water holders \citep{cobourn2015}, the common-pool resource management loss in a tragedy of the commons \citep{gisser1980,brownjr.1972}, local pumping externalities \citep{brozovic2010}, and added legal threat of neighbors when water rights could not be fulfilled. The estimates of these costs have historically been difficult to assess. Understanding and managing these costs is becoming progressively more important to economists and policymakers as arid regions face increased resource scarcity. + +Theory and empirical research contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness of groundwater programs. The usual \emph{first-best} policies of pumping fees and quotas have been tried \citep{schuerhoff2013,drysdale2018,smith2017,smith2018}. A pumping fee can be economically efficient\footnote{When the rate is property set, and is assessed on the party with the lowest abatement costs.} because the creator of the externality bears the cost of the decision to pump water \citep{pigou1924}. The groundwater user is able to determine their own cost and benefits inclusive of social costs, which brings their private benefit in line with the socially optimal outcomes. A common hurdle to initiating a Pigouvian tax is that the interests of the existing industry are harmed by adding the tax \citep{jenkins2014}. Also, the policy outcomes of pumping fees sometimes fall short of expectations, with institutional enforcement, and political influences of competing interest groups identified as hindering conservation \citep{yang2003,schuerhoff2013}. Both the institutional rigidity and reduced conservation can be over-improved through collective action \citep{huang2013,cody2018,ostrom1990}. In the case study elaborated in this paper, groundwater users in the \ac{SLV}, were able to take collective action and employ a self-imposed pumping fee to mitigate externality costs of pumping. The result was a 33\% reduction in groundwater extraction \citep{smith2017}. + +The ability to self-organize is not a given, as is evidenced by the scarce case studies of a pumping fee adoption. It can be easier to induce political change by paying users to reduce an externality rather than charging them for generating the costs. One common and growing alternative following this method is a \ac{PES} \citep{wunder2008,engel2008}. The \ac{PES} of study is \ac{CREP}, which is a federal program that pays farmers to fallow land and to grow vegetation that improves local environmental quality. + +There are a number of studies that evaluate the factors that contribute to enrollment in \ac{CREP}. Payment rates are consistently found to drive enrollment \citep{monger2018,suter2004,suter2008}. Other enrollment factors are centered on opportunity costs, with land quality and urbanization effecting enrollment numbers \citep{parks1997,plantinga2001}. Some benefits identified in specific applications of \ac{CREP} include increasing the water table by 15\% \citep{manning2020}, decreasing water intensity by 1.29 \(\frac{\ac{AF}}{acre}\) \citep{rosenberg2020} and creating cooperative norms where neighboring wells reduce pumping rates by 9.6 \(\frac{\ac{AF}}{year}\) \citep{rouhirad2021}. Due to the distortions created in \emph{second-best} policy outcomes, some inefficiencies are identified. Such programs offer a lump sum payment for enrollment. As a result land is enrolled based on opportunity costs, rather than targeting land with a high return for water conservation\citep{wanhongyang2005}. For example, regions with high vacant land values due to growing urban development will require a higher \ac{CREP} payment to enter the program than equivalent parcels in rural areas, a factor unrelated to total water use of the parcel. A related program, \ac{CRP}, has been identified as suffering from a rebound effect where non-farmland is converted into farmland, leading to a 9\% slippage in conservation \citep{wu2000}. + +The current analysis identifies how conservation outcomes of groundwater management programs change when alternative water conservation polices are in place. This is an important question to answer because almost all farmland in the United States will qualify for some form of \ac{PES} and the addition of a pumping fee or quota system should account for the combined policy outcome. + +There are multiple mechanisms by which a pumping fee can change the water conservation outcomes of a \ac{PES}. Both direct and indirect consequences of the fee are examined using econometric methods. To highlight the different types of interactions between a \ac{PES} and pumping fee consider the model of \ac{PES} water conservation: +\begin{equation} + Conservation = \sum_{w=1}^{W} \left( \theta_{w}\cdot I_{w}+\beta\left[1-\theta_{w}\right]\cdot\eta_{w}\right) +\end{equation} +Where \emph{w} is a well and \(w \in W\), \(I_{w}\) is the average water intensity of the well, \(\theta_{w}\) is a dummy variable indicating that a well is enrolled in the \ac{PES}, \(\beta\) is the change in pumping that results from a well being near a fallowed well, \(\eta_{w}\) is a dummy variable for a well being close to a well enrolled in the \ac{PES} program. +%\begin{equation} +% \theta_{w}= +% \begin{cases} +% 1\text{ if } P_{PES}\cdot Area_{w} \ge\pi_{w}\ \\ +% \text{else}=0 \\ +% \end{cases} +%\end{equation} +%Where \(P_{PES}\) is the price paid by the \ac{PES} program to retire an acre, \(Area_{w}\) is the area covered by a well and is assumed to be constant, and \(\pi_{w}\) is the total profit attributable to the operation of the well. +%and is defined as \(\eta_{w}=\max\left(\theta_{f\left(w,d\right)}\right)\). \emph{f} is a subset of wells that are within a distance (\(d)\)) of well \emph{w}. + +The \ac{PES} water conservation can be separated into direct and neighborhood spillover effects. The direct effect is captured in the term \(\theta_{w}I_{w}\) which is the amount of water saved by an enrolled well when it is shut off. The neighborhood effect is captured in \(\beta\left[1-\theta_{w}\right]\cdot\eta_{w}\), this is the change in water pumped by wells that are sufficiently near to a \ac{PES} well from both pro-social and water table consideration. + +A marginal increase in the pumping fee influences each of these components through the equation: +%\begin{equation} +% \frac{dConservation}{dFee} = \sum_{w=1}^{W} \left( \frac{d \theta_{w}}{d\ Fee}\cdot I_{w}+\frac{d\ I_{w}}{d\ Fee}\cdot \theta_{w}+\beta\left(\frac{\eta_{w}}{dFee}-\left[\theta_{w}\frac{\eta_{w}}{dFee}+\eta_{w}\frac{\theta_{w}}{dFee}\right]\right)\right) +%\end{equation} +\begin{equation} +\frac{dConservation}{dFee} = \sum_{w=1}^{W} \left[\theta_{w}\frac{dI_{w}}{dFee}+I_{w}\frac{d\theta_{w}}{dFee}+\beta\left(\left[1-\theta_{w}\right]\frac{\eta_{w}}{dFee}-\eta_{w}\frac{\theta_{w}}{dFee}\right)\right] +\end{equation} + +Four total effects from the pumping fee on the \ac{PES} are identified. First, the fee changes the intensity of groundwater pumped by wells in the program prior to enrollment based on the term \(\theta_{w}\frac{dI_{w}}{dFee}\). Each well enrolled in the \ac{PES} reduces output to zero, but the existence of the fee lowers the baseline pumping rate. Therefore, each well added to the \ac{PES} conserves less water under a pumping fee policy. Second, the pumping fee changes which wells enroll in the \ac{PES} through the term \(I_{w}\frac{d\theta_{w}}{dFee}\). The fee makes some wells more or less profitable to operate. This in turn changes which wells select into the \ac{PES} program. When this term is positive more wells are enrolled because of the fee which counteracts the reduced water saving per well enrolled in the term \(\theta_{w}\frac{dI_{w}}{dFee}\). Third, the number of wells that respond to neighborhood spillover effects adjust. Changing which wells enroll in the program also changes which wells are near enough to a fallowed \ac{PES} well to induced shifts in pumping behavior, this effect is \(\beta\left[1-\theta_{w}\right]\frac{\eta_{w}}{dFee}\). Fourth, the addition of wells to the \ac{PES} removes any potential neighborhood spillover effects that the well would have responded to, which is shown in the term \(-\beta \eta_{w} \frac{\theta_{w}}{dFee}\). + +These interactions are each evaluated empirically. First, the direct effect of the pumping rate of wells that eventually join \ac{CREP} and the magnitude of the neighborhood effect is found using a \ac{DID} study. An event study is developed that considers the institutional paths taken by farmers in the \ac{SLV}. In this setting, farmers self-organize and develop the self-imposed pumping fee. This fee began in 2011 and is treated as a natural experiment to develop a \ac{DID} estimate of the pumping effect replicating the work of \citep{smith2017} while distinguishing wells that join the \ac{PES} using \ac{CREP} as a separate treatment group. By 2014, farmland could begin active enrollment in \ac{CREP}. This is staggered treatment, so a weighted event study is used to estimate the amount of water conserved by the program \citep{sun2021}. A similar methodology is used to predict any neighborhood effects from \ac{CREP} enrollment as has been identified in Kansas \ac{CREP} \citep{rouhirad2021}. + +Second, a probit model is used to determine if the fee changes which wells enroll in the \ac{PES} and how much additional water is conserved through this process. To identify an indirect effect on neighboring wells the results of the probit are used in a Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo simulates which wells may have been added to \ac{CREP} as a result of the fee. In each simulation the number of neighboring wells is calculated providing a metric to assess the additionality of the fee on the spillover effects. These results are combined to estimate the total change on the \ac{PES} water conservation that result from the pumping fee. diff --git a/body/abstract.tex b/body/abstract.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e421eb --- /dev/null +++ b/body/abstract.tex @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Previous studies of groundwater management through \ac{PES} have focused on the isolated effects of the program. We evaluate the interaction of existing groundwater management programs with \ac{PES}, finding that existing conservation efforts can mitigate water conservation. We focus on the application of federal fallowing incentives using \ac{CREP} for farmers in \acl{SLV}, Colorado. Farmers in this environmentally sensitive region had previously self-organized to impose pumping fees that curb groundwater extraction and reduce externalities. These pumping fees are found to be highly effective in reducing groundwater consumption but have a second-order effect of dampening the conservation of \ac{CREP}. Farmers with the largest response to the subdistrict policies self-select into the \ac{CREP} program. Consequently, each well enrolled in \ac{CREP} conserves 62\% less water than would be expected without a pumping fee. Overall, the pumping fees reduce the conservation outcomes of \ac{CREP} by 32\% while raising program costs by 29.5\%. These outcomes highlight the need to consider interactions between conservation efforts when designing policy. They also suggest that other metrics of success should be considered. \ac{CREP} is effective at compensating the farmers who are the most affected by drought and pumping fees. Furthermore, the program is found to encourage spillover effects, where neighboring wells outside the program cooperatively reduce water usage by 2.8 \ac{AF} per year. The findings provide evidence that the interaction of policy, regional attributes, and community create complexities for \ac{PES} design. diff --git a/body/background.tex b/body/background.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cfe27ae --- /dev/null +++ b/body/background.tex @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +\section{Background} + +\subsection{Subdistrict One} +The \acf{SLV} is an agricultural region located in south-central Colorado. Farming practices started in 1630 with industrial farming becoming common by 1880 \citep{hearne1988}. The \ac{SLV} expanded rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century, with developments in rotary well technology spurring an explosion in groundwater use by 1940 \citep{cody2015}. Today 26\% of direct employment continues to come from the agricultural sector, median incomes are \$47,599 which is 37\% lower than the Colorado average \citep{slvdev2024}. + +The valley has a multifaceted water system with the Rio Grande River providing surface water, an unconfined aquifer providing strong feedback to the river, and a lower confined aquifer supplying hydrologic pressure. Transmissivity in the region varies but ranges from 700-30,200 \(\frac{feet^2}{day}\) in the unconfined aquifer and 13,400 to 16,800 \(\frac{feet^2}{day}\) in the confined aquifer \citep{bexfield2010}. This connectivity makes the groundwater a common-pool resource creating a tragedy of the commons \citep{hardin1968}. From both a geologic and technical level, the linkages between groundwater and surface water were not well understood at the time farmers increased drilling rates in the 1940s. This type of uncertainty can lead to institutional misallocation of resources which are difficult to correct \citep{libecap2011}. Sunk capital in wells provided an incentive to continue groundwater extraction under drought conditions in the 1950s and 1960s \citep{loos2022,cody2015}. This came to a head in 1969 when the State of Colorado passed the \emph{Water Rights Administration and Determination Act of 1969}, placing groundwater use more directly under prior apportion orders \citep{cody2015}. Out of this, the conservation districts of Colorado were formed to manage agricultural water usage in six Colorado hydrologic basins. The \ac{SLV} falls into the \acl{RGWCD}. + +With the backdrop of this institutional development, a drought in the early 2000s created historically large declines in aquifer storage volumes (See \cref{FIG:STOR}). During this era, other wells in Colorado were required to retire due to pumping deemed out of priority \citep{loos2022}. Facing this legal uncertainty and increasing externalities from pumping, \ac{SBD1} of the \ac{RGWCD} was formed in 2006. The number of farmers in the \ac{SLV}, and their joint interest in preserving agricultural productivity, contributed to the ability to manage the groundwater common-pool resource collectively \citep{ostrom1990,walker1990,smith2018,cody2015}. + +%\FloatBarrier +\begin{figure} + \includegraphics[width=0.97\textwidth]{GW_LEVEL} + \caption{Storage levels of closed basin relative to 2000} + \label{FIG:STOR} +\end{figure} + +Members in the subdistrict voted for enfranchisement under the authority of \ac{RGWCD}. Six total subdistricts have formed in the \ac{SLV}, each addressing water management locally. However, the region encompassing \ac{SBD1} was deemed to create the most injurious depletions to downstream rights holders. Given the limited resources of the \ac{RGWCD}, \ac{SBD1} was given priority over other subdistricts, becoming the first subdistrict to implement a water management plan. + +Leveraging the flexibility afforded to the subdistrict as a self-governed institution, different policies have been tried to reduce depletions. One policy that has met with interest from economists is a pumping fee. By charging groundwater users an additional cost above the electrical costs of pumping, the external costs can be internalized, allowing the socially optimal pumping rate to be achieved through pricing \citep{pigou1924}. Empirical evidence finds that the subdistrict pumping fee was able to reduce groundwater use by 33\% and promote institutional social norms that encourage water conservation \citep{smith2017,smith2018}. + +Aquifer levels have declined since the policy's inception, despite the reduced water use from the pumping fees. Climate factors have been identified as contributing to these declines \citep{grabenstein2022,sbd12023,sbd12022a}. The pumping fee has been raised four times to address this issue and currently is set at \$500 per \ac{AF}, suggesting that the 63\% decline in groundwater pumping from 2011 levels has been insufficient to meet aquifer goals \citep{sbd12022a}. + +The subdistrict has taken a holistic approach to policy management, employing a range of regulatory options. The focus of the present paper is involvement in \cref{CREP}, a program that pays users to retire cropland (refer to \cref{bckgndcrep}). A related program was a temporary fallowing program that provided rental rates to fallow farms for a four-year window. By retiring land for four years, the farmers were able to receive a payment and had the flexibility to rotate which acreage was fallowed. This program was only offered for the 2020 and 2021 irrigation years. The subdistrict is active in purchasing wells and surface water rights in order to retire or provide augmentation. They have also used funds to purchase land on the outskirts of the subdistrict and acquiring the associated water rights. Such mixing of policies and repeated treatment can make isolating policy effects difficult and lead to reversals of cause-and-effect interpretation \citep{besley2000,callaway2021}. Much of the policy changes can be treated as exogenous since the unexpected drought was outside human control. With proper econometric methods, such dynamic policy interactions provide a rich pool of knowledge to assess groundwater management. + +\subsection{CREP} +\label{bckgndcrep} +The \acf{CREP} is a program offered by the \acf{FSA}, which creates incentives to apply conservation practices on agricultural land within environmentally sensitive regions. \ac{CREP} is an offshoot of the \acf{CRP} program which provides more moderate incentives but covers a large portion of the country. \citep{fsa2023} + +Each local \ac{CREP} program has goals and requirements that are tailored to the region, with the Colorado Rio Grande \ac{CREP} program having additional entry requirements over \ac{CRP} or \ac{CREP} \citep{sbd12013}. The \ac{CREP} program as applied to the \ac{SLV} pays farmers to fallow land\footnote{The program allows for various forms of "fallowing" including planting cover crop or reintroducing wetland.}, requiring that no crops are planted over the contract term. The payment includes a sign-up bonus of \$300 per acre, with a yearly payment of \$288 \(\frac{acre}{year}\) over 15 years \citep{rgwcd2014,fsa2023a,sbd12011,rgwcd2023}\footnote{Federal, state, and local payments when land is not in the bonus payment region.}. The \ac{FSA} pays \$200 \(\frac{acre}{year}\) of this total with the caveat that a minimum of 20\% of funding must come from the State of Colorado or the subdistrict \citep{rgwcd2014}. The subdistrict funding of \ac{CREP} comes from self-imposed acreage fees that adjust to meet demand \citep{sbd12011}. As part of the fallowing incentive structure, the subdistrict provided resources to develop an additional \ac{CREP} contract option. Unlike other \ac{CREP} programs, \ac{SLV} participants can enter a permanent retirement contract \citep{sbd12011}. The subdistrict pays a one-time bonus of \(\frac{\$100}{acre}\) and a yearly bonus of \(\frac{\$22}{acre-year}\) for entering a permanent retirement contract\footnote{Amount above the 15-year contract, but the subdistrict supports both contract types.}\textsuperscript{,}\footnote{Payment only continues for 15 years, even if the contract is for permanent retirement.}. + +There is a set of criteria for eligibility in \ac{CREP}. Three of the most restrictive being that all land must be in \ac{SBD1} \citep{sbd12013a}, the covered area must have been irrigated with at least half a \ac{AF} per acre for at least four of the six years between 2008 and 2013, and half a \ac{AF} per acre must have been applied to the land within two years of submitting the application \citep{rgwcd2015}\footnote{Other restrictions include the land must be capable of being irrigated and the cropland must have water rights.}. Notably, for the proceeding analysis, the subdistrict pumping fee discussed in \cite{smith2017} was set at \$45 in 2011 and raised to \$75 per \ac{AF} in 2012. The groundwater use of farms during the four-year window with a low pumping fee can be used to meet the \ac{CREP} eligibility requirements, allowing farms with low water use in 2012-2013 to enter the program. + +The sign-up period began in 2013, placing the 2011 irrigation year within two years of sign-ups. 2011 happened to be the highest groundwater use year on record for \ac{SLV} farmers (see \cref{fig:AVPUMP}). While the \ac{SBD1} farmers began reducing water relative to other \ac{SLV} farms in 2011, the overall water use rate was high. For this reason, the pumping choices made in response to the \ac{SBD1} pumping fee do not significantly affect entry into \ac{CREP} based on either minimum irrigation requirements. + +Within the subdistrict, the main goals of \ac{CREP} are to enroll 40,000 acres of cropland and reduce irrigated water use by 60,060 \ac{AF} per year\footnote{Other goals are included in \cref{A_CREP_GOALS} (\cite{sbd12013a}).}. Since 2013, the subdistrict has enrolled 10,868 acres of farmland. Engineering estimates of water consumption reduction due to \ac{CREP} are 14,775 \ac{AF} per year in 2023\footnote{14,666 in 2022 and 17,365 in 2021.} \citep{sbd12023,sbd12022,sbd12021}. Prior to the subdistrict pumping fee, wells that were enrolled in \ac{CREP} averaged 17,365 \ac{AF} per year in total pumping. + +\subsection{Evidence of \ac{CREP} Outcome Changes} +The existence of the pumping fee changes the incentives of farmers choosing to enter the \ac{CREP} program. The pumping fee has an effect on the amount of land enrolled in \ac{CREP}, and the amount of water saved per acre enrolled. The direction of these factors is ambiguous without further empirical analysis. + +The first adjustment is made along the intensity of groundwater use, which lowers the amount of water saved by \ac{CREP}. The marginal cost of pumping increases because of the pumping fee. Increasing the cost of using groundwater reduces the quantity of groundwater applied by farmers\footnote{This is strictly non-increasing and could remain zero.}. Since all wells in the subdistrict decreased water use prior to the CREP program, \ac{CREP} induces less water conservation per well than if the pumping fee did not exist. Taking one extreme, if the pumping fee was high enough then all wells would be shut off, so the gains from \ac{CREP} would be zero. This implies that the marginal abatement cost of \ac{CREP} increases from the fee. Each enrolled well will cost the same amount as before the pumping fee, but the amount of water per retired well is lower. + +The fee can also interact in \ac{CREP} by changing the economics of entering the program. In other settings, \ac{PES} programs have been found to suffer from selection bias, with agents choosing to enter the program if they already meet the conservation standards \citep{daniels2010,martinpersson2013}. The design of the pumping fee is to alter groundwater extraction rates. By doing so, the fee increases the number of wells that would be in compliance with \ac{CREP}\footnote{Or close to compliance.} which may select into the program. In other groundwater management settings, the gains from the program were found to raise the value of farmland unevenly based on the hydraulic connectivity \citep{edwards2016}. This provides a mechanism by which the pumping fee has unevenly encouraged enrollment in \ac{CREP} based on spatial characteristics. This further reduces the per well intensity savings but will likely increase the amount of farmland enrolled in \ac{CREP}. This factor can increase overall water savings by inducing more enrollment but increase abatement costs through selection of wells that would have pumped less than the average subdistrict well. + +An evaluation of crop choice in the \ac{SLV} suggests that heterogeneous land attributes are significant in selecting into \ac{CREP}. \cref{FIG:CROP} shows the average acreage of crops grown by three user groups; farmland outside \ac{SBD1} ('\emph{Other} wells'), farmland in \ac{SBD1} \emph{Sbd.1}, and farmland that is enrolled in \emph{\ac{CREP}}. The crop choice is broken out into three periods: before the pumping fee (\emph{Pre-Policy}), after the pumping fee but before \ac{CREP} starts (\emph{post-2011}), and after \ac{CREP} begins (\emph{post-2014}). Wells that are entered into \ac{CREP} grow substantially more small grains and alfalfa compared to wells in \ac{SBD1}. These crops have been identified as seeing the largest intensive adjustments to the pumping fee \citep{smith2017}. This suggests that heterogeneous farm conditions lead to a selection of some farms into \ac{CREP}. + + +% \FloatBarrier +\begin{figure} + \subfloat[Crops of Other Wells]{ + \begin{minipage}[c][0.32\linewidth]{0.32\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{OTHER_CROP.jpeg} + \end{minipage}} + \hfill + \subfloat[Crops of Sbd.1 Wells]{ + \begin{minipage}[c][0.32\linewidth]{0.32\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{SBD1_CROP.jpeg} + \end{minipage}} + \hfill + \subfloat[Crops of \ac{CREP} Wells]{ + \begin{minipage}[c][0.32\linewidth]{0.32\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{CREP_CROP.jpeg} + \end{minipage}} + + \caption{Crop variations by groups (average acreage per well)}\label{FIG:CROP} + \end{figure} + % \FloatBarrier + +The well intensity margin also appears to be in play. The average pumping rate of wells in each of these three groups is provided in \cref{fig:AVPUMP}. \ac{CREP} wells and subdistrict wells have a nearly identical average prior to the pumping fee, suggesting the parallel trend assumption is valid. After the pumping fee starts, \ac{SBD1} wells, and wells that eventually join \ac{CREP} deviate from the control group, reducing average pumping. However, the \ac{CREP} wells reduce output even more than the subdistrict average while following the same yearly trend. The disproportionate response of \ac{CREP} wells is indicative of selection into \ac{CREP} by land that was most impacted by the pumping fee. + +% \FloatBarrier +\begingroup +\begin{figure}[h] + \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{Pumping_Rates.jpeg} + \caption{Adjustments in average pumping by well group} + \label{fig:AVPUMP} +\end{figure} +\endgroup + +This preliminary evidence is used to inform the following empirical analysis. The intensive margin of \ac{CREP} wells is explored before and after the pumping fee using a \ac{DID} specification. Next, a probit model is applied to predict the likelihood of a well joining \ac{CREP} based on their response to the pumping fee. These can be used together to estimate the direct effect of \ac{CREP} on water savings and program abatement costs. diff --git a/body/conclusion.tex b/body/conclusion.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50948f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/body/conclusion.tex @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +\section{Discussion and Conclusion} +\subsection{Water Conservation Outcomes} +Combining each of these empirical estimates a picture of the overall groundwater reduction in the subdistrict can be sketched. The interaction between the \ac{CREP} program and the existing pumping fee is the primary result, but the combined output is also relevant for policy choice. Overall effects are summarized by estimating each program using an event study and combining the effects. + +The estimated changes due to subdistrict and \ac{CREP} policies are summarized in \cref{RESTBL}, confidence intervals are suppressed for clarity but are provided in appendix \cref{A:CI_TBL}. The \emph{Direct} and \emph{Spillover} columns predict the amount of water saved as a result of the \ac{CREP} fallow program from the methods in \cref{SECCREP} using the well dataset\footnote{There is yearly variation because the number of wells in \ac{CREP} changes, and not all cohorts are in the same lag set. Estimates were made by summing the coefficient for each well in a given lag year and neighbor lag year.}. The \emph{Expected Column} is the total volume of water reduced by \ac{CREP} wells due to the Subdistrict One policies from \cref{REG2011}. This is referred to as \emph{expected} because a \ac{CREP} policy planners would expect that \ac{CREP} will induce this additional volume of water when not considering the interaction with the pumping fee. The total volume of water saved because of \ac{CREP} is the sum of the \emph{Direct} and \emph{Spillover} columns while the total volume of water reduced because of the \ac{CREP} wells fallowing is the sum of all three columns. Under the Subdistrict sections the Fallow column is the predicted direct effect of water savings from the four-year fallowing program as estimated in appendix \cref{A:FALPROG}\footnote{Neighborhood effects are assumed to be zero for this program.}. The \emph{Other Policies} column captures the response of wells not in \ac{CREP} relative to the control group\footnote{The model predicts a yearly event study of water savings of all wells in Subdistrict One compared to the control. These yearly net subdistrict savings are then subtracted by the other policy estimates. Leaving the reduction in water that cannot be accounted for by the \ac{CREP} program and short-term fallow programs.} estimating the yearly effect of all other policies including the pumping fee. Finally, the \emph{No Policies} column is the counterfactual volume expected if none of the water conservation efforts were made. + +\input{Tables/Policy_Estimates.tex} + +These results help provide a benchmark of the overall savings. The pumping fee and other subdistrict policies consistently provided the most water savings. This is due to the directed cost of pumping and the fact that all wells within the subdistrict are affected. Over time the direct effect of \ac{CREP} has increased as enrollment enlarges, but the relative importance of the neighbor effects has declined. The neighborhood effect coefficients revert to zero over time, becoming insignificant in five years. The wells enrolled in \ac{CREP} from 2014-2016 have already been active for five years, thus making these cohorts' addition to the spillover effect negligible going forward. Also, as more wells are enrolled then there are fewer wells that are not neighbors to a \ac{CREP} well. Since there is some spatial clustering in the program enrollment, latter \ac{CREP} wells add a smaller number of wells to neighboring treatment group. The progression of the added effect of each policy outcome is provided in \cref{FIG:BAR}. +%\FloatBarrier + \begin{figure}[h]% + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Policy_Bar_Graph} + \caption{Water use and conservation in \ac{SBD1}} + \label{FIG:BAR} + \end{figure}% + While the overall water conservation of \ac{SBD1} is substantial the \ac{CREP} and resulting spillover effects are minor compared to the pumping fee and other \ac{SBD1} policies. This smaller \ac{CREP} impact is not due entirely to the original \ac{PES} design but is in part reduced precisely because the \ac{SBD1} polices are successful at reducing groundwater extraction, which adds complications for policy makers seeking to reach conservation targets. + +How the outcomes of \ac{CREP} may be different from policymaker expectations can also be found. The volume of groundwater saved by the \ac{CREP} program is found to be 32\% lower due to the existence of Subdistrict One policies. However, it does not appear that either the spillover effects or the policy slippage due to the pumping fee were accounted for in \ac{CREP} plans. There are two unknowns pushing in opposite directions. A policy planner making choices without this knowledge would overestimate the policy benefits of \ac{CREP} by 33\%\footnote{They would overestimate the direct reduction of \ac{CREP} wells by 61.6\%}. In other settings the gains from \ac{CREP} are likely to be underestimated, since there is evidence that it encourages neighbors to cooperate and reduce water output. However, it is important to consider local spatial attributes and overall enrollment levels, when estimating these effects in a \ac{PES} program. In this case study it was found that the effect of adding 32 wells to \ac{CREP} only increased neighborhood effects by 3.27\%. + + + +The \ac{CREP} benchmarks can also be compared to the stated goals of the program. Looking at the year with the largest \ac{CREP} reduction the \ac{CREP} policy has achieved 17\% of the 60,000 \ac{AF} per year savings target. With the acreage intensity falling -0.49 \(\frac{\ac{AF}}{acre}\) short of the rate needed to reach the goal after full enrollment of 40,000 acres. However, the overall efforts of the farms in \ac{CREP} are relevant to outcomes. When evaluating the total amount of water saved by wells in \ac{CREP} the intensity of savings is 0.80\(\frac{\ac{AF}}{acre}\) above the rate needed to reach the \ac{CREP} program goals. The owners of \ac{CREP} wells have contributed to a more stable aquifer even if much of the conservation efforts were made prior to the \ac{CREP} program starting. + + + +%\FloatBarrier +\begin{landscape}% + \centering + \begin{figure}[h]% + \caption{Cumulative effect of conservation policies } + \label{FIG:POLICYEFF} + \includegraphics[width=1.3\textwidth]{POLICY_COUNTER_FACT} + \end{figure}% +\end{landscape}% +%\FloatBarrier + +The net expected water savings due to conservation efforts are provided in \cref{FIG:POLICYEFF}. Despite the declining aquifer levels, the subdistrict has been successful in reducing the volume of water pumped. The upticks in water use after 2015 does physically lower the water table, but these cumulative results suggest that without the subdistrict policies an even more severe drawdown would have occurred. Comparable wells outside the subdistrict responded to climate, prices, and other factors during this period by increasing groundwater use. The marginal value of groundwater increased, partially reflected in the subdistrict's need to raise pumping fee rates. + +For policymakers this provides an important case study for developing \ac{PES} programs. While more conservation may always seem better, the existence of highly efficient water saving policies are identified as reducing \ac{PES} effectiveness. The Pigouvian tax on water use was found to increase enrollment in the \ac{PES} while also lowering overall program savings. Complications in the enrollment structure led to these results. Tailoring program goals, and enrollment criteria to the \ac{PES} region is required to avoid unintended effects from policy interaction. Such programs have pro-social benefits of encouraging neighbors to conserve water, but once again complicating factors can arise. The spatial distribution of parcels is a major factor in outcomes of these neighborhood effects. Taken together, these outcomes provide insights into the complexities of conservation policy interactions. diff --git a/supporting-files/FinalThesis.bib b/supporting-files/FinalThesis.bib new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ec955e --- /dev/null +++ b/supporting-files/FinalThesis.bib @@ -0,0 +1,3312 @@ +@article{aastveit2015, + title = {What {{Drives Oil Prices}}? {{Emerging Versus Developed Economies}}}, + shorttitle = {What {{Drives Oil Prices}}?}, + author = {Aastveit, Knut Are and Bjørnland, Hilde C. and Thorsrud, Leif Anders}, + date = {2015}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, + volume = {30}, + number = {7}, + pages = {1013--1028}, + issn = {1099-1255}, + doi = {10.1002/jae.2406}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jae.2406}, + urldate = {2023-02-03}, + abstract = {We explore the role of demand from emerging and developed economies as drivers of the real price of oil. Using a FAVAR model that identifies shocks from different regions of the world, we find that demand from emerging economies (most notably from Asian countries) is more than twice as important as demand from developed countries in accounting for the fluctuations in the real oil price and in oil production. Furthermore, geographical regions respond differently to adverse oil market shocks that drive up oil prices, with Europe and North America being more negatively affected than countries in Asia and South America. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ADNSI2B7/Aastveit et al. - 2015 - What Drives Oil Prices Emerging Versus Developed .pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/5TMTLZ9B/jae.html} +} + +@article{abelson1985, + title = {The Interpretation of Capitalized Hedonic Prices in a Dynamic Environment}, + author = {Abelson, P.W and Markandya, A}, + date = {1985-09}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {12}, + number = {3}, + pages = {195--206}, + issn = {00950696}, + doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(85)90030-0}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0095069685900300}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8VDBS2ML/Abelson and Markandya - 1985 - The interpretation of capitalized hedonic prices i.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BQGSIYNN/Abelson and Markandya - 1985 - The interpretation of capitalized hedonic prices i.pdf} +} + +@article{allen2023, + title = {Market-Oriented Solutions for Groundwater Commons through Collective-Action}, + author = {Allen, Jonah J. and Smith, Steven M.}, + date = {2023-04}, + journaltitle = {Environmental Research Letters}, + volume = {18}, + number = {4}, + pages = {045006}, + publisher = {IOP Publishing}, + location = {Bristol, United Kingdom}, + doi = {10.1088/1748-9326/acc8ec}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/2800878826/abstract/93FD12703F904731PQ/1?sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + abstract = {Groundwater scarcity poses threats to communities across the globe, and effectively managing those challenges requires designing policy that achieves institutional fit. Collective action is well-suited to match rules with local context, and multiple pathways exist for communities to achieve reductions in groundwater use. To better understand how local conditions influence rule design, we examine two groundwater-reliant communities in the Western US that engaged in collective-action to arrive at distinct groundwater management rules. We consider: what drove stakeholders in Northwestern Kansas (NWKS) and San Luis Valley, Colorado (SLV) to adopt local groundwater policies, and why were different management pathways chosen? Further, why is more heterogeneity observed between local management organizations in SLV as compared to NWKS? To investigate these questions, we employ grounded theory to interpret the rules in reference to local hydro-agro-economic statistics and interviews with stakeholders (n = 19) in each region selected by expert sampling. We find that the additional goals of groundwater rules in SLV, partially driven by key contrasts in the resource system compared to NWKS, and higher resource productivity in SLV, creates both the need for and efficacy of a price-centered policy. Furthermore, variation in the resource systems and associated farm characteristics between subdistricts drives higher heterogeneity in rule design between local management districts in SLV compared to NWKS. More generally, we find the local flexibility afforded through the collective-action process as critical, even if it were to arrive at alternative, non-economic based incentives.}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {045006}, + keywords = {Agricultural economics,Collective action,Economic,Economic statistics,Economics,Grounded theory,Groundwater,groundwater commons,Groundwater management,Heterogeneity,Incentives,irrigation,self-governance,Water scarcity}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/6H3V8XVP/Allen and Smith - 2023 - Market-oriented solutions for groundwater commons through collective-action.pdf} +} + +@article{anderson2018, + title = {Hotelling under {{Pressure}}}, + author = {Anderson, Soren T. and Kellogg, Ryan and Salant, Stephen W.}, + date = {2018-06}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {126}, + number = {3}, + pages = {984-1026}, + publisher = {University of Chicago}, + issn = {00223808}, + doi = {10.1086/697203}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/26550410}, + urldate = {02-12-2024}, + abstract = {We show that oil production from existing wells in Texas does not respond to oil prices, while drilling activity and costs respond strongly. To explain these facts, we reformulate Hotelling’s classic model of exhaustible resource extraction as a drilling problem: firms choose when to drill, but production from existing wells is constrained by reservoir pressure, which decays as oil is extracted. The model implies a modified Hotelling rule for drilling revenues net of costs, explains why the production constraint typically binds, and rationalizes regional production peaks and observed patterns of prices, drilling, and production following demand and supply shocks.}, + keywords = {HOTELS,OIL well drilling,PETROLEUM production,PETROLEUM sales & prices,TEXAS}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SARHAIYU/Anderson et al. - 2018 - Hotelling under Pressure.pdf} +} + +@article{athey2022, + title = {Design-Based Analysis in {{Difference-In-Differences}} Settings with Staggered Adoption}, + author = {Athey, Susan and Imbens, Guido W.}, + date = {2022-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Econometrics}, + volume = {226}, + number = {1}, + pages = {62--79}, + issn = {03044076}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.10.012}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304407621000488}, + urldate = {2023-07-14}, + abstract = {In this paper we study estimation of and inference for average treatment effects in a setting with panel data. We focus on the staggered adoption setting where units, e.g, individuals, firms, or states, adopt the policy or treatment of interest at a particular point in time, and then remain exposed to this treatment at all times afterwards. We take a design perspective where we investigate the properties of estimators and procedures given assumptions on the assignment process. We show that under random assignment of the adoption date the standard Difference-In-Differences (DID) estimator is an unbiased estimator of a particular weighted average causal effect. We characterize the exact finite sample properties of this estimand, and show that the standard variance estimator is conservative.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XUXRZ6EE/Athey and Imbens - 2022 - Design-based analysis in Difference-In-Differences.pdf} +} + +@article{ayres2018-secure-water, + title = {The {{Economic Value}} of {{Secure Water}}: {{Landowner Returns}} to {{Defining Groundwater Property Rights}}}, + shorttitle = {The {{Economic Value}} of {{Secure Water}}}, + author = {Ayres, Andrew B. and Meng, Kyle C.}, + date = {2018-03-13}, + journaltitle = {UC Office of the President: University of California Research Initiatives.}, + url = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/19113484}, + urldate = {2024-09-24}, + abstract = {Groundwater is a prime example of a common-pool resource subject to over-extraction and rent dissipation under open access. To avoid this, users can assign groundwater rights: a cap is set on the volume of groundwater that can be pumped annually, and rights are allocated among users. Although this process restricts pumping, it also improves long-term resource availability, grants a fungible asset that can be traded, and reduces uncertainty for urban developers. We investigate the effect on land values by exploiting a plausibly exogenous discontinuity in the definition of rights in the Mojave groundwater basin in California. Because both the long-term stream of agricultural rents and the value of tradable permits are capitalized into land value, spatial regression discontinuity designs identify the difference between the value of interior parcels with water rights and those of free riders on the exterior, who can drain from the regulated area with no restrictions. We find that the value of rights outweighs gains realized by free riders and that property rights increase land value by half. The large gains estimated here support the idea that the allocation of rights may be instrumental in convincing otherwise recalcitrant users to accept restrictions.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FFTIXBNR/Ayres and Meng - 2018 - The Economic Value of Secure Water Landowner Returns to Defining Groundwater Property Rights.pdf} +} + +@article{barragan-beaud2018, + title = {Carbon Tax or Emissions Trading? {{An}} Analysis of Economic and Political Feasibility of Policy Mechanisms for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction in the {{Mexican}} Power Sector}, + shorttitle = {Carbon Tax or Emissions Trading?}, + author = {Barragán-Beaud, Camila and Pizarro-Alonso, Amalia and Xylia, Maria and Syri, Sanna and Silveira, Semida}, + date = {2018-11}, + journaltitle = {Energy Policy}, + shortjournal = {Energy Policy}, + volume = {122}, + pages = {287--299}, + issn = {03014215}, + doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2018.07.010}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421518304579}, + urldate = {2023-07-24}, + abstract = {This study provides a comparative assessment of carbon-pricing instruments for the Mexican electricity sector, contrasting a carbon tax with an emissions trading scheme (ETS). The assessment is performed in terms of economic impacts and political feasibility. Model-based scenarios considering different price and quantity levels are analyzed on Balmorel-MX, a cost optimization bottom-up model of the Mexican electricity system. The political feasibility is evaluated using an online survey and interviews with representatives of relevant stakeholder groups. The assessment suggests that an ETS is the most appropriate instrument for the Mexican case. We recommend to set the cap as 31\% abatement in relation to a baseline, which is suggested to be 102 MtCO2 by 2030, given the business-as-usual baseline used as reference by the Mexican government (202 MtCO2) is found to leave cost-effective abatement potential untapped. An emission trading system with such design has higher costefficiency and lower distributional effects than a carbon tax at equivalent ambition level (15 USD/tCO2). The political feasibility analysis confirms the assessment, as it is in line with the priorities of the stakeholder groups, allows earmarking carbon revenue and avoids exempting natural gas from carbon pricing.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/44L7SPX6/Barragán-Beaud et al. - 2018 - Carbon tax or emissions trading An analysis of ec.pdf} +} + +@book{bennison1947, + title = {Ground Water: Its Development, Uses and Conservation}, + shorttitle = {Ground Water}, + author = {Bennison, E. W.}, + date = {1947}, + edition = {1st ed.}, + publisher = {Edward E. Johnson, Inc.}, + location = {St. Paul, Minnesota}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {509}, + keywords = {Groundwater,Water-supply engineering,Wells}, + url = {https://reader.library.cornell.edu/docviewer/digital?id=chla2902957#page/6/mode/1up}, + urldate = {2024-12-02} +} + +@article{besley2000, + title = {Unnatural {{Experiments}}? {{Estimating}} the {{Incidence}} of {{Endogenous Policies}}}, + shorttitle = {Unnatural {{Experiments}}?}, + author = {Besley, Timothy and Case, Anne}, + date = {2000}, + journaltitle = {The Economic Journal}, + volume = {110}, + number = {467}, + eprint = {2667771}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {F672-F694}, + publisher = {[Royal Economic Society, Wiley]}, + issn = {0013-0133}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/2667771}, + urldate = {2024-09-24}, + abstract = {There are numerous empirical studies that exploit variation in policies over space and time in the U.S. federal system. If state policy making is purposeful action, responsive to economic and political conditions within the state, then it is necessary to identify and control for the forces that lead to these policy changes. This paper investigates the implications of policy endogeneity for a specific policy context - workers' compensation benefits. We contrast different methods of estimation and their pros and cons in this context.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/5C2F55L8/Besley and Case - 2000 - Unnatural Experiments Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies.pdf} +} + +@article{bester2011, + title = {Inference with Dependent Data Using Cluster Covariance Estimators}, + author = {Bester, C. Alan and Conley, Timothy G. and Hansen, Christian B.}, + date = {2011-12}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Econometrics}, + volume = {165}, + number = {2}, + pages = {137--151}, + issn = {03044076}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.01.007}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304407611000431}, + urldate = {2024-03-05}, + abstract = {This paper presents an inference approach for dependent data in time series, spatial, and panel data applications. The method involves constructing t and Wald statistics using a cluster covariance matrix estimator (CCE). We use an approximation that takes the number of clusters/groups as fixed and the number of observations per group to be large. The resulting limiting distributions of the t and Wald statistics are standard t and F distributions where the number of groups plays the role of sample size. Using a small number of groups is analogous to ‘fixed-b’ asymptotics of Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002, 2005) (KV) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent inference. We provide simulation evidence that demonstrates that the procedure substantially outperforms conventional inference procedures.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/RJXG4JHD/Bester et al. - 2011 - Inference with dependent data using cluster covari.pdf} +} +@report{bexfield2010, + type = {Professional paper}, + title = {Conceptual {{Understanding}} and {{Groundwater Quality}} of {{Selected Basin-Fill Aquifers}} in the {{Southwestern United States}}}, + author = {Bexfield, Laura and Anderholm, Scott}, + date = {2010}, + series = {Professional {{Paper}}}, + number = {1781}, + pages = {288}, + institution = {United States Geological Survey}, + location = {Reston, Virginia}, + url = {https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1781/pdf/pp1781.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8BZFXNGV/2010 - Professional Paper.pdf} +} + +@article{binswanger1980, + title = {Attitudes {{Toward Risk}}: {{Experimental Measurement}} in {{Rural India}}}, + shorttitle = {Attitudes {{Toward Risk}}}, + author = {Binswanger, Hans P.}, + date = {1980}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {62}, + number = {3}, + pages = {395--407}, + issn = {1467-8276}, + doi = {10.2307/1240194}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1240194}, + urldate = {2024-05-26}, + abstract = {Attitudes toward risk were measured in 240 households using two methods: an interview method eliciting certainty equivalents and an experimental gambling approach with real payoffs which, at their maximum, exceeded monthly incomes of unskilled laborers. The interview method is subject to interviewer bias and its results were totally inconsistent with the experimental measures of risk aversion. Experimental measures indicate that, at high payoff levels, virtually all individuals are moderately risk-averse with little variation according to personal characteristics. Wealth tends to reduce risk aversion slightly, but its effect is not statistically significant.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {India,psychological experiments,risk aversion,semi-arid tropics}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3SYFCKPL/Binswanger - 1980 - Attitudes Toward Risk Experimental Measurement in.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9V7IFD49/1240194.html} +} + +@article{bondarev2020, + title = {Energy {{Consumption}} of {{Bitcoin Mining}}}, + author = {Bondarev, Mikhail}, + date = {2020-05-16}, + journaltitle = {International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy}, + volume = {10}, + number = {4}, + pages = {525--529}, + issn = {2146-4553}, + url = {https://econjournals.com/index.php/ijeep/article/view/9276}, + urldate = {2022-05-09}, + abstract = {Blockchain is one of the most popular terms associated with changes in the technological paradigm-taking place within the framework of the so-called "fourth industrial revolution". The Proof of Work algorithm is used for process transactions and ensure security in the Bitcoin network. The paper aims energy consumption of bitcoin mining. It implies the need for a network participant to solve a certain cryptographic task with energy consumption and predetermined final time for its completion. The methodology includes the analysis of relationship between active, reactive and apparent power is determined by the phase angle between the current and voltage in the network, more precisely, with the cosine of this angle - cosφ (power factor news). A correctly solved task is accepted by the network and included in the public transaction register. The participant who first provided such a solution receives a block reward. The main finding is that the solution of the energy consumption problem by other network participants, an order of magnitude less time is required.Keywords:~ industrial mining farms, Bitcoin mining, power factor reactive power, reactive power compensatorsJEL Classifications: C30, D12, Q41, Q48DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.9276}, + issue = {4}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UMZFTQR7/Bondarev - 2020 - Energy Consumption of Bitcoin Mining.pdf} +} + +@article{borusyak2021, + title = {Revisiting {{Event Study Designs}}: {{Robust}} and {{Efficient Estimation}}}, + shorttitle = {Revisiting {{Event Study Designs}}}, + author = {Borusyak, Kirill and Jaravel, Xavier and Spiess, Jann}, + date = {2021}, + journaltitle = {IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc}, + publisher = {Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis}, + location = {St. Louis}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/publiccontent/docview/2585910691?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-07-14}, + abstract = {A broad empirical literature uses "event study," or "difference-in-differences with staggered rollout," research designs for treatment effect estimation: settings in which units in the panel receive treatment at different times. We show a series of problems with conventional regression-based two-way fixed effects estimators, both static and dynamic. These problems arise when researchers conflate the identifying assumptions of parallel trends and no anticipatory effects, implicit assumptions that restrict treatment effect heterogeneity, and the specification of the estimand as a weighted average of treatment effects. We then derive the efficient estimator robust to treatment effect heterogeneity for this setting, show that it has a particularly intuitive "imputation" form when treatment-effect heterogeneity is unrestricted, characterize its asymptotic behavior, provide tools for inference, and illustrate its attractive properties in simulations. We further discuss appropriate tests for parallel trends, and show how our estimation approach extends to many settings beyond standard event studies.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Trends} +} + +@article{bouri2018, + title = {Testing for Asymmetric Nonlinear Short- and Long-Run Relationships between Bitcoin, Aggregate Commodity and Gold Prices}, + author = {Bouri, Elie and Gupta, Rangan and Lahiani, Amine and Shahbaz, Muhammad}, + date = {2018-08}, + journaltitle = {Resources Policy}, + shortjournal = {Resources Policy}, + volume = {57}, + pages = {224--235}, + issn = {03014207}, + doi = {10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.03.008}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301420718300163}, + urldate = {2023-02-05}, + abstract = {Unlike prior studies, this study examines the nonlinear, asymmetric and quantile effects of aggregate commodity index and gold prices on the price of Bitcoin. Using daily data from July 17, 2010 to February 2, 2017, we employed several advanced autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models. The nonlinear ARDL approach was applied to uncover short- and longrun asymmetries, whereas the quantile ARDL was applied to account for a second type of asymmetry, known as the distributional asymmetry according to the position of a dependent variable within its own distribution. Moreover, we extended the nonlinear ARDL to a quantile framework, leading to a richer new model, which allows testing for distributional asymmetry while accounting for short- and long-run asymmetries. Overall, our results indicate the possibility to predict Bitcoin price movements based on price information from the aggregate commodity index and gold prices. Importantly, we report the nuanced result that most often the relations between bitcoin and aggregate commodity, on the one hand, and between bitcoin and gold, on the other, are asymmetric, nonlinear, and quantiles-dependent, suggesting the need to apply non-standard cointegration models to uncover the complexity and hidden relations between Bitcoin and asset classes.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Asymmetry,Bitcoin,Cointegration,Commodity,Gold,Nonlinearity,Quantile dependence}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UNFZZ9NK/Bouri et al. - 2018 - Testing for asymmetric nonlinear short- and long-r.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TLVC9NFQ/S0301420718300163.html} +} + +@article{bredehoeft1983, + title = {Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water for Irrigated Agriculture: {{Risk}} Aversion}, + shorttitle = {Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water for Irrigated Agriculture}, + author = {Bredehoeft, John D. and Young, Robert A.}, + date = {1983}, + journaltitle = {Water Resources Research}, + volume = {19}, + number = {5}, + pages = {1111--1121}, + issn = {1944-7973}, + doi = {10.1029/WR019i005p01111}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/WR019i005p01111}, + urldate = {2024-05-08}, + abstract = {In examining the South Platte system in Colorado where surface water and groundwater are used conjunctively for irrigation, we find the actual installed well capacity is approximately sufficient to irrigate the entire area. This would appear to be an overinvestment in well capacity. In this paper we examine to what extent groundwater is being developed as insurance against periods of low streamflow. Using a simulation model which couples the hydrology of a conjunctive stream aquifer system to a behavioral-economic model which incorporates farmer behavior in such a system, we have investigated the economics of an area patterned after a reach of the South Platte Valley in Colorado. The results suggest that under current economic conditions the most reasonable groundwater pumping capacity is a total capacity capable of irrigating the available acreage with groundwater. Installing sufficient well capacity to irrigate all available acreage has two benefits: (1) this capacity maximizes the expected net benefits and (2) this capacity also minimizes the variation in annual income: it reduces the variance to essentially zero. As pumping capacity is installed in a conjunctive use system, the value of flow forecasts is diminished. Poor forecasts are compensated for by pumping groundwater.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XZL3XUPL/Bredehoeft and Young - 1983 - Conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water f.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/N5A6V93V/wr019i005p01111.html} +} + +@online{bredehoest1982, + title = {Ground-Water Models, v.1: {{Concepts}}, Problems, and Methods of Analysis with Examples of Their Application - {{UNESCO Digital Library}}}, + author = {Bredehoest, John and Betzinski, P. and Cruickshank Villanueva, Carlos and family=Marsily, given=Ghislain, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Uzoma, J. U .}, + date = {1982}, + url = {https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000048909}, + urldate = {2024-05-08}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4YQ8BC2V/pf0000048909.html} +} + +@article{brownjr.1972, + title = {Economic Optimization of a Single-Cell Aquifer}, + author = {Brown, Gardner and Deacon, Robert}, + date = {1972}, + journaltitle = {Water Resources Research}, + volume = {8}, + number = {3}, + pages = {557--564}, + issn = {1944-7973}, + doi = {10.1029/WR008i003p00557}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/WR008i003p00557}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Optimal economic use of an aquifer over time is analyzed under conditions of economic growth, inequality of groundwater withdrawal and consumption, and availability of surface water and artificial recharge. The value of an aquifer as a natural water quality treatment facility is derived.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/RB5B9TJA/Brown Jr. and Deacon - 1972 - Economic optimization of a single-cell aquifer.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8CGBBQQC/WR008i003p00557.html} +} + +@article{brozovic2010, + title = {On the Spatial Nature of the Groundwater Pumping Externality}, + author = {Brozović, Nicholas and Sunding, David L. and Zilberman, David}, + date = {2010-04-01}, + journaltitle = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + series = {Spatial {{Natural Resource}} and {{Environmental Economics}}}, + volume = {32}, + number = {2}, + pages = {154--164}, + issn = {0928-7655}, + doi = {10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.11.010}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765509000712}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Most existing economic analyses of optimal groundwater management use single-cell aquifer models, which assume that an aquifer responds uniformly and instantly to groundwater pumping. In this paper, we develop an economic model of groundwater management that explicitly incorporates spatial dynamic groundwater flow equations. Calibration of our model to published economic studies of specific aquifers demonstrates that existing studies generally incorrectly estimate the magnitude of the groundwater pumping externality relative to spatially explicit models. In particular, for large aquifers with surface areas of thousands of square miles, the marginal pumping externality predicted by single-cell models may be orders of magnitude less than that predicted by a spatially explicit model, even at large distances from a pumping well. Conversely, for small aquifers with areas of a few hundred square miles or less, single-cell models reasonably approximate the pumping externality. Application of single-cell models to inappropriate settings may result in misleading policy implications due to understatement of the magnitude and spatial nature of the groundwater externality.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Common property resource,Dynamic optimization,Groundwater}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XF43XRQR/Brozović et al. - 2010 - On the spatial nature of the groundwater pumping e.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JYZ4TYDF/S0928765509000712.html} +} + +@article{buck2014, + title = {Land {{Markets}} and the {{Value}} of {{Water}}: {{Hedonic Analysis Using Repeat Sales}} of {{Farmland}}}, + shorttitle = {Land {{Markets}} and the {{Value}} of {{Water}}}, + author = {Buck, Steven and Auffhammer, Maximilian and Sunding, David}, + date = {2014}, + journaltitle = {American journal of agricultural economics}, + volume = {96}, + number = {4}, + pages = {953--969}, + publisher = {Oxford University Press}, + issn = {0002-9092}, + doi = {10.1093/ajae/aau013}, + abstract = {The lack of robust water markets makes it difficult to value irrigation water. Because water rights are appurtenant to land, it is possible to infer the value of water from observed differences in the market price of land. We use panel data on repeat farmland sales in California's San Joaquin Valley to estimate a hedonic regression equation with parcel fixed effects. This controls for sources of omitted variables bias and allows us to recover the value of irrigation water to landowners in our sample. We show that a more traditional cross-sectional regression results in an artificially low value of irrigation water.}, + issue = {4}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Economic value ; Groundwater ; Agricultural prices ; Surface water ; Soil quality ; Irrigation water ; Land economics ; Farmlands ; Capitalized value ; Farming ; Supply and demand ; Usage ; Agricultural land ; Research}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2IK6H2Q5/Steven Buck et al. - 2014 - Land Markets and the Value of Water Hedonic Analy.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VJJ9H4I2/Steven Buck et al. - 2014 - Land Markets and the Value of Water Hedonic Analy.pdf} +} + +@article{burness1979, + title = {Appropriative {{Water Rights}} and the {{Efficient Allocation}} of {{Resources}}}, + author = {Burness, H. Stuart and Quirk, James P.}, + date = {1979-03}, + journaltitle = {American Economic Review}, + volume = {69}, + number = {1}, + pages = {25-37}, + publisher = {American Economic Association}, + issn = {00028282}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/1802494}, + urldate = {2021-07-14}, + abstract = {This article examines the efficiency implications of the appropriative doctrine at a long-run competitive equilibrium under simplified assumptions as to the legal status of water rights in the U.S. Historically, water rights to surface water in the U.S. have developed under two distinct legal doctrines, the English common law notion of riparian rights and the appropriative doctrine. Generally speaking, the riparian doctrine forms the basis for water law in the eastern states, while the western states have adopted the appropriative doctrine. Under the riparian doctrine, each property owner fronting on a lake or stream has a right to the unimpaired use of the waterway, regardless of the location of his property along the waterway and regardless of the time at which the property is acquired or use made of the waterway.}, + keywords = {LAND tenure,LAW & legislation,RIPARIAN rights,UNITED States,WATER laws,WATER rights}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7WYD4DT8/Burness and Quirk - 1979 - Appropriative Water Rights and the Efficient Alloc.pdf} +} + +@article{burness2001, + title = {The Role for Policy in Common Pool Groundwater Use}, + author = {Burness, H.Stuart and Brill, Thomas C.}, + date = {2001-01}, + journaltitle = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + volume = {23}, + number = {1}, + pages = {19--40}, + issn = {09287655}, + doi = {10.1016/S0928-7655(00)00029-4}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0928765500000294}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {We consider a model of intertemporal common pool groundwater use with substitutable irrigation technology and declining yields from groundwater stocks where pumping cost/stock externalities arise from the usual common property problem. We contrast competitive and optimal allocations and examine the role of substitutable irrigation capital vis-a-vis the effectuation of efficient methods as well as levels of resource use. A case study involving groundwater use in New Mexico illustrates the procedures and considers the efficacy of some simple policy options regarding the amelioration of inefficiencies. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.}, + issue = {1}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TB8PKML9/Burness and Brill - 2001 - The role for policy in common pool groundwater use.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WVNJ8QRQ/Burness and Brill - 2001 - The role for policy in common pool groundwater use.pdf} +} + +@article{butsic2007, + title = {Valuing {{Water Rights}} in {{Douglas County}}, {{Oregon}}, {{Using}} the {{Hedonic Price Method1}}}, + author = {Butsic, Van and Netusil, Noelwah R.}, + date = {2007}, + journaltitle = {JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association}, + volume = {43}, + number = {3}, + pages = {622--629}, + issn = {1752-1688}, + doi = {10.1111/j.1752-1688.2007.00049.x}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1752-1688.2007.00049.x}, + urldate = {2024-02-08}, + abstract = {Abstract: This paper uses the hedonic price method to estimate the value of an acre-foot of irrigation water in Douglas County, Oregon. The analysis uses detailed information from 113 arms-length transactions of farmland for 2000 and 2001. The estimated willingness-to-accept of \$261 to sell an acre-foot of irrigation water is consistent with other studies and recent transactions in the study area. Estimates for the value of leasing water are provided using a range of discount rates and leasing periods.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {agriculture,economics,hedonic price method,instream flow,water right,water value}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SGJJPI9S/j.1752-1688.2007.00049.html} +} + +@article{callaway2021, + title = {Difference-in-{{Differences}} with Multiple Time Periods}, + author = {Callaway, Brantly and Sant’Anna, Pedro H. C.}, + date = {2021-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Econometrics}, + series = {Themed {{Issue}}: {{Treatment Effect}} 1}, + volume = {225}, + number = {2}, + pages = {200--230}, + issn = {0304-4076}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.12.001}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407620303948}, + urldate = {2023-04-05}, + abstract = {In this article, we consider identification, estimation, and inference procedures for treatment effect parameters using Difference-in-Differences (DiD) with (i) multiple time periods, (ii) variation in treatment timing, and (iii) when the “parallel trends assumption” holds potentially only after conditioning on observed covariates. We show that a family of causal effect parameters are identified in staggered DiD setups, even if differences in observed characteristics create non-parallel outcome dynamics between groups. Our identification results allow one to use outcome regression, inverse probability weighting, or doubly-robust estimands. We also propose different aggregation schemes that can be used to highlight treatment effect heterogeneity across different dimensions as well as to summarize the overall effect of participating in the treatment. We establish the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimators and prove the validity of a computationally convenient bootstrap procedure to conduct asymptotically valid simultaneous (instead of pointwise) inference. Finally, we illustrate the relevance of our proposed tools by analyzing the effect of the minimum wage on teen employment from 2001–2007. Open-source software is available for implementing the proposed methods.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Difference-in-Differences,Doubly robust,Dynamic treatment effects,Event study,Semi-parametric,Treatment effect heterogeneity,Variation in treatment timing}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3TN9AN63/Callaway and Sant’Anna - 2021 - Difference-in-Differences with multiple time perio.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YAFNC2LT/S0304407620303948.html} +} + +@article{carey2001, + title = {Emerging {{Markets}} in {{Water}}: {{A Comparative Institutional Analysis}} of the {{Central Valley}} and {{Colorado-Big Thompson Projects}}}, + shorttitle = {Emerging {{Markets}} in {{Water}}}, + author = {Carey, Janis M. and Sunding, David L.}, + date = {2001}, + journaltitle = {Natural Resources Journal}, + shortjournal = {Nat. Resources J.}, + volume = {41}, + number = {2}, + pages = {283--328}, + url = {https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/narj41&i=305}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/V9Z6YWWA/Carey and Sunding - 2001 - Emerging Markets in Water A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-B.pdf} +} + +@article{carlson1973, + title = {Seasonal {{Farm Labor}} in the {{San Luis Valley}}}, + author = {Carlson, Alvar W.}, + date = {1973-03}, + journaltitle = {Annals of the Association of American Geographers}, + volume = {63}, + number = {1}, + pages = {97--108}, + publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Ltd.}, + issn = {00045608}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/2561953}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {Specialty agriculture has been the mainstay of the agricultural economy of the San Luis Valley, Colorado. The dependence of Valley farmers upon thousands of local, intrastate, and interstate seasonal farm laborers is important in understanding the evolution of this agricultural region. Spanish-surname people have been available for farm labor since the early settlement of the Valley.}, + keywords = {Agriculture,Colorado,Migrant agricultural workers,New Mexico,Rural industries,San Luis Valley (Colo. & N.M.),United States}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3M9U864G/Carlson - 1973 - Seasonal Farm Labor in the San Luis Valley.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/LNMGNA38/Carlson - 1973 - Seasonal Farm Labor in the San Luis Valley.pdf} +} + +@online{CCWCD2020, + title = {{{CCWCD History}}}, + author = {{Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}}, + shortauthor = {{CCWCD}}, + date = {2020-05-08T22:20:42+00:00}, + url = {https://ccwcd.org/ccwcd-history/}, + urldate = {2021-03-02}, + abstract = {WHERE THE FUTURE FLOWS The Central Colorado Water Conservancy District was formed in 1965, and is a political subdivision of the State of Colorado. The District covers approximately 475,000 acres, and was formed under the Water Conservancy Act of 1937. The mission statement of Central}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/38I5MUDN/ccwcd-history.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ADXL98KU/ccwcd-history.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/L8WDUTHK/ccwcd-history.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/T9DLDBCT/ccwcd-history.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/V3FWBPDQ/ccwcd-history.html} +} + +@online{centralcoloradowaterconservancydistrict2023, + type = {CCWCD Where the Future Flows}, + title = {{{CCWCD History}}}, + author = {{Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}}, + shortauthor = {{CCWCD}}, + date = {2023-12-29T17:15:47+00:00}, + url = {https://ccwcd.org/about-us-2/}, + urldate = {2021-01-01}, + abstract = {ABOUT US OUR NAME Central Colorado Water Conservancy District is known by several names, which are often used interchangeably. These are those most common: Central Colorado Water CCWCD Central Colorado Water Conservancy District To make things even more confusing; we}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9CK24B6C/about-us-2.html} +} + +@online{centralcoloradowaterconservancydistrict2024, + title = {{{WAS}} Well Augmentation Subdistrict}, + author = {{Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}}, + shortauthor = {{CCWCD}}, + date = {2024-01-02T18:32:48+00:00}, + url = {https://ccwcd.org/was/}, + urldate = {2024-09-26}, + abstract = {WAS well augmentation subdistrict The WAS quota for the 2024 - 2025 water season was set at 65\% at the March 19, 2024 Board Meeting. CREATED in 2004, the Well Augmentation Subdistrict (WAS) has been through many battles. The story began in 1969 when}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Central Colorado Water Conservancy District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BAD4N2Y9/was.html} +} + +@online{chiang2023, + title = {Standard Errors for Two-Way Clustering with Serially Correlated Time Effects}, + author = {Chiang, Harold D. and Hansen, Bruce E. and Sasaki, Yuya}, + date = {2023-12-13}, + eprint = {2201.11304}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {econ}, + doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2201.11304}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.11304}, + urldate = {2024-09-25}, + abstract = {We propose improved standard errors and an asymptotic distribution theory for two-way clustered panels. Our proposed estimator and theory allow for arbitrary serial dependence in the common time effects, which is excluded by existing two-way methods, including the popular two-way cluster standard errors of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and the cluster bootstrap of Menzel (2021). Our asymptotic distribution theory is the first which allows for this level of inter-dependence among the observations. Under weak regularity conditions, we demonstrate that the least squares estimator is asymptotically normal, our proposed variance estimator is consistent, and t-ratios are asymptotically standard normal, permitting conventional inference. We present simulation evidence that confidence intervals constructed with our proposed standard errors obtain superior coverage performance relative to existing methods. We illustrate the relevance of the proposed method in an empirical application to a standard Fama-French three-factor regression.}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Economics - Econometrics}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UHNK7AQ6/Chiang et al. - 2023 - Standard errors for two-way clustering with serially correlated time effects.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4EVQKFST/2201.html} +} + +@jurisdiction{coats2003, + title = {{{Moyer}} v. {{Empire lodge homeowners association}}}, +% author = {Coats, Nathan}, + date = {2003-10-20}, + citation = {{Supreme Court of Colorado, 02SA220}}, + number = {02SA220}, + institution = {Supreme Court of Colorado}, + url = {https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/co-supreme-court/1262144.html}, + urldate = {2024-03-18}, + abstract = {Case opinion for CO Supreme Court MOYER v. EMPIRE LODGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. Read the Court's full decision on FindLaw.}, + langid = {american}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JS8WBUSC/1262144.html} +} + +@article{cobourn2015, + title = {Externalities and {{Simultaneity}} in {{Surface Water}}‐{{Groundwater Systems}}: {{Challenges}} for {{Water Rights Institutions}}}, + shorttitle = {Externalities and {{Simultaneity}} in {{Surface Water}}‐{{Groundwater Systems}}}, + author = {Cobourn, Kelly M.}, + date = {2015-04}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + shortjournal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {97}, + number = {3}, + pages = {786--808}, + issn = {0002-9092, 1467-8276}, + doi = {10.1093/ajae/aav001}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1093/ajae/aav001}, + urldate = {2023-07-24}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VZ5EZNZI/Cobourn - 2015 - Externalities and Simultaneity in Surface Water‐Gr.pdf} +} + +@article{cody2015, + title = {Emergence of {{Collective Action}} in a {{Groundwater Commons}}: {{Irrigators}} in the {{San Luis Valley}} of {{Colorado}}}, + shorttitle = {Emergence of {{Collective Action}} in a {{Groundwater Commons}}}, + author = {Cody, Kelsey and Smith, Steven and Cox, Michael and Andersson, Krister}, + date = {2015-02-12}, + journaltitle = {Society and Natural Resources}, + shortjournal = {Society and Natural Resources}, + doi = {10.1080/08941920.2014.970736}, + abstract = {Under what conditions are irrigators able to develop adaptive governance arrangements? This paper addresses this question by developing an empirically-grounded theory of self-governance of a snowmelt commons in Southern Colorado. Drawing on previous work in collective action and institutional theory, we argue that self-regulation of the hydro-commons is driven by changes in shared user perceptions with regards to the salience and scarcity of the resource, as well as the perceived probability of salvaging the resource system. We further posit that several conditioning factors affect the likelihood of effective local responses, including the existing institutional arrangements for self-governance, techno-institutional complementarities, and vested interests. We test and refine our theoretical argument by conducting a historical analysis of regional responses to hydrological, social, and institutional disturbances in Colorado’s San Luis Valley.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/IKWUFJCM/Cody et al. - 2015 - Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Co.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/Z66QLQJ2/Cody et al. - 2015 - Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Co.pdf} +} + +@thesis{cody2018, + title = {Institutions of {{Self-Governing Irrigation Systems}} and {{Climate Change Adaptation}} in the {{Upper Rio Grande Basin}}}, + author = {Cody, Kelsey Charles}, + date = {2018}, + institution = {ProQuest Dissertations \& Theses}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/2165479652/abstract/}, + urldate = {2024-09-25}, + abstract = {Self-governed irrigation systems cover about three quarters of global irrigated cropland, are essential to meeting global food security, and are threatened by climate change. Maintaining and improving irrigation performance depends on institutions, the rules, norms, and strategies used to organize economic behavior. However, the influence of institutions on irrigation performance is ambiguous and context dependent, as the shortcomings of decades of “panaceas” have shown. Therefore, for the benefit of academics, policy-makers, water managers, and irrigators alike, this dissertation asks the question: how do rules interact with context—specifically, biophysical context, other rules, and cultural norms—to influence irrigation performance in self-governing irrigation systems under climate change? To answer this question, the following chapters investigate three essential institutional features of irrigation systems and other long-lived common pool resource regimes: de facto access rights, allocation and distribution rules, and monitoring rules. The empirical chapters use original data to investigate the Upper Rio Grande Basin of North America, where Spanish and American self-governing irrigation systems have been adapting snowmelt-driven irrigation to a high desert valley for over 350 and 150 years, respectively, and have recently faced signals of climate change. Following the Institutional Analysis and Development framework and Common Pool Resource theory, this dissertation develops three arguments. First, de facto Prior Appropriation water rights are a reliably strong influence on irrigation performance, but they significantly interact with biophysical context such that de facto water rights have little to no influence. Second, during water scarcity, rules for flexible water allocation and rotational water distribution interact with each other and with water availability to influence irrigation performance differently at different locations within an irrigation system, with implications for inequality and continued collective action. Third, historical selection pressures are associated with institutional and technological features of irrigation systems and internalized norms. These norms interact with monitoring rules to influence the amount and equality of crop production and can conflict with water allocation rules in ways that harm performance in scarcity. Collectively, these arguments highlight the importance of a contextual, diagnostic approach to policy change and the need for further investigation into self-governing irrigation systems under long-term and accelerating climate change.}, + isbn = {9780438767553}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Political planning,Public policy} +} + +@article{cody2019, + title = {The Evolution of Norms and Their Influence on Performance among Self-Governing Irrigation Systems in the {{Southwestern United States}}}, + author = {Cody, Kelsey}, + date = {2019-04-25}, + journaltitle = {International Journal of the Commons}, + shortjournal = {Int J Commons}, + volume = {13}, + number = {1}, + pages = {578}, + issn = {1875-0281}, + doi = {10.18352/ijc.910}, + url = {https://thecommonsjournal.org/article/10.18352/ijc.910/}, + urldate = {2024-02-06}, + abstract = {Irrigation is important for global food supply and is vulnerable to climate change. Internalized cultural norms are important for the performance of Common Pool Resource (CPR) regimes such as irrigation systems, but much is unknown about the role of norms in shaping irrigation performance. This paper applies multi-level selection (MLS) theory and CPR theory to a stratified, semirandom sample of 71 irrigation systems of distinct cultural origins in the Upper Rio Grande Basin of the United States to test hypotheses related to the role of norms in irrigation system form and function. Results show that internalized norms of cooperation are strongly associated with the rules and technologies adopted by irrigators, the frequency of water use violations, average crop production, and the equality of crop production. Systems with internalized norms of cooperation have adopted rules and technologies which are associated with increased care for the commons, public goods, and higher equality between irrigators. Further, agents designated as monitors of CPR use have different effects depending on whether irrigators possess cooperative or competitive norms. Notably, the presence of monitors that enforce rules that are incongruent with norms is associated with increased water use violations and lower average crop production. These findings add weight to the growing body of work giving greater attention to cultural context when analyzing user-governed CPR regimes and climate resilience, and further illustrate the compatibility of MLS theory with other prevailing theories in CPR research.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/B3373H8Y/Cody - 2019 - The evolution of norms and their influence on perf.pdf} +} + +@article{coglianese2017, + title = {Anticipation, {{Tax Avoidance}}, and the {{Price Elasticity}} of {{Gasoline Demand}}}, + author = {Coglianese, John and Davis, Lucas W. and Kilian, Lutz and Stock, James H.}, + date = {2017}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, + volume = {32}, + number = {1}, + pages = {1--15}, + issn = {1099-1255}, + doi = {10.1002/jae.2500}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jae.2500}, + urldate = {2023-02-26}, + abstract = {Least-squares estimates of the response of gasoline consumption to a change in the gasoline price are biased toward zero, given the endogeneity of gasoline prices. A seemingly natural solution to this problem is to instrument for gasoline prices using gasoline taxes, but this approach tends to yield implausibly large price elasticities. We demonstrate that anticipatory behavior provides an important explanation for this result. Gasoline buyers increase purchases before tax increases and delay purchases before tax decreases, rendering the tax instrument endogenous. Including suitable leads and lags in the regression restores the validity of the IV estimator, resulting in much lower elasticity estimates. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2EKKNAE5/Coglianese et al. - 2017 - Anticipation, Tax Avoidance, and the Price Elastic.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UN2SR4VN/jae.html} +} + +@article{crouter1987, + title = {Hedonic {{Estimation Applied}} to a {{Water Rights Market}}}, + author = {Crouter, Jan P.}, + date = {1987-08}, + journaltitle = {Land Economics}, + shortjournal = {Land Economics}, + volume = {63}, + number = {3}, + pages = {259}, + publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, + issn = {00237639}, + doi = {10.2307/3146835}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/3146835}, + urldate = {2021-02-26}, + abstract = {Much of the current literature on water rights is concerned with the efficiency of water allocations where there are legal and institutional constraints on water rights trades. Economists have argued that such constraints prohibit water from moving to its socially highest valued uses and hence, that the allocation of water under these restrictions is inefficient. On the other hand, if water rights associated with a certain parcel of farm real estate could be sold separately from the land in a perfectly competitive market, the allocation of water would be efficient. The past attempts to examine and compare the efficiency of water rights markets have been qualitative. This paper provides a quantitative basis for assessing the efficiency of a regional water rights market. In the absence of externalities and public goods problems, water rights markets, which are separate from land markets and in which arbitrage yields a competitive price system, may be termed efficient in allocating water. The questions of seperability and competitiveness are analyzed empirically by estimating the hedonic price function for farm real estate. Such a function relates a parcel's selling price to its attributes: quantities of land and water, value of improvements, and location.}, + keywords = {Competition,Economics,Externalities,Pricing,Water laws,Water rights}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/5X4BHLQF/Crouter - 1987 - Hedonic Estimation Applied to a Water Rights Marke.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/U8YBGR2K/Crouter - 1987 - Hedonic Estimation Applied to a Water Rights Marke.pdf} +} + +@article{dai2022, + title = {An {{Assessment}} of the {{Impact}} of {{Natural Resource Price}} and {{Global Economic Policy Uncertainty}} on {{Financial Asset Performance}}: {{Evidence From Bitcoin}}}, + shorttitle = {An {{Assessment}} of the {{Impact}} of {{Natural Resource Price}} and {{Global Economic Policy Uncertainty}} on {{Financial Asset Performance}}}, + author = {Dai, Maoyu and Qamruzzaman, Md and Hamadelneel Adow, Anass}, + date = {2022}, + journaltitle = {Frontiers in environmental science}, + volume = {10}, + publisher = {Frontiers Media S.A}, + issn = {2296-665X}, + doi = {10.3389/fenvs.2022.897496}, + abstract = {The aim of this study is to gauge the impact of global economic policy uncertainty and natural resource prices, that is, oil prices and gold prices, on Bitcoin returns by using monthly data spanning from May 2013 to December 2021. The study applies ARDL and nonlinear ARDL for evaluating the symmetric and asymmetric effects of Global Economic Uncertainty (GU), oil price (O), and natural gas price on Bitcoin volatility investigated by using the ARCH-GARCH-ERAGCH and non-granger causality test. ARDL model estimation establishes a long-run cointegration between GU, O, G, and Bitcoin. Moreover, GU and oil price exhibits a negative association with Bitcoin and positive influences running from gold price shock to Bitcoin in the long run. NARDL results ascertain the long-run asymmetric relations between GU, oil price, gold price (G), and Bitcoin return. Furthermore, GU’s asymmetric effect and positive shock in gold price negatively linked to Bitcoin return in the long run, whereas asymmetric shock in oil price and negative shocks in gold price established a positive linkage with Bitcoin. The results of ARCH effects disclose the volatility persistence in the variables. The causality test reveals that the feedback hypothesis explains the causal effects between GU and Bitcoin and unidirectional causality running from Bitcoin to gold price and oil price to Bitcoin.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {ARDL,Bitcoin,global economic uncertainty,gold price,NARDL,oil price}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4SLWDSGQ/Dai et al. - 2022 - An Assessment of the Impact of Natural Resource Pr.pdf} +} + +@article{dailey2022, + entrysubtype = {newspaper}, + title = {A Major Oil Company Is Selling Gas to Bitcoin Miners in {{North Dakota}} Instead of Burning off Excess Supply}, + author = {Dailey, Natasha}, + date = {2022-11-06}, + journaltitle = {Markets Insider}, + url = {https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/conocophillips-sells-natural-gas-north-dakota-bitcoin-miners-bakken-shale-2022-2}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {The sale to third-party miners is part of ConocoPhillips' goal to reach zero routine gas flaring by 2025.}, + langid = {american}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WQECGZWL/conocophillips-sells-natural-gas-north-dakota-bitcoin-miners-bakken-shale-2022-2.html} +} + +@article{daniels2010, + title = {Understanding the Impacts of {{Costa Rica}}'s {{PES}}: {{Are}} We Asking the Right Questions?}, + shorttitle = {Understanding the Impacts of {{Costa Rica}}'s {{PES}}}, + author = {Daniels, Amy E. and Bagstad, Kenneth and Esposito, Valerie and Moulaert, Azur and Rodriguez, Carlos Manuel}, + date = {2010-09}, + journaltitle = {Ecological Economics}, + shortjournal = {Ecological Economics}, + volume = {69}, + number = {11}, + pages = {2116--2126}, + issn = {09218009}, + doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.06.011}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0921800910002363}, + urldate = {2023-07-21}, + abstract = {PES is an increasingly mainstream tool for influencing land-use decisions on private land and Costa Rica's experience provides critical insight. We review findings of PES impacts on forest cover, a proxy for forestbased ecosystem services. National studies conclude that PES has not lowered deforestation rates. Yet in northern Costa Rica, there is evidence of additionality for PES-related avoided deforestation. Moreover, subnational studies of bi-directional forest cover change, along with farm-level interview data and an understanding of ground-based operations, demonstrate that avoided deforestation is an incomplete measure of PES impact. Sub-national case studies suggest PES is associated with agricultural abandonment and net gains in forest cover via forest regeneration and plantation establishment. Explanations include that forest regeneration has always been an accepted PES modality for some regions. Also, early PES cohorts have an implicit spatial correlation with pre-PES incentives focusing exclusively on reforestation. Without understanding de facto PES implementation, it is impossible to appropriately evaluate PES impacts or discern whether PES outcomes—positive or negative—are due to PES design or its implementation. This distinction is critical in refining our understanding of both the utility and limitations of PES and has some practical implications for PES-style REDD initiatives.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/935VWFKG/Daniels et al. - 2010 - Understanding the impacts of Costa Rica's PES Are.pdf} +} + +@online{danielsson2021, + title = {What Happens If Bitcoin Succeeds?}, + author = {Danielsson, Jon}, + date = {2021-02-26}, + url = {https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/what-happens-if-bitcoin-succeeds}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {As the price of~bitcoin~continues to rise, this column argues that most of us would not want to live in a society where bitcoin succeeds. Fortunately, the internal contradictions and perverse consequences of~cryptocurrencies' success mean that they are destined for failure. Until then, it might make sense for speculators to ride the cryptocurrency bubble, so long as they get out in time.}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {CEPR}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/D5LRVDGJ/what-happens-if-bitcoin-succeeds.html} +} + +@article{dechaisemartin2020, + title = {Two-{{Way Fixed Effects Estimators}} with {{Heterogeneous Treatment Effects}}}, + author = {De Chaisemartin, Clément and D’Haultfœuille, Xavier}, + date = {2020-09-01}, + journaltitle = {American Economic Review}, + shortjournal = {American Economic Review}, + volume = {110}, + number = {9}, + pages = {2964--2996}, + issn = {0002-8282}, + doi = {10.1257/aer.20181169}, + url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181169}, + urldate = {2023-07-14}, + abstract = {Linear regressions with period and group fixed effects are widely used to estimate treatment effects. We show that they estimate weighted sums of the average treatment effects (ATE ) in each group and period, with weights that may be negative. Due to the negative weights, the linear regression coefficient may for instance be negative while all the ATEs are positive. We propose another estimator that solves this issue. In the two applications we revisit, it is significantly different from the linear regression estimator. (JEL C21, C23, D72, J31, J51, L82)}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MGXVB3VV/De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille - 2020 - Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneou.pdf} +} + +@report{dieter2018, + type = {Circular}, + title = {Estimated {{Use}} of {{Water}} in the {{United States}} in 2015}, + author = {Dieter, Cheryl and Maupin, Molly and Caldwell, Rodney and Harris, Melissa and Ivahnenko, Tamara and Lovelace, John and Barber, Nancy and Linsey, Kristin}, + date = {2018}, + series = {Circular}, + institution = {United States Geological Survey}, + url = {https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1441/circ1441.pdf}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YCY7NVFM/2018 - Circular.pdf} +} + +@article{drysdale2018, + title = {Adaptation to an Irrigation Water Restriction Imposed through Local Governance}, + author = {Drysdale, Krystal M. and Hendricks, Nathan P.}, + date = {2018-09-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {91}, + pages = {150--165}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.002}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617304345}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {We estimate how farmers adapted to a water restriction imposed through local governance. The restriction imposed a uniform quota on water use with a 5-year allocation and allowed trading of the quota within the restricted area. Our analysis exploits unique micro-level data on irrigated water use, irrigated acreage, and crops. We use a difference-in-differences econometric strategy that also includes farmer-time fixed effects to estimate the response to the restriction, where we exploit water rights between 2 and 5 miles of the policy boundary as a control group. Results indicate that farmers reduced water use by 26\% due to the policy with most of the response due to reductions in water use intensity on the same crops rather than through reductions in irrigated acreage or changes in crops. The results imply that the short-run welfare impact of the policy was smaller than a policy that reduces irrigated acreage.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/B64R5LZL/Drysdale and Hendricks - 2018 - Adaptation to an irrigation water restriction impo.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VWGJBXQ6/Drysdale and Hendricks - 2018 - Adaptation to an irrigation water restriction impo.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/N4SV8WKH/S0095069617304345.html} +} + +@article{edwards2016, + title = {What {{Lies Beneath}}? {{Aquifer Heterogeneity}} and the {{Economics}} of {{Groundwater Management}}}, + shorttitle = {What {{Lies Beneath}}?}, + author = {Edwards, Eric C.}, + date = {2016-06}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + volume = {3}, + number = {2}, + pages = {453--491}, + publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, + issn = {2333-5955}, + doi = {10.1086/685389}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/685389}, + urldate = {2023-06-26}, + abstract = {This paper examines the distribution of economic benefits from groundwater management as a consequence of underlying aquifer characteristics. The portions of an aquifer where water moves rapidly, those with high hydraulic conductivity, as well as those that receive less yearly recharge, face a more costly common-pool problem and therefore receive higher benefits from management. The introduction of management districts in Kansas is used to test the effect of underlying aquifer characteristics on changes in agricultural land value, farm size, and crop choice. A landowner in a county with hydraulic conductivity one standard deviation higher sees a relative land value increase of 5\%–8\% when management is implemented. Counties with lower recharge also see relative increases in land value. Changes in farm size and percentage of cropland in corn are also consistent with the proposition that the effect of management is unequal and depends on properties of the physical system.}, + keywords = {Common-pool resources,D70,Groundwater,Property rights,Q15,Q25,Q56}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/T2LDKFN2/Edwards - 2016 - What Lies Beneath Aquifer Heterogeneity and the E.pdf} +} + +@article{edwards2021, + title = {The {{Economics}} of {{Groundwater Governance Institutions}} across the {{Globe}}}, + author = {Edwards, Eric C. and Guilfoos, Todd}, + date = {2021}, + journaltitle = {Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy}, + volume = {43}, + number = {4}, + pages = {1571--1594}, + issn = {2040-5804}, + doi = {10.1002/aepp.13088}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/aepp.13088}, + urldate = {2024-05-08}, + abstract = {This article provides an economic framework for understanding the emergence and purpose of groundwater governance across the globe. We examine ten basins located on six continents via an integrated assessment along three dimensions: characteristics of the groundwater resource; externality problems; and governance institutions. Groundwater governance addresses local externalities to balance the benefits of reducing common pool losses with the costs of doing so. While broad, basin-wide solutions to open access pumping are limited, spatially localized externality problems raise the benefits of management actions, allowing for the implementation of more stringent pumping controls in certain areas.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Externalities,Governance,Groundwater,Institutions,Irrigation,Q25,Q28}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FIPTVCJU/Edwards and Guilfoos - 2021 - The Economics of Groundwater Governance Institutio.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YKGXMGWQ/aepp.html} +} + +@thesis{ekpe2021, + title = {Pumping {{Fees}} and {{Spillovers}} in the {{Groundwater Commons}}: {{An Evaluation}} of a {{Conservation Tool}} and {{Irrigator Competitive Behavior}}}, + shorttitle = {Pumping {{Fees}} and {{Spillovers}} in the {{Groundwater Commons}}}, + author = {Ekpe, Godwin Kwabla}, + date = {2021}, + institution = {ProQuest Dissertations Publishing}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/docview/2555626198?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {My dissertation examines the effectiveness of pumping fees in groundwater commons agricultural irrigation as a conservation tool in the presence of varying water scarcity levels and spatial interdependence among irrigators. The first chapter provides a brief overview of three important areas of groundwater commons irrigation addressed in this dissertation. The second chapter’s objectives are two-fold. First, I review the common-pool resources literature relative to concerns of sustainable extraction and implementation of conservation policies focusing on pricing incentives in the management of groundwater commons where irrigators share the same underlying aquifer. Second, I introduce a theoretical model involving incorporating a non-constant marginal cost of water dependent on a Pigouvian tax anddepth to water as cost-metric water scarcity measure into a multi-crop agricultural production theoretical model. This model motivates the empirical investigation of how irrigators are impacted differently by implementation of a conservation fee designed as a constant per unit water withdrawal (pumping) tax, based on the varying levels of scarcity they are con-fronted with. The third chapter describes the data and the sources of the data used in the dissertation as well as the implementation of a pumping fee in San Luis Valley of Colorado, the study region. In the fourth chapter, I present and estimate an empirical model motivated by the theoretical model of Chapter 2. The empirical investigation reveals that irrigators are impacted differently by the pumping fee based on the varying levels of scarcity they are face with. The fifth chapter builds on the analysis in the fourth chapter. Having established differential effects of the pumping fee on irrigators based on scarcity levels, I proceed to investigate how this might affect the distributional efficiency of this pricing policy. I categorize irrigators into two groups—low water-stress severity and high water-stress severity statuses – based on whether they have faced continuous scarcity for at least two successive irrigation or growing seasons. I interact this dummy variable with the pumping fee policy variable and conduct a panel quantile regression analysis. The result of this chapter shows that severely water-stressed irrigators with low pumping levels bear a disproportionate portion of the pumping tax burden, suggesting that a constant per unit pumping fee is regressive and may not be distributionally efficient in addressing conservation in groundwater commons in the long run. In the sixth chapter, I adopt a game theoretic approach, modelling possible interaction among irrigating units, to investigate the strategic responses of these irrigating units. Irrigating units may alter their irrigating habits in response to changes in irrigation choices and other farming input decisions by neighbors. I estimate Spatial Durbin Models, includinga Spatial Durbin fractional Probit model to explore whether spillover effects exist among irrigating units in terms of water use intensity, acreage size choice and production (land) use intensity. I control for the pumping fee, surface water use, depth to water levels (scarcity), types and acres of crops cultivated, and other irrigating unit specific characteristics, including their spatially lagged counterparts. The results indicate that in determining the amount of water use intensity, acreage size choices, and production intensity, irrigating units consider the choices of neighbors, with the strength of spatial dependency being highest for production intensity. Additionally, there are significant spillover (indirect) effects from changes in key covariates that show inadequacy of estimating only direct effects.}, + isbn = {9798516959134}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Adjustment,Agricultural economics,Agriculture,Aquifers,Climate Change,Competition,Drought,Economics,Efficiency,Environmental economics,Estimates,Fees & charges,Groundwater,Irrigation,Variables,Water Resources Management,Water shortages}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EC424HFP/Ekpe - 2021 - Pumping Fees and Spillovers in the Groundwater Com.pdf} +} + +@article{engel2008, + title = {Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and Practice: {{An}} Overview of the Issues}, + shorttitle = {Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and Practice}, + author = {Engel, Stefanie and Pagiola, Stefano and Wunder, Sven}, + date = {2008-05}, + journaltitle = {Ecological Economics}, + shortjournal = {Ecological Economics}, + volume = {65}, + number = {4}, + pages = {663--674}, + issn = {09218009}, + doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.011}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0921800908001420}, + urldate = {2023-07-18}, + abstract = {Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/D73IYQ4S/Engel et al. - 2008 - Designing payments for environmental services in t.pdf} +} + +@article{erdos2012, + title = {Have Oil and Gas Prices Got Separated?}, + author = {Erdős, Péter}, + date = {2012-10-01}, + journaltitle = {Energy Policy}, + shortjournal = {Energy Policy}, + series = {Special {{Section}}: {{Fuel Poverty Comes}} of {{Age}}: {{Commemorating}} 21 {{Years}} of {{Research}} and {{Policy}}}, + volume = {49}, + pages = {707--718}, + issn = {0301-4215}, + doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.022}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512006039}, + urldate = {2022-10-13}, + abstract = {This paper applies vector error correction models that show that oil and natural gas prices decoupled around 2009. Before 2009, US and UK gas prices had a long-term equilibrium with crude prices to which gas prices always reverted after exogenous shocks. Both US and UK gas prices adjusted to the crude oil price individually, and departure from the equilibrium gas price on one continent resulted in a similar departure on the other. After an exogenous shock, the adjustment between US and UK gas prices took approximately 20 weeks on average, and the convergence was mediated mainly by crude oil with a necessary condition that arbitrage across the Atlantic was possible. After 2009, however, the UK gas price has remained integrated with oil price, but the US gas price decoupled from crude oil price and the European gas price, as the Atlantic arbitrage has halted. The oversupply from shale gas production has not been mitigated by North American export, as there has been no liquefying and export capacity.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Atlantic arbitrage,Gas prices,Oil prices}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MKFS3IQ4/Erdős - 2012 - Have oil and gas prices got separated.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/64HZM5PP/S0301421512006039.html} +} + +@article{esmaeili2011, + title = {Valuation of Irrigation Water in {{South-western Iran}} Using a Hedonic Pricing Model}, + author = {Esmaeili, Abdoulkarim and Shahsavari, Zahra}, + date = {2011-12}, + journaltitle = {Applied Water Science}, + volume = {1}, + number = {3-4}, + pages = {119--124}, + publisher = {Springer Nature B.V.}, + location = {Heidelberg, Netherlands}, + issn = {21905487}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/1840811168?pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + abstract = {Population growth, improved socioeconomic conditions, increased demand for various types of water use, and a reduction in water supply has created more competition for scarce water supplies leveling many countries. Efficient allocation of water supplies between different economic sectors is therefore very important. Water valuation is a useful tool to determine water price. Water pricing can play a major part in improving water allocation by encouraging users to conserve scarce water resources, and promoting improvements in productivity. We used a hedonic pricing method to reveal the implicit value of irrigation water by analyzing agricultural land values in farms under the Doroodzan dam in South-western Iran. The method was applied to farms in which irrigation water came from wells and canals. The availability of irrigation water was one of the most important factors influencing land prices. The value of irrigation water in the farms investigated was estimated to be \$0.046 per cubic meter. The estimated price for water was clearly higher than the price farmers currently pay for water in the area of study. Efficient water pricing could help the sustainability of the water resources. Farmers must therefore be informed of the real value of irrigation water used on their land.}, + issue = {3-4}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {119-124}, + keywords = {Agricultural land prices,Hedonic pricing method, Iran,Value of irrigation water}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3RFDEMX4/Esmaeili and Shahsavari - 2011 - Valuation of irrigation water in South-western Ira.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/48VPSQRR/Esmaeili and Shahsavari - 2011 - Valuation of irrigation water in South-western Ira.pdf} +} + +@article{foroni2022, + title = {The Shale Oil Revolution and the Global Oil Supply Curve}, + author = {Foroni, Claudia and Stracca, Livio}, + date = {2022-12-04}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {J of Applied Econometrics}, + pages = {jae.2950}, + issn = {0883-7252, 1099-1255}, + doi = {10.1002/jae.2950}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jae.2950}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {We focus on the implications of the shale oil boom for the global supply of oil. In order to derive testable implications, we introduce a simple stylized model with two producers, one facing low production costs and one higher production costs but potentially lower adjustment costs, competing à la Stackelberg. We find that the supply function is flatter for the high cost producer and that the supply function for shale oil producers becomes more responsive to demand shocks when adjustment costs decline. On the empirical side, we apply an instrumental variable approach using estimates of demand-driven oil price changes derived from a standard structural VAR of the oil market. A main finding is that global oil supply is rather vertical, with a short-term elasticity around 0.05. A rolling sample reveals that the shale oil boom does not appear to have fundamentally changed the contours of global oil production, but there is evidence for the oil supply curve to become more vertical in Saudi Arabia and more price responsive in the United States.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {instrumental variables,oil shocks,oil supply,shale oil,sign restrictions,structural VAR}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/28LSTBJC/Foroni and Stracca - 2022 - The shale oil revolution and the global oil supply.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8DKEQSTX/Foroni and Stracca - The shale oil revolution and the global oil supply.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KDFDHEWG/jae.html} +} + +@misc{fsa2023, + title = {Conservation {{Reserve Enhancement Program}}}, + author = {{Farm Service Agency}}, + shortauthor = {{FSA}}, + date = {2022}, + url = {https://fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/Conservation/PDF/fsa_crep_factsheet_22.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-01}, + organization = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2PFZJX7V/fsa_crep_factsheet_22.pdf} +} + +@misc{fsa2023a, + title = {Colorado {{Rio Grande}} {{Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program}} ({{CREP}})}, + author = {{Farm Service Agency}}, + shortauthor = {{FSA}}, + date = {2023}, + url = {https://fsa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/colorado_crep_fact_sheet_52022.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TQX8828I/CREP – Colorado Rio Grande.pdf} +} + +@article{gardner2022, + title = {Two-Stage Differences in Differences}, + author = {Gardner, John}, + date = {2022}, + journaltitle = {IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc}, + publisher = {Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis}, + location = {St. Louis}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/publiccontent/docview/2690864065?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-07-14}, + abstract = {A recent literature has shown that when adoption of a treatment is staggered and average treatment effects vary across groups and over time, difference-in-differences regression does not identify an easily interpretable measure of the typical effect of the treatment. In this paper, I extend this literature in two ways. First, I provide some simple underlying intuition for why difference-in-differences regression does not identify a group\$\textbackslash\textbackslash times\$period average treatment effect. Second, I propose an alternative two-stage estimation framework, motivated by this intuition. In this framework, group and period effects are identified in a first stage from the sample of untreated observations, and average treatment effects are identified in a second stage by comparing treated and untreated outcomes, after removing these group and period effects. The two-stage approach is robust to treatment-effect heterogeneity under staggered adoption, and can be used to identify a host of different average treatment effect measures. It is also simple, intuitive, and easy to implement. I establish the theoretical properties of the two-stage approach and demonstrate its effectiveness and applicability using Monte-Carlo evidence and an example from the literature.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/6NHX2PB3/Gardner - Two-stage differences in differences.pdf} +} + +@misc{gaspinc.2007, + title = {Mailings to Members}, + author = {{GASP Inc.}}, + date = {2007}, + url = {https://archives.mountainscholar.org/digital/collection/p17393coll161/id/8308}, + urldate = {2021-05-01}, + abstract = {Materials mailed to GASP members, including newsletters, correspondence, meeting agendas, and data.}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {Colorado State University Libraries}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4BM6G7WW/Basin et al. - 1997 - Mailings to members.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4E3FUWJI/Basin et al. - 1997 - Mailings to members.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7WYDYELQ/Basin et al. - 1997 - Mailings to members.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/A9A3HCXR/Basin et al. - 1997 - Mailings to members.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/CDAY8ESN/84770.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DYIQYSAR/84770.html;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/LFVQSW78/84770.html} +} + +@article{ghanem2022, + title = {Causality in Structural Vector Autoregressions: {{Science}} or Sorcery?}, + shorttitle = {Causality in Structural Vector Autoregressions}, + author = {Ghanem, Dalia and Smith, Aaron}, + date = {2022}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {104}, + number = {3}, + pages = {881--904}, + issn = {1467-8276}, + doi = {10.1111/ajae.12269}, + url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajae.12269}, + urldate = {2022-11-21}, + abstract = {This paper presents the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) as a method for estimating dynamic causal effects in agricultural and resource economics. We have a pedagogical purpose; we aim the presentation at economists trained primarily in microeconometrics. The SVAR is a model of a system, whereas a reduced-form microeconometric study aims to estimate the causal effect of one variable on another. The system approach produces estimates of a complete set of causal relationships among the variables, but it requires strong assumptions to do so. We explain these assumptions and describe similarities and differences with the classical instrumental variables (IV) model. We demonstrate that the population analogue of the Wald IV estimator for a particular causal effect is identical to the ratio of two impulse responses from an SVAR. We further demonstrate that incorrect identification assumptions about some components of the SVAR do not necessarily invalidate the estimated causal effects of other components. We present an SVAR analysis of global supply and demand for agricultural commodities, which was previously examined using IV. We illustrate the additional economic insights that the SVAR reveals, and we articulate the additional assumptions upon which those insights rest.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {causal inference,instrumental variables,time series}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/G83K2F7R/Ghanem and Smith - 2022 - Causality in structural vector autoregressions Sc.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XUIKR88L/ajae.html} +} + +@article{gilbert2020, + title = {Drill-{{Bit Parity}}: {{Supply-Side Links}} in {{Oil}} and {{Gas Markets}}}, + shorttitle = {Drill-{{Bit Parity}}}, + author = {Gilbert, Ben and Roberts, Gavin}, + date = {2020-07}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + shortjournal = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + volume = {7}, + number = {4}, + pages = {619--658}, + issn = {2333-5955, 2333-5963}, + doi = {10.1086/708160}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/708160}, + urldate = {2021-10-20}, + abstract = {Previous analyses of relationships between crude oil and natural gas markets focused primarily on demand-side connections. We provide a model and empirical evidence of important supply-side connections. First, crude oil and natural gas production require common inputs: drilling rigs, well completion services, and specialized labor. Competition for these inputs creates a cost-spillover channel through which a price shock for one commodity reduces supply of the other commodity. Second, crude oil wells produce associated gas, while natural gas wells often produce associated liquid hydrocarbons. This creates an associated-commodity channel through which a price shock for one commodity will increase supply of the other. Which effect dominates depends on the characteristics of the producing region. We test the model using well-level data from five large oil and gas producing basins in Texas and Oklahoma. We find substantial evidence across all five basins of a cost-spillover channel between natural gas prices and oil drilling, but mixed evidence of an associated-commodity channel between oil prices and natural gas drilling. Finally, we discuss the implications of these supply-side connections for energy policy.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PHHGR3JL/Gilbert and Roberts - 2020 - Drill-Bit Parity Supply-Side Links in Oil and Gas.pdf} +} + +@article{gisser1980, + title = {Competition versus Optimal Control in Groundwater Pumping}, + author = {Gisser, Micha and Sánchez, David A.}, + date = {1980}, + journaltitle = {Water Resources Research}, + volume = {16}, + number = {4}, + pages = {638--642}, + issn = {1944-7973}, + doi = {10.1029/WR016i004p00638}, + url = {http://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/WR016i004p00638}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {This article considers one of the most important issues in water resources research, namely, the management of groundwater. Economists have long taken it for granted that the temporal allocation of groundwater would lead to welfare losses if left to the free market because all farmers pump from a common aquifer. Hence water economists studied extensively optimal control of temporal groundwater allocation. They never paused to compare the temporal allocation yielded by optimal control with the free market. In this article we prove by comparing the two strategies analytically that if the storage capacity of the aquifer is relatively large, the difference between them is so small that it can be ignored for practical consideration.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/972ST9II/Gisser and Sánchez - 1980 - Competition versus optimal control in groundwater .pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/NQHDLU3N/WR016i004p00638.html} +} + +@article{gisser1983, + title = {Groundwater: {{Focusing}} on the {{Real Issue}}}, + shorttitle = {Groundwater}, + author = {Gisser, Micha}, + date = {1983-12}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {91}, + number = {6}, + pages = {1001--1027}, + publisher = {University of Chicago}, + issn = {00223808}, + doi = {10.1086/261197}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/1831201?sid=primo}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {Most studies of' the welfare economics of groundwater have focused mainly on the dichotomy between optimal control of groundwater use and no control at all. This article argues that, under circumstances that generally prevail in semiarid zones, assigning property rights to groundwater and permitting the market to determine the allocation of water use can lead to a second-best solution. An argument is made that if potential users would be allowed to Coase-bargain with incumbent users on the issuance of new groundwater rights, the second-best solution is elevated to a Pareto-optimal solution. This article is also a tale of two states: water law and performance in New Mexico and Arizona. At the outset this paper held that the adaptation of the appropriative system to groundwater gives rise to an efficient intertemporal allocation of groundwater diversion where natural recharge and the slope of the demand for water are small relative to the storage of the aquifer. This should be true in typical cases of mining groundwater (e.g., the Ogallala), as well as in most cases of rechargeable aquifers such as the Pecos. Thus it has been shown that the appropriative system, by establishing exclusive individual water rights, prevents congestion but also results in pumping trajectories that are roughly identical with optimal control. It was stressed, however, that in the absence of a mechanism allowing a potential user who appears on the scene to compensate the incumbents to increase aggregate rights in his favor, we cannot be sure that a Pareto-optimal level of groundwater rights has been reached. There is no reason why this blemish could not be removed.}, + keywords = {RESOURCE allocation,WELFARE economics}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/76WDDKDP/Gisser - 1983 - Groundwater Focusing on the Real Issue.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MWK8U6EV/Gisser - 1983 - Groundwater Focusing on the Real Issue.pdf} +} + +@article{gonzalez2020, + title = {Nonlinear {{Autoregressive Distributed Lag Approach}}: {{An Application}} on the {{Connectedness}} between {{Bitcoin Returns}} and the {{Other Ten Most Relevant Cryptocurrency Returns}}}, + shorttitle = {Nonlinear {{Autoregressive Distributed Lag Approach}}}, + author = {González, María de la O. and Jareño, Francisco and Skinner, Frank S.}, + date = {2020}, + journaltitle = {Mathematics (Basel)}, + volume = {8}, + number = {5}, + pages = {810-}, + publisher = {MDPI AG}, + issn = {2227-7390}, + doi = {10.3390/math8050810}, + abstract = {This article examines the connectedness between Bitcoin returns and returns of ten additional cryptocurrencies for several frequencies—daily, weekly, and monthly—over the period January 2015–March 2020 using a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) approach. We find important and positive interdependencies among cryptocurrencies and significant long-run relationships among most of them. In addition, non-Bitcoin cryptocurrency returns seem to react in the same way to positive and negative changes in Bitcoin returns, obtaining strong evidence of asymmetry in the short run. Finally, our results show high persistence in the impact of both positive and negative changes in Bitcoin returns on most of the other cryptocurrency returns. Thus, our model explains about 50\% of the other cryptocurrency returns with changes in Bitcoin returns.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Bitcoin,connectedness,cryptocurrencies,NARDL}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PCLBLLIV/González et al. - 2020 - Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag Approach.pdf} +} + +@article{goodman-bacon2021, + title = {Difference-in-Differences with Variation in Treatment Timing}, + author = {Goodman-Bacon, Andrew}, + date = {2021-12}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Econometrics}, + volume = {225}, + number = {2}, + pages = {254--277}, + issn = {03044076}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2021.03.014}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304407621001445}, + urldate = {2023-07-14}, + abstract = {The canonical difference-in-differences (DD) estimator contains two time periods, "pre" and "post", and two groups, "treatment" and "control". Most DD applications, however, exploit variation across groups of units that receive treatment at different times. This paper shows that the two-way fixed effects estimator equals a weighted average of all possible two-group/two-period DD estimators in the data. A causal interpretation of twoway fixed effects DD estimates requires both a parallel trends assumption and treatment effects that are constant over time. I show how to decompose the difference between two specifications, and provide a new analysis of models that include time-varying controls.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VX2TJBR5/Goodman-Bacon - 2021 - Difference-in-differences with variation in treatm.pdf} +} + +@article{grabenstein2022, + title = {Groundwater {{Law}}, the {{San Luis Valley}}, and {{Climate Change}}}, + author = {Grabenstein, Rachel}, + date = {2022-24}, + journaltitle = {Vermont Journal of Environmental Law}, + volume = {23}, + number = {2}, + pages = {181--208}, + publisher = {Vermont Journal of Environmental Law}, + issn = {19364253}, + url = {https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/vermenl23&id=189&men_tab=srchresults}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + keywords = {Climate change,Colorado,Groundwater laws,Groundwater management,San Luis Valley (Colo. & N.M.),Water management}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9JLAU95E/Grabenstein - 2022 - Groundwater Law, the San Luis Valley, and Climate .pdf} +} + +@article{gu1993, + title = {Comparison of {{Multivariate Matching Methods}}: {{Structures}}, {{Distances}}, and {{Algorithms}}}, + shorttitle = {Comparison of {{Multivariate Matching Methods}}}, + author = {Gu, Xing Sam and Rosenbaum, Paul R.}, + date = {1993-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics}, + volume = {2}, + number = {4}, + pages = {405--420}, + publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, + issn = {1061-8600}, + doi = {10.1080/10618600.1993.10474623}, + url = {https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10618600.1993.10474623}, + urldate = {2024-05-29}, + abstract = {A comparison and evaluation is made of recent proposals for multivariate matched sampling in observational studies, where the following three questions are answered: (1) Algorithms: In current statistical practice, matched samples are formed using “nearest available” matching, a greedy algorithm. Greedy matching does not minimize the total distance within matched pairs, though good algorithms exist for optimal matching that do minimize the total distance. How much better is optimal matching than greedy matching? We find that optimal matching is sometimes noticeably better than greedy matching in the sense of producing closely matched pairs, sometimes only marginally better, but it is no better than greedy matching in the sense of producing balanced matched samples. (2) Structures: In common practice, treated units are matched to one control, called pair matching or 1–1 matching, or treated units are matched to two controls, called 1–2 matching, and so on. It is known, however, that the optimal structure is a full matching in which a treated unit may have one or more controls or a control may have one or more treated units. Optimal 1 — k matching is compared to optimal full matching, finding that optimal full matching is often much better. (3) Distances: Matching involves defining a distance between covariate vectors, and several such distances exist. Three recent proposals are compared. Practical advice is summarized in a final section.}, + keywords = {Full matching,Mahalanobis metric matching,Matched sampling,Observational studies,Optimal matching,Propensity scores} +} + +@article{guilfoos2013, + title = {Groundwater Management: {{The}} Effect of Water Flows on Welfare Gains}, + shorttitle = {Groundwater Management}, + author = {Guilfoos, Todd and Pape, Andreas D. and Khanna, Neha and Salvage, Karen}, + date = {2013-11-01}, + journaltitle = {Ecological Economics}, + shortjournal = {Ecological Economics}, + volume = {95}, + pages = {31--40}, + issn = {0921-8009}, + doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.07.013}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180091300253X}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {We construct a spatially explicit groundwater model that has multiple cells and finite hydraulic conductivity to estimate the gains from groundwater management and the factors driving those gains. We calibrate an 246-cell model to the parameters and geography of Kern County, California, and find that the welfare gain from management for the entire aquifer is significantly higher in the multi-cell model (27\%) than in the bathtub model (13\%) and that individual farmer gains can vary from 7\% to 39\% depending of their location and relative size of demand for water. We also find that when all farmers in the aquifer simultaneously behave strategically the aggregate gains from management are significantly smaller. However, individual farmers do not have the incentive to behave strategically even with finite hydraulic conductivity when other farmers behave myopically.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Common pool resource,Darcy's Law,Hydraulic conductivity,Numerical optimization,Strategic behavior}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WFM8VJSB/Guilfoos et al. - 2013 - Groundwater management The effect of water flows .pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KNL3KWG3/S092180091300253X.html} +} + +@article{guizani2019, + title = {The {{Determinants}} of {{Bitcoin Price Volatility}}: {{An Investigation With ARDL Model}}}, + shorttitle = {The {{Determinants}} of {{Bitcoin Price Volatility}}}, + author = {Guizani, Sana and Nafti, Ines Kahloul}, + date = {2019}, + journaltitle = {Procedia computer science}, + volume = {164}, + pages = {233--238}, + publisher = {Elsevier B.V}, + issn = {1877-0509}, + doi = {10.1016/j.procs.2019.12.177}, + abstract = {The emergence of Bitcoin (BTC) has triggered intense discussions. Despite the particular interest of the public, the theoretical understanding of the value of this crypto currency is limited. This is why current research is trying to find better leads to evaluate a complex phenomenon: the BTC price. The volatility of its price presents a certain specificity compared to the traditional currencies. In order to understand the reasons for this volatility, we try to identify and to analyze the main determinants of the BTC price and to estimate their influence. We apply time series to daily data for the period from 19/12/2011 to 06/02/2018. We used several approaches, including the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag ARDL model, the cointegration test at Pesaran et al. (2001) and the Granger causality test in the sense of Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Our estimated results suggest that the number of addresses, the attractiveness indicator and the mining difficulty have a significant impact on the BTC price with variations over time. On the other hand, the transaction volume, the stock, the EUR/USD exchange rate and the macroeconomic and financial development do not determine the price of the BTC in the short term as well as in the long term.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {ARDL,attractiveness,Bitcoin,demand,financial development,macro-economic development,mining difficulty,supply,volatility}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3FIUBUK5/Guizani and Nafti - 2019 - The Determinants of Bitcoin Price Volatility An I.pdf} +} + +@article{hansen2004, + title = {Small {{Farms}}, {{Externalities}}, and the {{Dust Bowl}} of the 1930s}, + author = {Hansen, Zeynep K. and Libecap, Gary D.}, + date = {2004-06}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {112}, + number = {3}, + pages = {665--694}, + publisher = {University of Chicago}, + issn = {00223808}, + doi = {10.1086/383102}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/10.1086/383102?sid=primo}, + urldate = {2023-03-09}, + abstract = {We provide a new and more complete analysis of the origins of the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, one of the most severe environmental crises in North America in the twentieth century. Severe drought and wind erosion hit the Great Plains in 1930 and lasted through 1940. There were similar droughts in the 1950s and 1970s, but no comparable level of wind erosion. We explain why. The prevalence of small farms in the 1930s limited private solutions for controlling the downwind externalities associated with wind erosion. Drifting sand from unprotected fields damaged neighboring farms. Small farmers cultivated more of their land and were less likely to invest in erosion control than larger farmers. Soil conservation districts, established by the government after 1937, helped coordinate erosion control. This "unitized" solution for collective action is similar to that used in other natural resource/environmental settings.}, + keywords = {ENVIRONMENTAL management,ENVIRONMENTAL policy,EROSION,FARM management,NATURAL disasters,NORTH America}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SWQUXAPE/Hansen and Libecap - 2004 - Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of t.pdf} +} + +@article{hansen2006, + title = {Optimal {{Full Matching}} and {{Related Designs}} via {{Network Flows}}}, + author = {Hansen, Ben B. and Klopfer, Stephanie Olsen}, + date = {2006}, + journaltitle = {Journal of computational and graphical statistics}, + volume = {15}, + number = {3}, + pages = {609--627}, + publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, + location = {Alexandria}, + issn = {1061-8600}, + doi = {10.1198/106186006X137047}, + abstract = {In the matched analysis of an observational study, confounding on covariates X is addressed by comparing members of a distinguished group (Z = 1) to controls (Z = 0) only when they belong to the same matched set. The better matchings, therefore, are those whose matched sets exhibit both dispersion in Z and uniformity in X. For dispersion in Z, pair matching is best, creating matched sets that are equally balanced between the groups; but actual data place limits, often severe limits, on matched pairs' uniformity in X. At the other extreme is full matching, the matched sets of which are as uniform in X as can be, while often so poorly dispersed in Z as to sacrifice efficiency. This article presents an algorithm for exploring the intermediate territory. Given requirements on matched sets' uniformity in X and dispersion in Z, the algorithm first decides the requirements' feasibility. In feasible cases, it furnishes a match that is optimal for X-uniformity among matches with Z-dispersion as stipulated. To illustrate, we describe the algorithm's use in a study comparing womens' to mens' working conditions; and we compare our method to a commonly used alternative, greedy matching, which is neither optimal nor as flexible but is algorithmically much simpler. The comparison finds meaningful advantages, in terms of both bias and efficiency, for our more studied approach.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Algorithms,Calipers,Comparative studies,Control Groups,Data Analysis,Employment,Grants-in-aid,Inference,Men,Observational Study,Sex differences,Subsidies}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PI2R2REG/Hansen and Klopfer - 2006 - Optimal Full Matching and Related Designs via Netw.pdf} +} + +@article{hardin1968, + title = {The {{Tragedy}} of the {{Commons}}}, + author = {Hardin, Garrett}, + date = {1968}, + journaltitle = {Science, New Series}, + volume = {162}, + number = {3859}, + eprint = {1724745}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {1243--1248}, + url = {http://jstor.org/stable/1724745}, + issue = {3859}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DASAIJUV/Hardin - 1968 - The Tragedy of the Commons.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/T8LF2AUU/Hardin - 1968 - The Tragedy of the Commons.pdf} +} + +@article{hayek1945, + title = {The {{Use}} of {{Knowledge}} in {{Society}}}, + author = {Hayek, F. A.}, + date = {1945}, + journaltitle = {The American Economic Review}, + volume = {35}, + number = {4}, + eprint = {1809376}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {519--530}, + publisher = {American Economic Association}, + issn = {0002-8282}, + url = {http://jstor.org/stable/1809376}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + issue = {4} +} + +@book{hearne1988, + title = {Hydrologic Analysis of the {{Rio Grande}} Basin North of {{Embudo}}, {{New Mexico}}, {{Colorado}} and {{New Mexico}}}, + author = {Hearne, Glenn A. and Dewey, J. D. and {Geological Survey (U.S.)}}, + date = {1988}, + publisher = {{Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey : Books and Open-File Reports distributor}}, + location = {Denver, Colo.}, + url = {https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/102179654}, + urldate = {2023-07-12}, + pagetotal = {244}, + keywords = {Groundwater flow,Hydrology,Rio Grande Watershed (Colo.-Mexico and Tex.)} +} + +@article{heide2005, + entrysubtype = {magazine}, + title = {Declining {{Aquifers}}:{{San Luis Valley}} Water Users Struggle to Pump Groundwater Sustainably}, + shorttitle = {Headwaters {{Fall}} 2005}, + author = {Heide, Ruth}, + date = {2005}, + journaltitle = {Headwaters}, + volume = {Fall 2005}, + url = {https://issuu.com/cfwe/docs/headwaters9}, + urldate = {2024-05-11}, + abstract = {The San Luis Valley writes its own script. A repeat cast of characters works together on wetlands committees, land trusts, conservation district bo...}, + langid = {english} +} + +@article{hendricks2012, + title = {Fixed {{Effects Estimation}} of the {{Intensive}} and {{Extensive Margins}} of {{Irrigation Water Demand}}}, + author = {Hendricks, Nathan P. and Peterson, Jeffrey M.}, + date = {2012-04}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics}, + volume = {37}, + number = {1}, + pages = {1--19}, + publisher = {Western Agricultural Economics Association}, + location = {Logan, United States}, + issn = {10685502}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/1081184926/citation/23A358E410084F24PQ/1}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {19}, + keywords = {Agriculture--Agricultural Economics,Aquifers,Bias,Cost analysis,Elasticity of demand,Energy prices,Estimates,Farmers,Irrigation,Land use,Natural gas prices,Price elasticity,Pricing policies,Variables,Water conservation,Water rights} +} + +@jurisdiction{hobbs2011, + title = {Concerning the Office of the State Engineer’s Approval of the Plan of Water Management for Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District.}, +% author = {Hobbs, Gregory}, + citation = {{Supreme Court of Colorado, 10SA224}}, + date = {2011-12-19}, + number = {10sa224}, + institution = {Colorado Supreme Court}, + url = {https://cases.justia.com/colorado/supreme-court/10sa224.pdf?ts=1462305948}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2CKW9SVS/10sa224.pdf} +} + +@online{hostetter2024, + title = {Alamosa {{County Property Search}}}, + author = {Hostetter, Sandra}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://qpublic.schneidercorp.com/Application.aspx?App=AlamosaCountyCO&PageType=Search}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + organization = {qPublic}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VSZT76C9/Application.html} +} + +@article{hotelling1931, + title = {The {{Economics}} of {{Exhaustible Resources}}}, + author = {Hotelling, Harold}, + date = {1931}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {39}, + number = {2}, + eprint = {1822328}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {137--175}, + publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, + issn = {0022-3808}, + url = {http://jstor.org/stable/1822328}, + urldate = {2022-05-09}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZQ7NQIC8/Hotelling - 1931 - The Economics of Exhaustible Resources.pdf} +} + +@article{huang2013, + title = {The {{Effects}} of {{Well Management}} and the {{Nature}} of the {{Aquifer}} on {{Groundwater Resources}}}, + author = {Huang, Qiuqiong and Wang, Jinxia and Rozelle, Scott and Polasky, Stephen and Liu, Yang}, + date = {2013}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {95}, + number = {1}, + pages = {94--116}, + issn = {1467-8276}, + doi = {10.1093/ajae/aas076}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1093/ajae/aas076}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {We compare groundwater use under collective well management in China, where village leaders allocate water among households, and under private well management where farmers either pump from their own wells or buy water from wells owned by other farmers. Villages are divided into connected or isolated groups depending on whether there are lateral groundwater flows between aquifers underlying a village and neighboring ones. In rural China, households under collective well management use less water. Even under collective management, households located in connected villages use more water, indicating that the connectedness of the aquifers may undermine leaders’ incentives to conserve water.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {collective well management,community-based management,connected village,isolated village,private well management}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/F834KXK7/Huang et al. - 2013 - The Effects of Well Management and the Nature of t.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FK9E9XAR/aas076.html} +} + +@online{internationalmonetaryfund2024, + title = {Global Price of {{Barley}}}, + shorttitle = {{{PBARLUSDM}}}, + author = {{International Monetary Fund}}, + shortauthor = {{IMF}}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}, + url = {https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PBARLUSDM}, + urldate = {2024-06-17}, + abstract = {Value represents the benchmark prices which are representative of the global market. They are determined by the largest exporter of a given commodity. Prices are period averages in nominal U.S. dollars. Copyright © 2016, International Monetary Fund. Reprinted with permission. Complete terms of use and contact details are available at http://imf.org/external/terms.htm.}, + organization = {FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis} +} + +@article{jareno2020, + title = {Bitcoin and Gold Price Returns: {{A}} Quantile Regression and {{NARDL}} Analysis}, + shorttitle = {Bitcoin and Gold Price Returns}, + author = {Jareño, Francisco and González, María de la O and Tolentino, Marta and Sierra, Karen}, + date = {2020-08-01}, + journaltitle = {Resources Policy}, + shortjournal = {Resources Policy}, + volume = {67}, + pages = {101666}, + issn = {0301-4207}, + doi = {10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101666}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420719309985}, + urldate = {2023-02-12}, + abstract = {This research analyses the sensitivity of Bitcoin returns to changes in gold price returns and some other international risk factors such as US stock market returns, interest rates, crude oil prices, the volatility index of the American stock market (VIX) and the Saint Louis financial stress index (STLFSI). This study applies the quantile regression approach for the 2010–2018 period. For robustness, this paper splits the whole sample period into two different subsamples: a more volatile and a less volatile sub-period. Moreover, to capture both long- and short-run asymmetries between Bitcoin and gold price returns, an asymmetric nonlinear cointegration approach (NARDL) is applied. The results evidence that the most relevant risk factor is the VIX index, followed by changes in the STLFSI stress index, and both show negative and statistically significant effects on Bitcoin returns in most periods and quantiles. The US stock market returns have statistically significant effects (with positive sign) on Bitcoin returns in all periods and specifically in high quantiles. Bitcoin returns show negative statistically significant sensitivity to changes in nominal interest rates in the highest quantile and the full period. Moreover, Bitcoin returns show negative and statistically significant sensitivity to oil returns at low quantiles, by serving as a safe-haven asset during economic turmoil. Therefore, in general, the sensitivity of Bitcoin returns to movements in international risk factors tends to be more pronounced in extreme market conditions (bullish and bearish scenarios), showing the highest explanatory power in the lowest quantile. Finally, we have applied the non-linear ARDL approach to analyse the long- and short-run relations between Bitcoin and gold price returns and have found a positive and statistically significant connectedness between them.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Bitcoin,International factors,NARDL,Quantile regression,Stock market}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YCTWBNCI/Jareño et al. - 2020 - Bitcoin and gold price returns A quantile regress.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FJZ4JSQI/S0301420719309985.html} +} + +@article{javaid2015, + title = {Incorporating Local Institutions in Irrigation Experiments: Evidence from Rural Communities in {{Pakistan}}}, + shorttitle = {Incorporating Local Institutions in Irrigation Experiments}, + author = {Javaid, Aneeque and Falk, Thomas}, + date = {2015}, + journaltitle = {Ecology and society}, + volume = {20}, + number = {2}, + pages = {28-}, + publisher = {Resilience Alliance}, + issn = {1708-3087}, + doi = {10.5751/ES-07532-200228}, + abstract = {Many irrigation systems are special cases of common-pool resources (CPRs) in which some users have preferential access to the resource, which in theory aggravates collective action challenges such as the under-provision of necessary infrastructure as a result of unequal appropriation of water resources. We present experimental evidence based on an irrigation game played in communities that are dependent on one of the largest contiguous irrigation network: the Indus basin irrigation system in Punjab, Pakistan. Furthermore, we simulate two institutional mechanisms that are neglected in experimental studies, despite their importance in many CPR governance systems: traditional authorities and legal pluralism. In our experiments, Punjabi farmers (N= 160) managed to provide the CPR at a level close to the social optimum, even without communication or enforcement opportunities. The equal investment in water infrastructure seems to be a strong social norm, even though those in disadvantageous positions (tail-users) earn less than those who have preferential access (head-users). At the same time, head-users restrain themselves from maximum resource extraction, which could be interpreted either as a norm or a stationary bandit strategy. In contrast to one of the most consistent findings of previous experimental studies, the participants in our experiment increased their earnings over the experimental rounds by using the available resources in a more efficient manner. One explanation for this behavior could be the availability of social information in our game. Starting from a high level of cooperation during baseline rounds, the treatments did not change the group investment significantly. The introduction of external sanctions created additional coordination problems, which led to a decrease in the level of group welfare. More specifically, head-users reduced their water extraction in the face of possible external sanctions to a level that the remaining water could not be used completely by tail-users.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {asymmetric access,Basin irrigation,Canals,common-pool resources,Communities,field experiments,Human ecology,Irrigation management,Irrigation systems,Irrigation water,Pakistan,Punjab,Securities sales,traditional authorities,Water management,Water resources}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YGP342U8/Javaid and Falk - 2015 - Incorporating local institutions in irrigation exp.pdf} +} + +@article{jenkins2014, + title = {Political Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing Policies: {{What}} Are the Implications for Economic Efficiency, Environmental Efficacy, and Climate Policy Design?}, + shorttitle = {Political Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing Policies}, + author = {Jenkins, Jesse D.}, + date = {2014-06}, + journaltitle = {Energy Policy}, + shortjournal = {Energy Policy}, + volume = {69}, + pages = {467--477}, + issn = {03014215}, + doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.003}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421514000901}, + urldate = {2023-07-24}, + abstract = {Economists traditionally view a Pigouvian fee on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions, either via carbon taxes or emissions caps and permit trading (“cap-and-trade”), as the economically optimal or “first-best” policy to address climate change-related externalities. Yet several political economy factors can severely constrain the implementation of these carbon pricing policies, including opposition of industrial sectors with a concentration of assets that would lose considerable value under such policies; the collective action nature of climate mitigation efforts; principal agent failures; and a low willingness-to-pay for climate mitigation by citizens. Real-world implementations of carbon pricing policies can thus fall short of the economically optimal outcomes envisioned in theory. Consistent with the general theory of the second-best, the presence of binding political economy constraints opens a significant “opportunity space” for the design of creative climate policy instruments with superior political feasibility, economic efficiency, and environmental efficacy relative to the constrained implementation of carbon pricing policies. This paper presents theoretical political economy frameworks relevant to climate policy design and provides corroborating evidence from the United States context. It concludes with a series of implications for climate policy making and argues for the creative pursuit of a mix of second-best policy instruments.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EZY5RH62/Jenkins - 2014 - Political economy constraints on carbon pricing po.pdf} +} + +@book{jevons1865, + title = {The {{Coal Question}}; an {{Inquiry Concerning}} the {{Progress}} of the {{Nation}}, and the {{Probable Exhaustion}} of Our {{Coal-Mines}}}, + author = {Jevons, W.}, + date = {1865}, + publisher = {{Macmillan and Co}}, + location = {London; Cambridge}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Coal industry,Coal mining,Mining industry} +} + +@article{karp2012, + title = {Taxes versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information}, + author = {Karp, Larry and Zhang, Jiangfeng}, + date = {2012-02-01}, + journaltitle = {Economic Theory}, + volume = {49}, + number = {2}, + pages = {371--410}, + publisher = {Springer}, + issn = {09382259}, + doi = {10.1007/s00199-010-0561-y}, + url = {http://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&issn=09382259&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA307919608&sid=googleScholar&linkaccess=abs}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4YU6ADIH/Karp and Zhang - 2012 - Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EPC2JM92/Karp and Zhang - 2012 - Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/X6YGIERQ/i.html} +} + +@online{keys2024, + title = {Conejos {{County Property Search}}}, + author = {Keys, Naomi}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://qpublic.schneidercorp.com/Application.aspx?AppID=1217&LayerID=36995&PageTypeID=3&PageID=14237}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + organization = {qPublic}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/LY2IB2UV/Application.html} +} + +@article{kilian2009, + title = {Why {{Agnostic Sign Restrictions Are Not Enough}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Dynamics}} of {{Oil Market VAR Models}}}, + shorttitle = {Why {{Agnostic Sign Restrictions Are Not Enough}}}, + author = {Kilian, Lutz and Murphy, Daniel P.}, + date = {2009}, + journaltitle = {IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc}, + publisher = {Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis}, + location = {St. Louis}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/publiccontent/docview/1698253301?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {Sign restrictions on the responses generated by structural vector autoregressive models have been proposed as an alternative approach to the use of exclusion restrictions on the impact multiplier matrix. In recent years such models have been increasingly used to identify demand and supply shocks in the market for crude oil. We demonstrate that sign restrictions alone are insufficient to infer the responses of the real price of oil to such shocks. Moreover, the conventional assumption that all admissible models are equally likely is routinely violated in oil market models, calling into question the use of median responses to characterize the responses to structural shocks. When combining sign restrictions with additional empirically plausible bounds on the magnitude of the short-run oil supply elasticity and on the impact response of real activity, however, it is possible to reduce the set of admissible model solutions to a small number of qualitatively similar estimates. The resulting model estimates are broadly consistent with earlier results regarding the relative importance of demand and supply shocks for the real price of oil based on structural VAR models identified by exclusion restrictions, but imply very different dynamics from the median responses in VAR models based on sign restrictions only.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/HXNH38GN/Why Agnostic Sign Restrictions Are Not Enough Und.pdf} +} + +@article{kilian2014, + title = {The {{Role}} of {{Inventories}} and {{Speculative Trading}} in the {{Global Market}} for {{Crude Oil}}}, + author = {Kilian, Lutz and Murphy, Daniel P.}, + date = {2014}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, + volume = {29}, + number = {3}, + pages = {454--478}, + issn = {1099-1255}, + doi = {10.1002/jae.2322}, + url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jae.2322}, + urldate = {2022-11-21}, + abstract = {We develop a structural model of the global market for crude oil that for the first time explicitly allows for shocks to the speculative demand for oil as well as shocks to flow demand and flow supply. The speculative component of the real price of oil is identified with the help of data on oil inventories. Our estimates rule out explanations of the 2003–2008 oil price surge based on unexpectedly diminishing oil supplies and based on speculative trading. Instead, this surge was caused by unexpected increases in world oil consumption driven by the global business cycle. There is evidence, however, that speculative demand shifts played an important role during earlier oil price shock episodes including 1979, 1986 and 1990. Our analysis implies that additional regulation of oil markets would not have prevented the 2003–2008 oil price surge. We also show that, even after accounting for the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption, our estimate of the short-run price elasticity of oil demand is much higher than traditional estimates from dynamic models that do not account for for the endogeneity of the price of oil. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DZ83LXCA/Kilian and Murphy - 2014 - The Role of Inventories and Speculative Trading in.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/J5GM7RII/jae.html} +} + +@article{kilian2020, + title = {The {{Econometrics}} of {{Oil Market VAR Models}}}, + author = {Kilian, Lutz and Zhou, Xiaoqing and {Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas}}, + date = {2020-03}, + journaltitle = {Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Papers}, + shortjournal = {wp}, + volume = {2020}, + number = {2006}, + doi = {10.24149/wp2006}, + url = {https://dallasfed.org/-/media/documents/research/papers/2020/wp2006.pdf}, + urldate = {2022-11-21}, + abstract = {Oil market VAR models have become the standard tool for understanding the evolution of the real price of oil and its impact in the macro economy. As this literature has expanded at a rapid pace, it has become increasingly difficult for mainstream economists to understand the differences between alternative oil market models, let alone the basis for the sometimes divergent conclusions reached in the literature. The purpose of this survey is to provide a guide to this literature. Our focus is on the econometric foundations of the analysis of oil market models with special attention to the identifying assumptions and methods of inference. We not only explain how the workhorse models in this literature have evolved, but also examine alternative oil market VAR models. We help the reader understand why the latter models sometimes generated unconventional, puzzling or erroneous conclusions. Finally, we discuss the construction of extraneous measures of oil demand and oil supply shocks that have been used as external or internal instruments for VAR models.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {IV estimation,oil demand elasticity,Oil supply elasticity,structural VAR}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/RB7KWVXP/wp2006.pdf} +} + +@article{kim2017, + title = {Oil Price Shocks and {{China}}'s Economy: {{Reactions}} of the Monetary Policy to Oil Price Shocks}, + shorttitle = {Oil Price Shocks and {{China}}'s Economy}, + author = {Kim, Won Joong and Hammoudeh, Shawkat and Hyun, Jun Seog and Gupta, Rangan}, + date = {2017-02}, + journaltitle = {Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Energy Economics}, + volume = {62}, + pages = {61--69}, + issn = {01409883}, + doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2016.12.007}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S014098831630353X}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {The paper empirically analyzes the effect of positive oil price shocks on China's economy, having special interest in the response of the Chinese interest rate to those shocks. Using different econometric models, i) a time-varying parameter structural vector autoregression (TVP SVAR) model with short-run identifying restrictions, ii) a structural VAR (SVAR) model with the short-run identifying restrictions, and iii) a VAR model with orderingfree generalized impulse response VAR (GIR VAR), we find that the response of the Chinese interest rate to the oil price shocks is not only time-varying but also showing quite different signs of responses. Specifically, in the earlier sample period (1992:4–2001:10), the interest rate shows a negative response to the oil price shock, while in the latter period (2001:11–2014:5) it shows a positive response to the shock. Given the negative response of the world oil production to an oil price shock in the earlier period, the shock is identified as a negative supply shock or a precautionary demand shock as suggested by Kilian (2009), thereby the negative response of the interest rate to the oil price shock is deemed as economy-boosting. The positive response of the interest rate to the oil price shock in the later period, given that this shock is identified as a positive world oil demand shock, gives evidence that stabilization of inflation is one of the main objectives of China's monetary authority, even though the current main objective of the monetary policy is characterized as “maintaining the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promoting economic growth.” Finally, the variance decomposition results reveal that the oil price shock becomes an increasingly important source in the volatility of China's interest rate. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KNWT5T6R/Kim et al. - 2017 - Oil price shocks and China's economy Reactions of.pdf} +} + +@article{knapp2006, + title = {Ground {{Water Quantity}} and {{Quality Management}}: {{Agricultural Production}} and {{Aquifer Salinization}} over {{Long Time Scales}}}, + shorttitle = {Ground {{Water Quantity}} and {{Quality Management}}}, + author = {Knapp, Keith C. and Baerenklau, Kenneth A.}, + date = {2006-12}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics}, + volume = {31}, + number = {3}, + pages = {616--641}, + publisher = {Western Agricultural Economics Association}, + location = {Logan, United States}, + issn = {10685502}, + url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/214691254/citation/DB28492087E34056PQ/1}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {26}, + keywords = {Agriculture--Agricultural Economics}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BGW58P3I/Knapp and Baerenklau - 2006 - Ground Water Quantity and Quality Management Agri.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UD6D8Z37/Knapp and Baerenklau - 2006 - Ground Water Quantity and Quality Management Agri.pdf} +} + +@article{kristoufek2020, + title = {Bitcoin and Its Mining on the Equilibrium Path}, + author = {Kristoufek, Ladislav}, + date = {2020-01}, + journaltitle = {Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Energy Economics}, + volume = {85}, + pages = {104588}, + issn = {01409883}, + doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104588}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140988319303834}, + urldate = {2023-02-01}, + abstract = {Bitcoin as a major cryptocurrency has come up as a shooting star of the 2017 and 2018 headlines. After exploding its price twenty times just in the twelve months of 2017, the tone has changed dramatically in 2018 after major price corrections and increasing concerns about its mining power consumption and overall sustainability. The dynamics and interaction between Bitcoin price and its mining costs have become of major interest. Here we show that these two quantities are tightly interconnected and they tend to a common long-term equilibrium. Mining costs adjust to the cryptocurrency price with the adjustment time of several months up to a year. Current developments suggest that we have arrived at a new era of Bitcoin mining where marginal (electricity) costs and mining efficiency play the prime role. Presented results open new avenues towards interpreting past and predicting future developments of the Bitcoin mining framework and their main possible directions are outlined and discussed here as well.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DXFWXMHF/Kristoufek - 2020 - Bitcoin and its mining on the equilibrium path.pdf} +} + +@jurisdiction{kuenhold2006, + title = {{{Concerning the matter of the rules governing new withdrawals of ground water in water division no}}. 3{{ affecting the rate or direction of movement of water in the confined aquifer system}}}, + author = {{{{Concerning the matter of the rules governing new withdrawals of ground water in water division no}}. 3{{ affecting the rate or direction of movement of water in the confined aquifer system}}}}, + shortauthor = {{Kuenhold}}, + date = {2006-09-11}, + citation = {{Judge John Kuenhold, Colorado District Court Water Division no. 3, 2004 CW 24}}, + number = {2004 CW 24}, + % institution = {DISTRICT COURT, WATER DIVISION NO. 3, COLORADO}, + url = {https://courts.state.co.us/Courts/Water/Rulings/Div3/04CW24%20Part%20I-IV.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-03-17}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EWLPLWQU/04CW24 Part I-IV.pdf} + } + +@jurisdiction{kuenhold2009, + title = {{Concerning the office of the State Engineer’s approval of the plan of water management for Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District in the matter of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District, in Alamosa county, Colorado findings of fact, conclusions of law and order}}, + author = {{Concerning the office of the State Engineer’s approval of the plan of water management for Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District in the matter of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District, in Alamosa county, Colorado findings of fact, conclusions of law and order}}, + shortauthor = {Kuenhold}, + date = {2009-02}, + citation = {{Judge John Kuenhold, Colorado District Court Water Division no. 3, 2007CW52 and 2006CV64}}, + number = {2007CW52 and 2006CV64}, + institution = {District Court Water Division No. 3}, + url = {https://courts.state.co.us/Courts/Water/Rulings/Div3/order%20with%20amendement%20attached.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-05-11}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/X7KYTNPU/order with amendement attached.pdf} +} + +@article{lach2005, + title = {Maintaining the {{Status Quo}}: {{How Institutional Norms}} and {{Practices Create Conservative Water Organizations}}}, + shorttitle = {Maintaining the {{Status Quo}}}, + author = {Lach, Denise and Ingram, Helen and Rayner, Steve}, + date = {2005-06}, + journaltitle = {Texas Law Review}, + shortjournal = {Texas Law Review}, + volume = {83}, + number = {7}, + pages = {2027--2053}, + publisher = {University of Texas at Austin School of Law Publications}, + issn = {00404411}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/203710538?pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {Explores the institutional norms and practices of water agencies and organizations in the U.S. Description of the traditional response of water agencies to what were perceived as ordinary or tame problems; Strategies for addressing the problems; Consequences of the strategies that agencies have adopted to respond to changing pressures and constituents.}, + keywords = {ASSOCIATIONS institutions etc.,ORGANIZATION,UNITED States,WATER supply,WATER utilities}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/5LG6U79S/Lach et al. - 2005 - Maintaining the Status Quo How Institutional Norm.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7UMVN3K5/Lach et al. - 2005 - Maintaining the Status Quo How Institutional Norm.pdf} +} + +@article{lancaster1966, + title = {A {{New Approach}} to {{Consumer Theory}}}, + author = {Lancaster, Kelvin J.}, + date = {1966-04}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {74}, + number = {2}, + pages = {132}, + publisher = {University of Chicago}, + issn = {00223808}, + doi = {10.1086/259131}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/1828835}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {THE theory of consumer behavior in deterministic situations as set out by, say, Debreu (1959, 1960) or Uzawa (1960) is a thing of great aesthetic beauty, a jewel set in a glass case. The product of a long process of refinement from the nineteenth-century utility theorists through Slutsky and Hicks-Allen to the economists of the last twenty-five years,[1] it has been shorn of all irrelevant postulates so that it now stands as an example of how to extract the minimum of results from the minimum of assumptions. In this model we have extended into consumption theory activity analysis, which has proved so penetrating in its application to production theory. The crucial assumption in making this application has been the assumption that goods possess, or gire rise to, multiple characteristics in fixed proportions and that it is these characteristics, not goods themselves, on which the consumer's preferences are exercised. The result, as this brief survey of the possibilities has shown, is a model very many rimes richer in heuristic explanatory and predictive power than the con- ventional model of consumer behavior and one that deals easily with those many common-sense characteristics of actual behavior that have found no place in traditional exposition. This paper is nothing more than a condensed presentation of some of the great number of possible ways in which the model can be used. It is hoped that a door has been opened to a new, rich treasure house of ideas for the future development of the most refined and least powerful branch of economic theory, the theory of the consumer himself.}, + keywords = {CONSUMER behavior,CONSUMPTION (Economics)}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/HZ3L7YD4/Lancaster - 1966 - A New Approach to Consumer Theory.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZK39LJFW/Lancaster - 1966 - A New Approach to Consumer Theory.pdf} +} + +@online{landnetwork2024, + title = {San {{Luis}}, {{CO Land}} for {{Sale}} - 109 {{Listings}}}, + author = {{Land Network}}, + date = {2024-03-03}, + url = {https://landwatch.com/colorado-land-for-sale/san-luis}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + abstract = {LandWatch has 109 land listings for sale in San Luis, CO. Browse our San Luis, CO land for sale listings, view photos and contact an agent today!}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {LandWatch}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TQLRWADH/san-luis.html} +} + +@article{lansford1995, + title = {Recreational and {{Aesthetic Value}} of {{Water Using Hedonic Price Analysis}}}, + author = {Lansford, Node H. and Jones, Lonnie L.}, + date = {1995}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics}, + volume = {20}, + number = {2}, + eprint = {40987743}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {341--355}, + publisher = {Western Agricultural Economics Association}, + issn = {1068-5502}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/40987743}, + urldate = {2024-09-25}, + abstract = {Historically, water allocation focused on quantities demanded by consumptive uses. As quantity demand grows, efficient allocation among consumptive and nonconsumptive uses becomes more critical. This hedonic approach provides information regarding recreational and aesthetic (RA) value for a central Texas lake. The model indicates several statistically significant RA characteristics of housing; proximity is the most important. Waterfront properties command a premium, but marginal RA price falls rapidly with increasing distance. Marginal RA values are estimated for selected water levels and are found to have a lower marginal price per acre-foot than many agricultural uses.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EBJ644PP/Lansford and Jones - 1995 - Recreational and Aesthetic Value of Water Using Hedonic Price Analysis.pdf} +} + +@article{lee2010, + title = {Improving Propensity Score Weighting Using Machine Learning}, + author = {Lee, Brian K. and Lessler, Justin and Stuart, Elizabeth A.}, + date = {2010-02-10}, + journaltitle = {Statistics in medicine}, + shortjournal = {Stat Med}, + volume = {29}, + number = {3}, + eprint = {19960510}, + eprinttype = {pmid}, + pages = {337--346}, + issn = {0277-6715}, + doi = {10.1002/sim.3782}, + url = {https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2807890/}, + urldate = {2024-06-07}, + abstract = {Machine learning techniques such as classification and regression trees (CART) have been suggested as promising alternatives to logistic regression for the estimation of propensity scores. The authors examined the performance of various CART-based propensity score models using simulated data. Hypothetical studies of varying sample sizes (n=500, 1000, 2000) with a binary exposure, continuous outcome, and ten covariates were simulated under seven scenarios differing by degree of non-linear and non-additive associations between covariates and the exposure. Propensity score weights were estimated using logistic regression (all main effects), CART, pruned CART, and the ensemble methods of bagged CART, random forests, and boosted CART. Performance metrics included covariate balance, standard error, percent absolute bias, and 95\% confidence interval coverage. All methods displayed generally acceptable performance under conditions of either non-linearity or non-additivity alone. However, under conditions of both moderate non-additivity and moderate non-linearity, logistic regression had subpar performance, while ensemble methods provided substantially better bias reduction and more consistent 95\% CI coverage. The results suggest that ensemble methods, especially boosted CART, may be useful for propensity score weighting.}, + pmcid = {PMC2807890}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/QTPRR7CY/Lee et al. - 2010 - Improving propensity score weighting using machine.pdf} +} + +@article{libecap1984, + title = {Contractual {{Responses}} to the {{Common Pool}}: {{Prorationing}} of {{Crude Oil Production}}}, + shorttitle = {Contractual {{Responses}} to the {{Common Pool}}}, + author = {Libecap, Gary D. and Wiggins, Steven N.}, + date = {1984}, + journaltitle = {The American Economic Review}, + volume = {74}, + number = {1}, + eprint = {1803310}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {87--98}, + publisher = {American Economic Association}, + issn = {0002-8282}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/1803310}, + urldate = {2023-07-16}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KWBNDFMI/Libecap and Wiggins - 1984 - Contractual Responses to the Common Pool Proratio.pdf} +} + +@book{libecap1993, + title = {Contracting for Property Rights}, + author = {Libecap, Gary D.}, + date = {1993}, + series = {Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions}, + edition = {1st pbk. ed.}, + publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, + location = {Cambridge [England] ;}, + isbn = {978-0-521-44904-5}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Decision making,Natural law,Natürliche Ressourcen,Pressure groups,Property-Rights-Ansatz,Right of property,United States,USA} +} + +@article{libecap2011, + title = {Institutional {{Path Dependence}} in {{Climate Adaptation}}: {{Coman}}'s "{{Some Unsettled Problems}} of {{Irrigation}}"}, + shorttitle = {Institutional {{Path Dependence}} in {{Climate Adaptation}}}, + author = {Libecap, Gary D.}, + date = {2011}, + journaltitle = {The American Economic Review}, + volume = {101}, + number = {1}, + eprint = {41038782}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {64--80}, + publisher = {American Economic Association}, + issn = {0002-8282}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/41038782}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Katharine Coman's "Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation," published in March 1911 in the first issue of the American Economic Review, addressed issues of water supply, rights, and organization. These same issues have relevance today, in the face of growing concern about the availability of fresh water worldwide. The central point of this article is that appropriative water rights and irrigation districts that emerged in the American West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to aridity to facilitate agricultural water delivery, use, and trade raise the transaction costs today of water markets. These markets are vital for smooth reallocation of water to higher-valued uses elsewhere in the economy and for flexible response to greater hydrological uncertainty. This institutional path dependence illustrates how past arrangements to meet conditions of the time constrain contemporary economic opportunities. They cannot be easily significantly modified or replaced ex post.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PBKZNST2/Libecap - 2011 - Institutional Path Dependence in Climate Adaptatio.pdf} +} + +@article{lin2019, + title = {Decentralized {{Mining}} in {{Centralized Pools}}}, + author = {Lin, William Cong and He, Zhiguo and Li, Jiasun}, + date = {2019}, + journaltitle = {IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc}, + publisher = {Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis}, + location = {St. Louis}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/publiccontent/docview/2188171873?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {The rise of centralized mining pools for risk sharing does not necessarily undermine the decentralization required for public blockchains. However, mining pools as a financial innovation significantly escalates the arms race among competing miners and thus increases the energy consumption of proof-of-work-based blockchains. Each individual miner's cross-pool diversification and endogenous fees charged by pools generally sustain decentralization --- larger pools better internalize their externality on global hash rates, charge higher fees, attract disproportionately fewer miners, and thus grow slower. Empirical evidence from Bitcoin mining supports our model predictions, and the economic insights apply to many other blockchain protocols, as well as mainstream industries with similar characteristics.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/P3CQBS32/w25592.pdf} +} + +@online{linzy2024, + title = {Potatoes: {{An Alternative}} to {{Consider}}}, + author = {Linzy, Carlson}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://waterquality.montana.edu/farm-ranch/irrigation/other_crops/potato.html}, + urldate = {2024-03-09}, + organization = {Montana State University}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZB4H23N4/potato.html} +} + +@article{lipsey1956, + title = {The {{General Theory}} of {{Second Best}}}, + author = {Lipsey, R. G. and Lancaster, Kelvin}, + date = {1956}, + journaltitle = {The Review of economic studies}, + volume = {24}, + number = {1}, + pages = {11--32}, + publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, + location = {Oxford, etc}, + issn = {0034-6527}, + doi = {10.2307/2296233}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Commodities,Customs unions,Economic theory,Imports,Income taxes,Indirect taxes,Marginal costs,Monopoly,Recreation,Tariffs}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/H4PLH6BA/Lipsey and Lancaster - 1956 - The General Theory of Second Best.pdf} +} + +@article{loomis2003, + title = {Estimating the Benefits of Maintaining Adequate Lake Levels to Homeowners Using the Hedonic Property Method}, + author = {Loomis, John and Feldman, Marvin}, + date = {2003}, + journaltitle = {Water Resources Research}, + volume = {39}, + number = {9}, + issn = {1944-7973}, + doi = {10.1029/2002WR001799}, + url = {http://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/2002WR001799}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {The hedonic property method was used to estimate residents' economic benefits from maintaining high and stable lake levels at Lake Almanor, California. Nearly a thousand property transactions over a 14-year period from 1987 to 2001 were analyzed. The linear hedonic property regression explained more than 60\% of the variation in-house prices. Property prices were negatively and significantly related to the number of linear feet of exposed lake shoreline. Each additional one foot of exposed shoreline reduces the property price by \$108–\$119. A view of the lake added nearly \$31,000 to house prices, while lakefront properties sold for \$209,000 more than non-lake front properties.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {nonmarket valuation,property values,water quality,willingness to pay}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9VENSU9N/Loomis and Feldman - 2003 - Estimating the benefits of maintaining adequate la.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TCJ5W3XU/Loomis and Feldman - 2003 - Estimating the benefits of maintaining adequate la.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9KMPINXL/2002WR001799.html} +} + +@article{loomis2014, + title = {Economic {{Value}} of {{Instream Flow}} for {{Non-Commercial Whitewater Boating Using Recreation Demand}} and {{Contingent Valuation Methods}}}, + author = {Loomis, John and Mcternan, James}, + date = {2014-03}, + journaltitle = {Environmental Management}, + volume = {53}, + number = {3}, + pages = {510--9}, + publisher = {Springer Nature B.V.}, + location = {New York, Netherlands}, + issn = {0364-152X}, + url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/1500908866/abstract/127A8EFBD76400FPQ/1}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {Whitewater river kayaking and river rafting require adequate instream flows that are often adversely affected by upstream water diversions. However, there are very few studies in the USA of the economic value of instream flow to inform environmental managers. This study estimates the economic value of instream flow to non-commercial kayakers derived using a Travel Cost Method recreation demand model and Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), a type of Contingent Behavior Method (CBM). Data were obtained from a visitor survey administered along the Poudre River in Colorado. In the dichotomous choice CVM willingness to pay (WTP) question, visitors were asked if they would still visit the river if the cost of their trip was \$Y higher, and the level of \$Y was varied across the sample. The CVM yielded an estimate of WTP that was sensitive to flows ranging from \$55 per person per day at 300 Cubic Feet per Second (CFS) to a maximum \$97 per person per day at flows of 1900 CFS. The recreation demand model estimated a boater's number of trips per season. We found the number of trips taken was also sensitive to flow, ranging from as little as 1.63 trips at 300 CFS to a maximum number of 14 trips over the season at 1900 CFS. Thus, there is consistency between peak benefits per trip and number of trips, respectively. With an average of about 100 non-commercial boaters per day, the maximum marginal values per acre foot averages about \$220. This value exceeds irrigation water values in this area of Colorado. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {510-9}, + keywords = {Environmental management,Environmental Studies,Kayaking,Utility functions,Valuation methods,Water diversion,Water flow,Willingness to pay}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/HYC2GBKT/Loomis and Mcternan - 2014 - Economic Value of Instream Flow for Non-Commercial.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/P88623M8/Loomis and Mcternan - 2014 - Economic Value of Instream Flow for Non-Commercial.pdf} +} + +@article{loos2022, + title = {Individual to Collective Adaptation through Incremental Change in {{Colorado}} Groundwater Governance}, + author = {Loos, Jonathon R. and Andersson, Krister and Bulger, Shauna and Cody, Kelsey C. and Cox, Michael and Gebben, Alexander and Smith, Steven M.}, + date = {2022}, + journaltitle = {Frontiers in Environmental Science}, + volume = {10}, + issn = {2296-665X}, + url = {https://frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.958597}, + urldate = {2022-11-01}, + abstract = {Designing adaptive institutions for achieving sustainable groundwater use is a central challenge to local and state governments. This challenge is exacerbated by the growing impacts and uncertainty of climate change on water resources. Calls to reform water governance systems are often made in the context of these challenges, and reform efforts increasingly emphasize the need for solutions that are locally designed and administered. Such reforms often require fundamental institutional change that is difficult to achieve amid the myriad forces that stabilize and reproduce existing institutional structures and functions. In practice, governance change is instead overwhelmingly incremental and tends to be punctuated by periods of adjustment in response to social or environmental shocks and disturbances. We present a comparative study of four major Colorado river basins and examine how each has evolved distinct arrangements of groundwater governance in response to regulatory and drought disturbances over the past century. We interrogate concepts of path-dependence and apply a historical lens to understand why locally designed institutions for self-regulation emerge in some Colorado groundwater basins but not in others. We uncover a pattern of collective action by groundwater users that first seeks to oppose state regulation, followed by acceptance and efforts to comply, and eventual attempts to get ahead of state regulation by enacting local institutions for self-regulation. We report these findings and discuss the insights they offer for understanding how adaptive natural resources institutions are shaped through time by the constraints and opportunities of path-dependence and local contexts.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BBBU39M9/Loos et al. - 2022 - Individual to collective adaptation through increm.pdf} +} + +@report{makarov2021, + type = {Working Paper}, + title = {Blockchain {{Analysis}} of the {{Bitcoin Market}}}, + author = {Makarov, Igor and Schoar, Antoinette}, + date = {2021-10}, + series = {Working {{Paper Series}}}, + number = {29396}, + eprint = {29396}, + eprinttype = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, + doi = {10.3386/w29396}, + url = {https://nber.org/papers/w29396}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {In this paper, we provide detailed analyses of the Bitcoin network and its main participants. We build a novel database using a large number of public and proprietary sources to link Bitcoin addresses to real entities and develop an extensive suite of algorithms to extract information about the behavior of the main market participants. We conduct three major pieces of analysis of the Bitcoin eco-system. First, we analyze the transaction volume and network structure of the main participants on the blockchain. Second, we document the concentration and regional composition of the miners which are the backbone of the verification protocol and ensure the integrity of the blockchain ledger. Finally, we analyze the ownership concentration of the largest holders of Bitcoin.}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ASDP7PSX/Makarov and Schoar - 2021 - Blockchain Analysis of the Bitcoin Market.pdf} +} + +@article{manning2019, + title = {Production {{Externalities}} and the {{Gains}} from {{Management}} in a {{Spatially-Explicit Aquifer}}}, + author = {Manning, Dale T. and Suter, Jordan F.}, + date = {2019-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics}, + volume = {44}, + number = {1}, + pages = {194--211,S1-S3}, + publisher = {Western Agricultural Economics Association}, + location = {Logan, United States}, + issn = {10685502}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/2173844520/abstract/760944A232D64D1FPQ/1}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Groundwater is a valuable input to agricultural production in many areas, but its use imposes external costs on nearby producers. Little attention has been given to externalities that directly affect groundwater productivity. We develop a dynamic, spatially-explicit model of groundwater use that allows changes in saturated thickness to affect both the pumping cost and productivity of nearby wells. We compare gains from coordinated, socially optimal groundwater use to those that result from a user pursuing unilateral optimization. For wells with average saturated thickness, both unilateral and coordinated optimization can moderately increase the net present value of resource rents.}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {194-211,S1-S3}, + keywords = {Accounting,Agricultural economics,Agricultural production,Agriculture--Agricultural Economics,Aquifer management,Aquifers,Costs,Crops,Economic models,Elasticity,Environmental economics,Externality,Groundwater,Groundwater management,Hydrologic data,Irrigation,Land economics,Mathematical models,Optimization,Parameter estimation,Productivity,River basins,Rivers,Thickness,Water availability,Water levels,Water shortages}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XCYBF45C/Manning and Suter - 2019 - Production Externalities and the Gains from Manage.pdf} +} + +@article{manning2020, + title = {Non-Market Valuation in Integrated Assessment Modeling: {{The}} Benefits of Water Right Retirement}, + shorttitle = {Non-Market Valuation in Integrated Assessment Modeling}, + author = {Manning, Dale T. and Rad, Mani Rouhi and Suter, Jordan F. and Goemans, Christopher and Xiang, Zaichen and Bailey, Ryan}, + date = {2020-09-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {103}, + pages = {102341}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102341}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069620300644}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {The impact of resource management on natural capital value depends on processes that affect resource stocks over space and time. We develop an integrated assessment modeling framework that links econometric estimates of non-market benefits from a resource stock to a spatially explicit model of resource dynamics. Results from a dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey are used to estimate a marginal willingness to pay function for groundwater, which has no market. We use the model to measure the economic benefits to agricultural producers of a program that pays for water right retirement. Under the baseline scenario, without water right retirement, the benefits from groundwater stocks in the study region decline in value by \$3.6 million over 15 years because of groundwater depletion. Water right retirement leads to groundwater benefits that are \$0.55 million higher than in the baseline after 15 years, but benefits vary greatly over space. Comparing this to an explicit program cost of \$45 million suggests that other social benefits from groundwater stocks must exist to justify the program from a benefit-cost perspective. Valuing the economic benefits from increasing natural capital stocks can inform policy and provide insight into the value of management in resource and environmental systems.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Conservation policy,Contingent valuation method,Groundwater,Integrated assessment modeling,Natural capital,Non-market valuation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/5XR5INJ4/Manning et al. - 2020 - Non-market valuation in integrated assessment mode.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/G9VC6K8V/S0095069620300644.html} +} + +@jurisdiction{marquez2015, + title = {{San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1}}, + author = {{San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1}}, + shortauthor = {Márquez}, + %author = {Márquez, Monica}, + date = {2015-06-29}, + citation = {{Judge Monica Márquez, Supreme Court of Colorado, No. 13SA135}}, + number = {2015 CO 52 No. 13SA135}, + institution = {The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/ae481ac69/Opinion.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-04-25}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/QYTAX2A9/Opinion.pdf} +} + +@article{martinpersson2013, + title = {Conditional {{Cash Transfers}} and {{Payments}} for {{Environmental Services}}—{{A Conceptual Framework}} for {{Explaining}} and {{Judging Differences}} in {{Outcomes}}}, + author = {Martin Persson, U. and Alpízar, Francisco}, + date = {2013-03}, + journaltitle = {World Development}, + shortjournal = {World Development}, + volume = {43}, + pages = {124--137}, + issn = {0305750X}, + doi = {10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.10.006}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0305750X12002501}, + urldate = {2023-07-21}, + abstract = {We develop a conceptual framework elucidating the main determinants of the impact of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) programs. Using a simple multi-agent model and evaluations of existing programs, we show that (1) the share of the population who would meet the program’s conditions in the absence of payments is a powerful predictor of program efficiency, and that (2) program efficiency is eroded by selection bias (people who already meet conditions self-select into the programs at higher rates than others). We then discuss possibilities for increasing efficiency and criteria for evaluating and choosing between CCTs/PES or other policy instruments.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZZW4F47I/Martin Persson and Alpízar - 2013 - Conditional Cash Transfers and Payments for Enviro.pdf} +} + +@article{mason2018, + title = {Price {{Elasticity}} of {{Supply}} and {{Productivity}}: {{An Analysis}} of {{Natural Gas Wells}} in {{Wyoming}}}, + shorttitle = {Price {{Elasticity}} of {{Supply}} and {{Productivity}}}, + author = {Mason, Charles F. and Roberts, Gavin}, + date = {2018-09-15}, + journaltitle = {The Energy Journal}, + volume = {39}, + number = {S1}, + pages = {79--101}, + publisher = {International Association for Energy Economics}, + issn = {01956574}, + doi = {10.5547/01956574.39.SI1.cmas}, + url = {https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&issn=01956574&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA562868610&sid=googleScholar&linkaccess=abs}, + urldate = {2022-10-13}, + abstract = {{$<$}em{$>$}Gale{$<$}/em{$>$} Academic OneFile includes Price Elasticity of Supply and Productivity: An Analysi by Charles F. Mason and Gavin Roberts. Click to explore.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/K3MHSLFC/Mason and Roberts - 2018 - Price Elasticity of Supply and Productivity An An.PDF;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/RJUKEZ25/i.html} +} + +@article{mccaffrey2004, + title = {Propensity {{Score Estimation With Boosted Regression}} for {{Evaluating Causal Effects}} in {{Observational Studies}}}, + author = {McCaffrey, Daniel and Ridgeway, Greg and Morral, Andrew}, + date = {2004-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Psychological methods}, + shortjournal = {Psychological methods}, + volume = {9}, + pages = {403--25}, + doi = {10.1037/1082-989X.9.4.403}, + abstract = {Causal effect modeling with naturalistic rather than experimental data is challenging. In observational studies participants in different treatment conditions may also differ on pretreatment characteristics that influence outcomes. Propensity score methods can theoretically eliminate these confounds for all observed covariates, but accurate estimation of propensity scores is impeded by large numbers of covariates, uncertain functional forms for their associations with treatment selection, and other problems. This article demonstrates that boosting, a modern statistical technique, can overcome many of these obstacles. The authors illustrate this approach with a study of adolescent probationers in substance abuse treatment programs. Propensity score weights estimated using boosting eliminate most pretreatment group differences and substantially alter the apparent relative effects of adolescent substance abuse treatment.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/IX6NW55C/Mccaffrey et al. - 2004 - Propensity Score Estimation With Boosted Regressio.pdf} +} + +@misc{mccaffrey2016, + title = {Propensity {{Scores}} for {{Multiple Treatments}}: {{A Tutorial}} for the {{MNPS Macro}} in the {{TWANG SAS Macros}}}, + author = {McCaffrey, Daniel and Burgette, Lane and Griffin, Beth Ann and Martin, Craig}, + date = {2016-06-16}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {RAND Corporation}, + url = {https://rand.org/pubs/tools/TL169z1.html}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VVTC9I2Q/McCaffrey et al. - Propensity Scores for Multiple Treatments A Tutor.pdf} +} + +@book{mccain2017, + title = {Properties of {{Petroleum Fluids}}}, + author = {{McCain William D Jr}}, + date = {2017}, + edition = {3}, + publisher = {PennWell}, + location = {Tulsa, Oklahoma}, + abstract = {Petroleum can exist as either a liquid or a gas, either in the reservoir or on the trip to the surface. These properties are the basis for the chemistry of petroleum. This long-awaited new edition to author acclaimed text expands on the various compounds of this essential hydrocarbon. It includes new chapters on petroleum gas condensates and volatile oils, while the discussion on oilfield waters is extended. A vital resource for petroleum engineering students, this book is equally useful as a reference for practicing engineers. New Features: Two new chapters on gas condensates; A new chapter on volatile oils; A simplified explanation of phase behavior and an extended discussion of oilfield waters; An expanded review of the components of petroleum and the methods of determining its composition.}, + isbn = {978-1-59370-373-8}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Oil & Gas Engineering,Petrochemistry & Petrochemicals} +} + +@article{menapace2013, + title = {Risk {{Aversion}}, {{Subjective Beliefs}}, and {{Farmer Risk Management Strategies}}}, + author = {Menapace, Luisa and Colson, Gregory and Raffaelli, Roberta}, + date = {2013}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {95}, + number = {2}, + eprint = {23358407}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {384--389}, + publisher = {[Agricultural \& Applied Economics Association, Oxford University Press]}, + issn = {0002-9092}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/23358407}, + urldate = {2024-04-17}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/Y2ZRUGUV/Menapace et al. - 2013 - Risk Aversion, Subjective Beliefs, and Farmer Risk.pdf} +} + +@online{mondragon2024, + title = {Rio {{Grande Account Search}}}, + author = {Mondragon, J.J.}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://assessor.riograndecounty.org/assessor/taxweb/search.jsp}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + organization = {Rio Grande County County Tax Web}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EV8J6IZW/search.html} +} + +@article{monger2018, + title = {Retiring {{Land}} to {{Save Water}}: {{Participation}} in {{Colorado}}'s {{Republican River Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program}}}, + shorttitle = {Retiring {{Land}} to {{Save Water}}}, + author = {Monger, Randall G. and Suter, Jordan F. and Manning, Dale T. and Schneekloth, Joel P.}, + date = {2018-02}, + journaltitle = {Land Economics}, + volume = {94}, + number = {1}, + pages = {36--51}, + publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, + issn = {00237639}, + doi = {10.3368/le.94.1.36}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/26448861}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Agricultural land retirement is increasingly used to manage water resources. This study uses well-level enrollment data to explore the factors that influence landowner participation in the Colorado Republican River Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program. An empirical model of enrollment is informed by a theoretical model of participation that incorporates aquifer and soil characteristics in addition to financial incentives. Our results reveal that enrollment is predicted to increase by 0.087 percentage points with a \$10 increase in the incentives offered. The probability of enrollment is also influenced by the aquifer's saturated thickness and the soil characteristics that impact land productivity.}, + keywords = {Aquifers,Colorado,Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (U.S.),Land retirement,Monetary incentives,Rivers,Water conservation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZGI7RGRX/Monger et al. - 2018 - Retiring Land to Save Water Participation in Colo.pdf} +} + +@article{mora2018, + title = {Bitcoin Emissions Alone Could Push Global Warming above 2°{{C}}}, + author = {Mora, Camilo and Rollins, Randi L. and Taladay, Katie and Kantar, Michael B. and Chock, Mason K. and Shimada, Mio and Franklin, Erik C.}, + date = {2018}, + journaltitle = {Nature climate change}, + volume = {8}, + number = {11}, + pages = {931--933}, + publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, + location = {London}, + issn = {1758-678X}, + doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0321-8}, + abstract = {Bitcoin is a power-hungry cryptocurrency that is increasingly used as an investment and payment system. Here we show that projected Bitcoin usage, should it follow the rate of adoption of other broadly adopted technologies, could alone produce enough CO2 emissions to push warming above 2 °C within less than three decades.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Carbon dioxide,Carbon dioxide emissions,Climate change,Digital currencies,Emissions,Global warming,Meteorology,Payment systems}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7QWTR7M9/Mora et al. - 2018 - Bitcoin emissions alone could push global warming .pdf} +} + +@article{moussa2021, + title = {Exploring the Dynamic Relationship between {{Bitcoin}} and Commodities: {{New}} Insights through {{STECM}} Model}, + shorttitle = {Exploring the Dynamic Relationship between {{Bitcoin}} and Commodities}, + author = {Moussa, Wajdi and Mgadmi, Nidhal and Béjaoui, Azza and Regaieg, Rym}, + date = {2021-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Resources Policy}, + shortjournal = {Resources Policy}, + volume = {74}, + pages = {102416}, + issn = {0301-4207}, + doi = {10.1016/j.resourpol.2021.102416}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420721004256}, + urldate = {2022-05-09}, + abstract = {This paper investigates the dynamic relationships between Bitcoin, Oil, Natural Gas, Gold and Coal in the short- and long-run over the period 2011–2018. For this end, we use a Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (STECM) to accommodate the presence of some stylized facts (the nonlinearity and asymmetry) in the adjustment process of Bitcoin towards their long-run equilibrium. We show significant long-run equilibrium links for Bitcoin, which seems to be asymmetric and nonlinear. Gold and Oil Brent Crude logarithmic prices potentially and significantly influence the Bitcoin logarithmic prices. Our empirical results also indicate that the current Bitcoin logarithmic prices have a significant and positive impact on their lagged values for both regimes, implying some symmetric memory effects over time. Such analysis of the interlinkages between different assets could be interesting from investment and academic perspectives.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Bitcoin,Portfolio management,STECM}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/AAJQJPML/Moussa et al. - 2021 - Exploring the dynamic relationship between Bitcoin.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/VLBFRNRZ/S0301420721004256.html} +} + +@online{moveinc.2024, + title = {Center, {{CO Land}} for {{Sale}} \& {{Real Estate}}}, + author = {{Move, Inc.}}, + date = {2024-06-03}, + url = {https://realtor.com/realestateandhomes-search/Center_CO/type-land}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + abstract = {Find Center, CO land for sale at realtor.com®. Find information about ranches, lots, acreage and more at realtor.com®.}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {Realtor}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7RVFHG32/type-land.html} +} + +@book{mullan2016, + title = {A {{History}} of {{Digital Currency}} in the {{United States}}: {{New Technology}} in an {{Unregulated Market}}}, + shorttitle = {A {{History}} of {{Digital Currency}} in the {{United States}}}, + author = {Mullan, P. Carl}, + date = {2016}, + series = {Palgrave {{Advances}} in the {{Economics}} of {{Innovation}} and {{Technology}}}, + publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan US}, + location = {New York}, + doi = {10.1057/978-1-137-56870-0}, + abstract = {This book presents detailed case studies of the first commercial internet digital currency systems developed between 1996 and 2004. Transactions completed with the new technology circumvented all US financial regulations, an opening that transnational criminals exploited. Mullan explains how an entire industry of companies, agents, and participants turned a blind eye to crimes being committed in this unsupervised environment. He then tracks the subsequent changes made to US regulations that now prevent such unlicensed activity, illustrating the importance of supervising products and industries that arise from new disruptive technology. This book distills hundreds of hours of interviews with the creators and operators of early digital currency businesses to create detailed case studies of their practices.}, + isbn = {978-1-137-56869-4}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {E-business,e-Business/e-Commerce,Economic History,Economics and Finance,Electronic funds transfers,Finance,Financial History,Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics,Risk Management}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DMHHVUIG/Mullan - 2016 - A History of Digital Currency in the United States.pdf} +} + +@article{naeem2021, + title = {Tail Dependence between Bitcoin and Green Financial Assets}, + author = {Naeem, Muhammad Abubakr and Karim, Sitara}, + date = {2021-11}, + journaltitle = {Economics Letters}, + shortjournal = {Economics Letters}, + volume = {208}, + pages = {110068}, + issn = {01651765}, + doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110068}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176521003451}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {The high power consumption of Bitcoin transactions has raised environmental and sustainable concerns of green investors and regulatory bodies. We utilize the time-varying optimal copula (TVOC) approach to showcase the dependence structure between bitcoin and green financial assets. We find multiple tail-dependence regimes characterize the extreme dependence between bitcoin and green financial assets, and the dependence structure is mainly asymmetric and time-varying. Finally, the hedging effectiveness of green financial assets for bitcoin revealed that all green assets, especially clean energy, are effective hedges for bitcoin.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WJ4YQK6C/Naeem and Karim - 2021 - Tail dependence between bitcoin and green financia.pdf} +} + +@article{nakamoto2008, + title = {Bitcoin: {{A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System}}}, + author = {Nakamoto, Satoshi}, + date = {2008-10-31}, + url = {https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf}, + abstract = {A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FIV5X5X3/Nakamoto - Bitcoin A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.pdf} +} + +@report{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2012, + title = {Small {{Grains}} 2012 {{Summary}}}, + author = {{National Agricultural Statistics Service}}, + shortauthor = {{NASS}}, + date = {2012-09-30}, + number = {ISSN: 1949-162X}, + institution = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + url = {https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/5t34sj573/ms35tp36v/3197z0970/smgr0919.pdf}, + langid = {english} +} + +@report{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2013, + title = {Potatoes 2012 {{Summary}}}, + author = {{National Agricultural Statistics Service}}, + shortauthor = {{NASS}}, + date = {2013-09}, + number = {ISSN: 1949-1514}, + institution = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + url = {https://nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/pots0920.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-02-27}, + langid = {english} +} + +@report{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2019, + title = {Small {{Grains}} 2019 {{Summary}}}, + author = {{National Agricultural Statistics Service}}, + shortauthor = {{NASS}}, + date = {2019-09-30}, + number = {ISSN: 1949-162X}, + institution = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + url = {https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/5t34sj573/ms35tp36v/3197z0970/smgr0919.pdf}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/757QH8I3/2019 - Small Grains 2019 Summary 09302019.pdf} +} + +@report{nationalagriculturalstatisticsservice2019a, + title = {Potatoes 2019 {{Summary}}}, + author = {{National Agricultural Statistics Service}}, + shortauthor = {{NASS}}, + date = {2020-09}, + number = {ISSN: 1949-1514}, + institution = {United States Department of Agriculture}, + url = {https://nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/pots0920.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-02-27}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/26UIV4CS/2019 - Potatoes 2019 Summary 09172020.pdf} +} + +@article{negri1989, + title = {The Common Property Aquifer as a Differential Game}, + author = {Negri, Donald H.}, + date = {1989}, + journaltitle = {Water Resources Research}, + volume = {25}, + number = {1}, + pages = {9--15}, + issn = {1944-7973}, + doi = {10.1029/WR025i001p00009}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/WR025i001p00009}, + urldate = {2023-07-16}, + abstract = {Open-loop and feedback equilibria are compared using a common property aquifer model. Open-loop solutions correspond to assuming that participants commit themselves in the initial period to pumping rates in all future periods. Feedback solutions represent a more realistic assumption as farm operators adopt pumping strategies that depend on the reserve stock of water. Comparing the two equilibrium concepts reveals two sources of dynamic inefficiency in the common property aquifer: a pumping cost externality and a “strategic externality” that arises from the competition among users to capture the groundwater reserves. The qualitative results show that the open-loop solution captures only the pumping cost externality. The feedback solution captures both externalities and exacerbates the over- exploitation of the commons compared to the open-loop solution. Moreover, the dynamic inefficiency resulting from both externalities increases in the number of independent landowners with access to the aquifer.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JYN4AQ3C/WR025i001p00009.html} +} + +@article{newell2019, + title = {Trophy {{Hunting}} versus {{Manufacturing Energy}}: {{The Price Responsiveness}} of {{Shale Gas}}}, + shorttitle = {Trophy {{Hunting}} versus {{Manufacturing Energy}}}, + author = {Newell, Richard G. and Prest, Brian C. and Vissing, Ashley B.}, + date = {2019-03-02}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + volume = {6}, + number = {2}, + pages = {391--431}, + publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, + issn = {2333-5955}, + doi = {10.1086/701531}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/701531}, + urldate = {2023-02-03}, + abstract = {We analyze the relative price responsiveness of unconventional versus conventional natural gas extraction. We separately analyze three key stages of gas production: drilling wells, completing wells, and producing natural gas from the completed wells. The most important margin is drilling investment, and neither production from existing wells nor completion times respond strongly to prices. We estimate a gas drilling response of 0.9\% per 1\% gas price shock, for both conventional and unconventional sources. Nonetheless, because unconventional wells produce about three times more gas per well than conventional ones, the supply response is much larger for unconventional supply. Accounting for changes to the level and composition of drilling activity, the gas supply is about three times more responsive during the “shale era” of 2010–15 compared to 2000–2005. We illustrate how the distinctions between the stages of production (drilling, completion, and production) are key to understanding price responsiveness.}, + keywords = {D24,drilling,L71,natural gas supply,Q41,shale gas,supply response}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9LHJ5GT5/Newell et al. - 2019 - Trophy Hunting versus Manufacturing Energy The Pr.pdf} +} + +@article{nick2014, + title = {What Drives Natural Gas Prices? — {{A}} Structural {{VAR}} Approach}, + shorttitle = {What Drives Natural Gas Prices?}, + author = {Nick, Sebastian and Thoenes, Stefan}, + date = {2014-09}, + journaltitle = {Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Energy Economics}, + volume = {45}, + pages = {517--527}, + issn = {01409883}, + doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2014.08.010}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140988314001911}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {In this study, we develop a structural vector autoregressive model (VAR) for the German natural gas market. Our setup allows us to analyze the determinants of the natural gas price in a comprehensive framework. In particular, we illustrate the usefulness of our approach by disentangling the effects of different fundamental influences on gas prices during three recent supply interruptions: the Russian–Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009, the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the withheld Russian exports in February 2012. Our results show that the natural gas price is affected by temperature, storage and supply shortfalls in the short term, while the long-term development is closely tied to both crude oil and coal prices, capturing the economic climate and the substitution relationship between the different energy commodities.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2NWS6AJ8/Nick and Thoenes - 2014 - What drives natural gas prices — A structural VAR.pdf} +} + +@article{nkoro2016, + title = {Autoregressive {{Distributed Lag}} ({{ARDL}}) Cointegration Technique: Application and Interpretation}, + shorttitle = {Autoregressive {{Distributed Lag}} ({{ARDL}}) Cointegration Technique}, + author = {Nkoro, Emeka and {Aham Kelvin Uko}}, + date = {2016}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Statistical and Econometric Methods}, + volume = {5}, + number = {4}, + publisher = {Scientific Press International Limited}, + location = {Christchurch}, + issn = {2241-0384}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/publiccontent/docview/2573399409?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {Economic analysis suggests that there is a long run relationship between variables under consideration as stipulated by theory. This means that the long run relationship properties are intact. In other words, the means and variances are constant and not depending on time. However, most empirical researches have shown that the constancy of the means and variances are not satisfied in analyzing time series variables. In the event of resolving this problem most cointegration techniques are wrongly applied, estimated, and interpreted. One of these techniques is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration technique or bound cointegration technique. Hence, this study reviews the issues surrounding the way cointegration techniques are applied, estimated and interpreted within the context of ARDL cointegration framework. The study shows that the adoption of the ARDL cointegration technique does not require pretests for unit roots unlike other techniques. Consequently, ARDL cointegration technique is preferable when dealing with variables that are integrated of different order, I(0), I(1) or combination of the both and, robust when there is a single long run relationship between the underlying variables in a small sample size. The long run relationship of the underlying variables is detected through the F-statistic (Wald test). In this approach, long run relationship of the series is said to be established when the Fstatistic exceeds the critical value band. The major advantage of this approach lies in its identification of the cointegrating vectors where there are multiple cointegrating vectors. However, this technique will crash in the presence of integrated stochastic trend of I(2). To forestall effort in futility, it may be advisable to test for unit roots, though not as a necessary condition. Based on forecast and policy stance, there is need to explore the necessary conditions that give rise to ARDL cointegration technique in order to avoid its wrongful application, estimation, and interpretation. If the conditions are not followed, it may lead to model misspecification and inconsistent and unrealistic estimates with its implication on forecast and policy. However, this paper cannot claim to have treated the underlying issues in their greatest details, but have endeavoured to provide sufficient insight into the issues surrounding ARDL cointegration technique to young practitioners to enable them to properly apply, estimate, and interpret; in addition to following discussions of the issues in some more advanced texts.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XJR88FKS/Nkoro and Uko - Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegratio.pdf} +} + +@letter{odor2003, + type = {Letter}, + title = {Acceptance Letters from the State Engineer's Office}, + author = {Odor, Jack}, + date = {2003}, + publisher = {Colorado State University. Libraries}, + url = {https://mountainscholar.org/handle/10217/41031}, + urldate = {2021-04-30}, + abstract = {Correspondence between GASP and the State Engineer's office seeking and granting approval for water recharge plans.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/44T4UJMM/Author - 1974 - Acceptance letters from the state engineer's offic.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TTCCRLBN/Author - 1974 - Acceptance letters from the state engineer's offic.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PFL5DDXJ/41031.html} +} + +@inproceedings{odwyer2014, + title = {Bitcoin {{Mining}} and Its {{Energy Footprint}}}, + booktitle = {25th {{IET Irish Signals}} \& {{Systems Conference}} 2014 and 2014 {{China-Ireland International Conference}} on {{Information}} and {{Communications Technologies}} ({{ISSC}} 2014/{{CIICT}} 2014)}, + author = {O'Dwyer, K. J. and Malone, D.}, + date = {2014}, + pages = {280--285}, + publisher = {IET}, + location = {Stevenage, UK}, + doi = {10.1049/cp.2014.0699}, + abstract = {Bitcoin is a digital cryptocurrency that has generated considerable public interest, including both booms in value and busts of exchanges dealing in Bitcoins. One of the fundamental concepts of Bitcoin is that work, called mining, must be done in checking all monetary transactions, which in turn creates Bitcoins as a reward. In this paper we look at the energy consumption of Bitcoin mining. We consider if and when Bitcoin mining has been profitable compared to the energy cost of performing the mining, and conclude that specialist hardware is usually required to make Bitcoin mining profitable. We also show that the power currently used for Bitcoin mining is comparable to Ireland's electricity consumption.}, + isbn = {978-1-84919-924-7}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Data handling techniques,Environmental aspects of computing,Financial computing,Knowledge engineering techniques}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/F27I7SQT/O'Dwyer and Malone - 2014 - Bitcoin Mining and its Energy Footprint.pdf} +} + +@thesis{ostrom1964, + type = {phdthesis}, + title = {Public {{Entrepreneurship}}: {{A Case Study}} in {{Ground Water Basin Management}}}, + shorttitle = {Public {{Entrepreneurship}}}, + author = {Ostrom, Elinor}, + date = {1964}, + institution = {University of California, Los Angeles}, + location = {United States -- California}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/302168853/abstract/84EFE91D0B3D4523PQ/1}, + urldate = {2024-04-22}, + abstract = {The traditional literature of political science and economics has given little consideration to the strategy used by individuals in organizing public enterprises to provide public goods and services. Economists have long been concerned with entrepreneurship, but have largely confined their analysis of entrepreneurship to the private market economy. Political scientists most often take a governmental agency as given and rarely investigate the problems of undertaking new public enterprises. The perspective of public entrepreneurship was taken in this study in order to better understand the process of launching new public enterprises and of devising a public enterprise system to undertake a ground water basin management program. The study was based primarily upon the use of documentary materials.}, + isbn = {9798658124735}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {631}, + keywords = {Basin management,Ground water,Public entrepreneurship,Social sciences}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/I4C5PY9I/Ostrom - Public Entrepreneurship A Case Study in Ground Wa.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XA56ZGE7/fxtFM} +} + +@inproceedings{ostrom1989, + title = {Communication in a {{Commons}}: {{Cooperation Without External Enforcement}}}, + booktitle = {American {{Political Science Association}} Meetings}, + author = {Ostrom, Elinor and Walker, James M}, + date = {1989-07-20}, + location = {Atlanta, Georgia}, + abstract = {The experiments reported in this paper provide strong evidence for the power of face-to-face communication in a repeated common-pool resource environment where decisions are made privately. When communication was provided as a "costless" institution, players successfully used the opportunity to: (a) calculate coordinated rent improving strategies, (b) devise verbal agreements to implement these strategies, and (c) deal with non-conforming players. In field settings, it is rare that the opportunity to communicate is costless. Someone has to invest time and effort to create and maintain arenas for face-to-face communication. The cost of providing an arena for communicating has not been overtly considered in previous experimental work. We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate the affect of costly provision of the communication mechanism on: a) the ability of players to provide the mechanism; and b) the impact of the second order dilemma in solving the first order dilemma posed by the common pool environment itself. In summary, the provision problem players faced in the costly communication experiments was not trivial and did in fact create a barrier. In all three experiments, the problem of providing the institution for communication diminished the success of either: (a) having the ability to develop a coordinated strategy and/or (b) dealing with players who cheated on a previous agreement. On the other hand, all groups succeeded to some degree in providing the communication mechanism and in significantly improving the efficiency of resource allocation decisions.}, + eventtitle = {Workshop in {{Political Theory}} \& {{Policy Analysis}}}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JAT6WBAD/Ostrom and Walker - COMMUNICATION IN A COMMONS COOPERATION WITHOUT EX.pdf} +} + +@book{ostrom1990, + title = {Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action}, + shorttitle = {Governing the Commons}, + author = {Ostrom, Elinor}, + date = {1990}, + series = {The {{Political}} Economy of Institutions and Decisions}, + publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, + location = {Cambridge [England] ;}, + isbn = {978-0-521-37101-8}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {xviii+280}, + keywords = {Commons,Social choice} +} + +@article{palmquist1989, + title = {Land as a {{Differentiated Factor}} of {{Production}}: {{A Hedonic Model}} and {{Its Implications}} for {{Welfare Measurement}}}, + shorttitle = {Land as a {{Differentiated Factor}} of {{Production}}}, + author = {Palmquist, Raymond B.}, + date = {1989-02}, + journaltitle = {Land Economics}, + shortjournal = {Land Economics}, + volume = {65}, + number = {1}, + pages = {23}, + publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, + issn = {00237639}, + doi = {10.2307/3146260}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/3146260}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the derived demand for a differentiated factor of production (agricultural and) and to develop welfare measurement techniques that can be applied to various land and agricultural policy questions. While it is common to treat land as a homogeneous factor of production, each parcel of land actually has a large number of characteristics that will vary between tracts. These characteristics include characteristics that cannot be changed by the owner of the land and others that can be changed in response to market information. The owner cannot reasonably change the soil type or structure, the topsoil depth (although the rate of change in that depth can be influenced), the erosivity of the soil (although the amount of erosion can be affected), major topographic features or terrain, or climate including rainfall, temperature, and sunshine. Other features can be changed such as drainage, terracing, changing the pH or fertility, irrigation of the land, erosion control such as grass waterways or tillage techniques, and building structures on the land.}, + keywords = {Agricultural equipment,Agriculture,Drainage,Fertility,Tillage,Transportation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BGNEBH3G/Palmquist - 1989 - Land as a Differentiated Factor of Production A H.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MES7KFL4/Palmquist - 1989 - Land as a Differentiated Factor of Production A H.pdf} +} + +@article{parks1997, + title = {Sustaining {{Open Space Benefits}} in the {{Northeast}}: {{An Evaluation}} of the {{Conservation Reserve Program}}}, + shorttitle = {Sustaining {{Open Space Benefits}} in the {{Northeast}}}, + author = {Parks, Peter J. and Schorr, James P.}, + date = {1997-01-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {32}, + number = {1}, + pages = {85--94}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1006/jeem.1996.0956}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069696909560}, + urldate = {2023-07-09}, + abstract = {A conceptual model is developed to analyze agricultural landowners' decisions to continue agricultural use, participate in conservation programs, or sell land. The model serves as the framework for an econometric study of participation in the Conservation Reserve Program by Northeastern landowners. Results identify significant differences in enrollment between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties in the region, and indicate that the Conservation Reserve Program is relatively unimportant to agricultural landowners in metropolitan counties. Also, the results indicate that if open space benefits are desired in metropolitan counties, alternative policies (e.g., purchase of development rights, zoning legislation) may be required.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XRC359W6/Parks and Schorr - 1997 - Sustaining Open Space Benefits in the Northeast A.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/Z2CMGYBL/S0095069696909560.html} +} + +@article{pesaran2001, + title = {Bounds Testing Approaches to the Analysis of Level Relationships}, + author = {Pesaran, M. Hashem and Shin, Yongcheol and Smith, Richard J.}, + date = {2001}, + journaltitle = {Journal of applied econometrics (Chichester, England)}, + volume = {16}, + number = {3}, + pages = {289--326}, + publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd}, + location = {Chichester, UK}, + issn = {0883-7252}, + doi = {10.1002/jae.616}, + abstract = {This paper develops a new approach to the problem of testing the existence of a level relationship between a dependent variable and a set of regressors, when it is not known with certainty whether the underlying regressors are trend- or first-difference stationary. The proposed tests are based on standard F- and t-statistics used to test the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in a univariate equilibrium correction mechanism. The asymptotic distributions of these statistics are non-standard under the null hypothesis that there exists no level relationship, irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1). Two sets of asymptotic critical values are provided: one when all regressors are purely I(1) and the other if they are all purely 1(0). These two sets of critical values provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors into purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Accordingly, various bounds testing procedures are proposed. It is shown that the proposed tests are consistent, and their asymptotic distribution under the null and suitably defined local alternatives are derived. The empirical relevance of the bounds procedures is demonstrated by a re-examination of the earnings equation included in the UK Treasury macroeconometric model.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Applied statistics,Brownian motion,Coefficients,Cointegration analysis,Critical values,Determinism,Distribution,Earnings,Econometrics,Economic conditions,Economic models,Economic theory,Hypotheses,Macroeconomics,Mathematical economics,Model testing,Null hypothesis,Real wages,Regression analysis,Statistical theories,Statistics,Studies,Trends,Unemployment,Unemployment benefits,Variables,Wage rates,Wages & salaries}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FWACQAQ6/Pesaran et al. - 2001 - Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level.pdf} +} + +@article{peterson2018a, + title = {Citizen Preferences for Possible Energy Policies at the National and State Levels}, + author = {Peterson, Mark and Feldman, David}, + date = {2018-10-01}, + journaltitle = {Energy Policy}, + shortjournal = {Energy Policy}, + volume = {121}, + pages = {80--91}, + issn = {0301-4215}, + doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2018.05.069}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518303872}, + urldate = {2023-02-27}, + abstract = {Without knowledge of citizen preferences, policy makers most often rely on their intuition to infer such preferences or on biased information provided by special interest groups. Using a choice-modeling approach, the study features two large-scale, field-research projects—one done nationally in the US, and another composed of separate data collection efforts across eight states where energy policies have a high profile in public discourse. The results suggest four outcomes of energy policies are most important to citizens at the national level: 1) environmental quality, 2) energy costs, 3) job creation, and 4) greenhouse gas emissions. This pattern of importance for the outcomes of energy policy persists across important demographic groups including those related to political-party affiliation. At the state level, the four preferred outcomes of energy policies seen at the national level also appear—although in a different order of preference in some states. Further analysis of citizens’ willingness to change energy policy at the state level suggests that risk aversion characterizes citizens’ views about revising energy policy.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Choice modeling,Citizen preferences,Discrete choice experiment,Energy policy,Energy policy outcomes,Risk aversion}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/C8QE56WN/Peterson and Feldman - 2018 - Citizen preferences for possible energy policies a.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/IGQ32H8K/S0301421518303872.html} +} + +@online{peterson2024, + title = {Saguache {{County Account Search}}}, + author = {Peterson, Peter}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://saguachecountyco-assessor.tylerhost.net/assessor/taxweb/search.jsp}, + urldate = {2024-06-03}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SN7LWHQC/search.html} +} + +@article{petrie2007, + title = {Estimating the {{Value}} of {{Water Use Permits}}: {{A Hedonic Approach Applied}} to {{Farmland}} in the {{Southeastern United States}}}, + shorttitle = {Estimating the {{Value}} of {{Water Use Permits}}}, + author = {Petrie, Ragan A. and Taylor, Laura O.}, + date = {2007-08}, + journaltitle = {Land Economics}, + shortjournal = {Land Economics}, + volume = {83}, + number = {3}, + pages = {302--318}, + publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, + issn = {00237639}, + doi = {10.3368/le.83.3.302}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/27647774}, + urldate = {2021-02-26}, + abstract = {Agricultural irrigation permits in the Flint River Basin in Georgia had been routinely granted until a moratorium was placed on permit issuance in 1999. This research exploits this policy change within a hedonic-pricing framework to estimate the value of irrigation rights in the southeastern United States. While the value of irrigation rights has been studied extensively in the western United States, differences in property rights and legal regimes, as well as a lack of established water-rights markets in the eastern United States, leave us with little information regarding the value of irrigation rights in this setting.}, + keywords = {Agricultural policy -- United States,Dooly County (Ga.),Economics,Georgia,Government policy,Irrigation,Irrigation laws,Licenses,Property rights,Resource allocation,Rural land use,United States,Value (Economics),Water in agriculture,Water rights,Water use}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8TC8DSPV/Petrie and Taylor - 2007 - Estimating the Value of Water Use Permits A Hedon.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TIRLI34K/Petrie and Taylor - 2007 - Estimating the Value of Water Use Permits A Hedon.pdf} +} + +@article{pfeiffer2012, + title = {Groundwater Pumping and Spatial Externalities in Agriculture}, + author = {Pfeiffer, Lisa and Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia}, + date = {2012-07-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {64}, + number = {1}, + pages = {16--30}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2012.03.003}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069612000320}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {We investigate the behavior of farmers who share an underground aquifer. In the case where seepage may occur the resource is nonexclusive, giving rise to a spatial externality whereby pumping by one user affects others nearby. Theoretically, these externalities are potentially important causes of welfare loss. Using a unique spatial data set of groundwater users in western Kansas, we are able to empirically measure the physical and behavioral effects of groundwater pumping by neighbors. To address the simultaneity of neighbors' pumping, we use the neighbors' permitted water allocation as an instrument for their pumping. We estimate that 2.5\% of the total groundwater extracted each year in western Kansas is over-extraction due to the effects of spatial externalities. Individuals who own multiple wells internalize their own externality by trading off pumping at one well for pumping at another.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Common property resource,Groundwater management,Nonrenewable resources,Spatial externalities}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WKML76V8/Pfeiffer and Lin - 2012 - Groundwater pumping and spatial externalities in a.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7R4269VF/S0095069612000320.html} +} + +@article{pfeiffer2014, + title = {Does Efficient Irrigation Technology Lead to Reduced Groundwater Extraction? {{Empirical}} Evidence}, + shorttitle = {Does Efficient Irrigation Technology Lead to Reduced Groundwater Extraction?}, + author = {Pfeiffer, Lisa and Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia}, + date = {2014-03-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {67}, + number = {2}, + pages = {189--208}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2013.12.002}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069613001095}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Encouraging the use of more efficient irrigation technology is often viewed as an effective, politically feasible method to reduce the consumptive use of water for agricultural production. Despite its pervasive recommendation, it is not clear that increasing irrigation efficiency will lead to water conservation in practice. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of a widespread conversion from traditional center pivot irrigation systems to higher efficiency dropped-nozzle center pivot systems that has occurred in western Kansas. State and national cost-share programs subsidized the conversion. On an average, the intended reduction in groundwater use did not occur; the shift to more efficient irrigation technology has increased groundwater extraction, in part due to shifting crop patterns.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Agriculture,Aquifer,Groundwater,Irrigation efficiency,Irrigation technology,Rebound effect,Water conservation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/Z54EUC6A/Pfeiffer and Lin - 2014 - Does efficient irrigation technology lead to reduc.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3PBSYKQ3/S0095069613001095.html} +} + +@book{pigou1924, + title = {The {{Economics}} of {{Welfare}}}, + author = {Pigou, Arthur Cecil}, + date = {1924}, + edition = {1}, + eprint = {10kPAQAAIAAJ}, + eprinttype = {googlebooks}, + publisher = {Macmillan}, + location = {London}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {820} +} + +@article{plantinga2001, + title = {The Supply of Land for Conservation Uses: Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program}, + shorttitle = {The Supply of Land for Conservation Uses}, + author = {Plantinga, Andrew J and Alig, Ralph and Cheng, Hsiang-tai}, + date = {2001-03-01}, + journaltitle = {Resources, Conservation and Recycling}, + shortjournal = {Resources, Conservation and Recycling}, + volume = {31}, + number = {3}, + pages = {199--215}, + issn = {0921-3449}, + doi = {10.1016/S0921-3449(00)00085-9}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921344900000859}, + urldate = {2023-07-09}, + abstract = {From 1987 to 1990, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) operated similarly to a competitive market for conservation lands. Using CRP data on counties from this period, we estimate supply functions for conservation lands for nine US regions. The results allow regions to be grouped according to low (Mountain, North Plains), moderate (Cornbelt, Lake States, South Plains), and high (Appalachian, Delta States, Northeast, Southeast) costs based on acreage enrolled. In addition, they identify farmers’ perceived opportunity costs of enrolling cropland in a conservation program. The results provide potentially useful information to CRP administrators following the recent reauthorization of the program and also yield insights into the costs of other land conservation efforts.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Conservation,Economic analyses,Land}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/89PCTBIN/Plantinga et al. - 2001 - The supply of land for conservation uses evidence.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9LFEN66I/S0921344900000859.html} +} + +@article{prat2021, + title = {An {{Equilibrium Model}} of the {{Market}} for {{Bitcoin Mining}}}, + author = {Prat, Julien and Walter, Benjamin}, + date = {2021-08}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy}, + volume = {129}, + number = {8}, + pages = {2415--2452}, + publisher = {University of Chicago}, + issn = {00223808}, + doi = {10.1086/714445}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/714445}, + urldate = {2024-12-02}, + abstract = {We propose a model that uses the exchange rate of Bitcoin against the US dollar to predict the computing power of Bitcoin's network. We show that free entry places an upper bound on mining revenues and explain how it can be identified. Calibrating the model's parameters allows us to accurately forecast the evolution of the network computing power over time. We find that a significant share of mining rewards was invested in mining equipment and that the seigniorage income of miners was limited.}, + keywords = {BITCOIN,CRYPTOCURRENCY mining,MARKET equilibrium,MARKETING models,U.S. dollar}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KCPA9V9S/Prat and Walter - 2021 - An Equilibrium Model of the Market for Bitcoin Min.pdf} +} + +@article{provencher1993, + title = {The {{Externalities Associated}} with the {{Common Property Exploitation}} of {{Groundwater}}}, + author = {Provencher, Bill and Burt, Oscar}, + date = {1993-03-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {24}, + number = {2}, + pages = {139--158}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1006/jeem.1993.1010}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069683710107}, + urldate = {2023-07-16}, + abstract = {In this paper the rate of groundwater extraction under the common property arrangement is the outcome of a dynamic game played with feedback strategies. The analysis clarifies the externalities associated with the common property extraction of groundwater and identifies an risk externality that arises when firms are risk averse. Identifying the various externalities bears on the development of appropriate forms of groundwater management. In particular, the risk externality would be unknown to the "watermaster" of a central control agency, suggesting the need for creative, decentralized forms of groundwater management.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/C4PQXLBU/main.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/795KUUBU/S0095069683710107.html} +} + +@software{rcoreteam2023, + title = {R: {{A Language}} and {{Environment}} for {{Statistical}} {{Computing}}}, + author = {{R Core Team}}, + date = {2023-06-16}, + location = {Vienna, Austria.}, + url = {https://R-project.org/}, + organization = {R Foundation for Statistical Computing}, + version = {4.3.1 Beagle Scouts}, +} + +@article{rehman2021, + title = {A Time–Frequency Comovement and Causality Relationship between {{Bitcoin}} Hashrate and Energy Commodity Markets}, + author = {Rehman, Mobeen Ur and Kang, Sang Hoon}, + date = {2021-08-01}, + journaltitle = {Global Finance Journal}, + shortjournal = {Global Finance Journal}, + volume = {49}, + pages = {100576}, + issn = {1044-0283}, + doi = {10.1016/j.gfj.2020.100576}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1044028320302763}, + urldate = {2022-05-09}, + abstract = {This study examines time–frequency relationship between Bitcoin prices and Bitcoin mining based on daily data from January 2013 to October 2018. Bitcoin mining is measured through Bitcoin hashrate, which represents the completion speed of the Bitcoin code. We also include three energy commodities, i.e. oil, coal, and gas in a multivariate model employing time–frequency wavelet extensions in the form of partial and multivariate models. Results of our study suggest that both oil and gas lead Bitcoin returns from mid 2014 till 2016 across 64–~128~days' period. Under the investment period of 64–~256, hashrate and Bitcoin returns share significant comovement in the presence of oil and natural gas however exhibit no comovement when the effect of coal market is considered. Our results of wavelet decomposition suggest that the magnitude of comovement ranging from short- to long-run is time varying. Finally, results of the causality on quantile test suggest that Bitcoin returns cause changes in Bitcoin hashrate mostly during median quantiles with an asymmetric pattern. Our work entail implications for investors in the Bitcoin and energy market and is also helpful in forecasting the pricing behavior of Bitcoin using the hashrate and vice versa.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Bitcoin hashrate,Bitcoin prices,Causality in quantiles analysis,Commodity futures,Wavelet analysis}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MBM8TUZE/Rehman and Kang - 2021 - A time–frequency comovement and causality relation.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3SPJPM7T/S1044028320302763.html} +} + +@misc{rgwcd2014, + title = {{{CREP PowerPoint}}}, + author = {{Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{RGWCD}}, + date = {2014}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/1def8c50c/CREP_PPT.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JPI6R78H/CREP_PPT.pdf} +} + +@misc{rgwcd2015, + title = {Fact {{Sheet CREP- Colorado Rio Grande}}}, + author = {{Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{RGWCD}}, + date = {2015-02}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/45978fdfb/2015Fact+Sheet+RG+CREP_updated2092015.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + organization = {Rio Grande Water Conservation District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/RPQDEYJN/2015Fact+Sheet+RG+CREP_updated2092015.pdf} +} + +@online{rgwcd2024, + title = {Closed {{Basin Project}}}, + author = {{Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{RGWCD}}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/closed-basin-project}, + urldate = {2024-05-26}, + organization = {Rio Grande Water Conservation District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UXZVBUXU/closed-basin-project.html} +} + +@online{rgwcd2023, + type = {Rio Grande Water Conservation District}, + title = {{{CREP}}}, + author = {{Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{RGWCD}}, + date = {2023}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/crep}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + abstract = {The Colorado Rio Grande CREP is a partnership between the United States Department of Agriculture, the State of Colorado and Subdistrict No. 1 of the…}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {Rio Grande Water Conservation District}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/96DPS6QV/crep.html} +} + +@article{rosen1974, + title = {Hedonic {{Prices}} and {{Implicit Markets}}: {{Product Differentiation}} in {{Pure Competition}}}, + shorttitle = {Hedonic {{Prices}} and {{Implicit Markets}}}, + author = {Rosen, Sherwin}, + date = {1974}, + journaltitle = {The Journal of political economy}, + volume = {82}, + number = {1}, + pages = {34--55}, + publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, + location = {Chicago}, + issn = {0022-3808}, + doi = {10.1086/260169}, + abstract = {A CLASS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS IS COMPLETELY DESCRIBED BY A VECTOR OF OBJECTIVELY MEASURED CHARACTERISTICS. OBSERVED PRODUCT PRICES AND THE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS OF CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH GOOD DEFINE A SET OF IMPLICIT OR 'HEDONIC' PRICES. A THEORY OF HEDONIC PRICES IS FORMULATED AS A PROBLEM IN THE ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM IN WHICH THE ENTIRE SET OF IMPLICIT PRICES GUIDES BOTH CONSUMER AND PRODUCER LOCATIONAL MEANING AND NATURE OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, ARE ANALYZED. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HEDONIC PRICE REGRESSIONS AND INDEX NUMBER CONSTRUCTION ARE POINTED OUT.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Economics,Equipment and supplies,Microeconomics,Prices,Pricing,Product differentiation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/6SL7XY2C/Rosen - 1974 - Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets Product Diffe.pdf} +} + +@online{rosen2021, + title = {Potato Fertilization on Irrigated Soils}, + author = {Rosen, Carl}, + date = {2021}, + url = {https://extension.umn.edu/crop-specific-needs/potato-fertilization-irrigated-soils}, + urldate = {2024-02-27}, + abstract = {Nutrient guidelines for Minnesota potato production on irrigated soils: Nitrogen, phosphate and potash fertilizer recommendations.}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {University of Minnesota Extension}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/CHR6TQZE/potato-fertilization-irrigated-soils.html} +} + +@article{rosenberg2020, + title = {Targeting of {{Water Rights Retirement Programs}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Kansas}}}, + shorttitle = {Targeting of {{Water Rights Retirement Programs}}}, + author = {Rosenberg, Andrew B.}, + date = {2020-10}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {102}, + number = {5}, + pages = {1425--1447}, + publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.}, + issn = {00029092}, + doi = {10.1111/ajae.12102}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajae.12102}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {This article assesses the water use impacts of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program in the Upper Arkansas River basin in Kansas, a water rights retirement program aimed at reducing depletion of the High Plains Aquifer. First, I use a fixed effects model with matched samples of farmers to determine the effect of the program on the water use of individuals who retire acreage. I find that every acre authorized for irrigation that is retired in the program represents about 1.28 acre‐feet of water that would have been used each year. Further, I do not find evidence that farmers increase their water use in an effort to satisfy program eligibility requirements. Second, I estimate a probit regression to determine which factors most influence the probability that a farmer retires a water right. Using the results of the probit regression, I then simulate enrollment decisions outside of the policy region to assess how features of the program impact its cost effectiveness and how the policy design could be improved. I find that programs that base incentives on past levels of water extraction lead to more water use reductions per dollar paid.}, + keywords = {Aquifer,conservation,FIXED effects model,irrigation,Kansas,KANSAS,LEAD in water,Q15,Q18,Q20,Q25,Q28,rights,WATER levels,WATER rights,WATER use}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/2CTIHBDZ/Rosenberg - 2020 - Targeting of Water Rights Retirement Programs Evi.pdf} +} + +@article{rouhirad2020, + title = {Effects of Instantaneous Groundwater Availability on Irrigated Agriculture and Implications for Aquifer Management}, + author = {Rouhi Rad, Mani and Brozović, Nicholas and Foster, Timothy and Mieno, Taro}, + date = {2020-02-01}, + journaltitle = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + shortjournal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, + volume = {59}, + pages = {101129}, + issn = {0928-7655}, + doi = {10.1016/j.reseneeco.2019.101129}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765518303816}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {Groundwater is an important input for agricultural production in many parts of the world. Aquifer depletion has been shown to affect the rate that groundwater can be extracted from an aquifer. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework that accounts explicitly for the effects of limited instantaneous groundwater extraction rate (well capacity) on a producer's irrigation decisions. We show that limited well capacities can affect the producer’s groundwater use and profit. We draw three important insights from these findings. First, we demonstrate that the price elasticity of demand for groundwater is higher for lower well capacities. Second, farmers’ irrigation decisions are non-monotonic with respect to well capacity and climate conditions. Under a drier climate, producers with greater well capacities increase their groundwater use, and producers with lower well capacities reduce their water use. Third, through numerical analysis, we show that considering spatial heterogeneity in well capacities is important for estimating the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of groundwater management policies. Our results shed new light on the importance of extraction capacity for groundwater management policies and the potential impacts of climate change on agricultural production.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XMTCMMQT/Rouhi Rad et al. - 2020 - Effects of instantaneous groundwater availability .pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YUQEWMB4/S0928765518303816.html} +} + +@article{rouhirad2021, + title = {Policy {{Leakage}} or {{Policy Benefit}}? {{Spatial Spillovers}} from {{Conservation Policies}} in {{Common Property Resources}}}, + shorttitle = {Policy {{Leakage}} or {{Policy Benefit}}?}, + author = {Rouhi Rad, Mani and Manning, Dale T. and Suter, Jordan F. and Goemans, Christopher}, + date = {2021-09}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + volume = {8}, + number = {5}, + pages = {923--953}, + publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, + issn = {2333-5955}, + doi = {10.1086/714148}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/714148}, + urldate = {2023-03-31}, + abstract = {Voluntary, incentive-based policies are often offered to resource users to address the overexploitation of common property resources. Spillovers from these policies have important implications for policy effectiveness. Considering different externalities that can affect producers’ irrigation decisions, we investigate whether permanently retiring groundwater rights impacts groundwater use among active neighboring groundwater users. We find that enrollment in the retirement program causes neighboring wells to initially pump less groundwater on average. However, water use reductions are only temporary, due to relative increases in stock levels over time. The results imply that policies that retire water rights may conserve more water than anticipated in the short term, but, over time, higher resource stocks could lead to policy leakage. We also present evidence that the decrease in groundwater use is driven by the shared resource stock. Our results provide empirical evidence for the importance of spatial spillovers related to common property resource management.}, + keywords = {common property resources,conservation,groundwater,Q18,Q25,Q30,spatial spillovers}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TKLHET7V/Rouhi Rad et al. - 2021 - Policy Leakage or Policy Benefit Spatial Spillove.pdf} +} + +@thesis{rui2011, + title = {Comprehensive Investigation into Historical Pipeline Construction Costs and Engineering Economic Analysis of {{Alaska}} In-State Gas Pipeline}, + author = {Rui, Zhenhua}, + date = {2011}, + institution = {University of Alaska Fairbanks}, + location = {Fairbanks}, + url = {https://search.proquest.com/docview/922680992?pq-origsite=primo}, + urldate = {2023-02-11}, + abstract = {This study analyzes historical cost data of 412 pipelines and 220 compressor stations. On the basis of this analysis, the study also evaluates the feasibility of an Alaska in-state gas pipeline using Monte Carlo simulation techniques. Analysis of pipeline construction costs shows that component costs, shares of cost components, and learning rates for material and labor costs vary by diameter, length, volume, year, and location. Overall average learning rates for pipeline material and labor costs are 6.1\% and 12.4\%, respectively. Overall average cost shares for pipeline material, labor, miscellaneous, and right of way (ROW) are 31\%, 40\%, 23\%, and 7\%, respectively. Regression models are developed to estimate pipeline component costs for different lengths, cross-sectional areas, and locations. An analysis of inaccuracy in pipeline cost estimation demonstrates that the cost estimation of pipeline cost components is biased except for in the case of total costs. Overall overrun rates for pipeline material, labor, miscellaneous, ROW, and total costs are 4.9\%, 22.4\%, -0.9\%, 9.1\%, and 6.5\%, respectively, and project size, capacity, diameter, location, and year of completion have different degrees of impacts on cost overruns of pipeline cost components. Analysis of compressor station costs shows that component costs, shares of cost components, and learning rates for material and labor costs vary in terms of capacity, year, and location. Average learning rates for compressor station material and labor costs are 12.1\% and 7.48\%, respectively. Overall average cost shares of material, labor, miscellaneous, and ROW are 50.6\%, 27.2\%, 21.5\%, and 0.8\%, respectively. Regression models are developed to estimate compressor station component costs in different capacities and locations. An investigation into inaccuracies in compressor station cost estimation demonstrates that the cost estimation for compressor stations is biased except for in the case of material costs. Overall average overrun rates for compressor station material, labor, miscellaneous, land, and total costs are 3\%, 60\%, 2\%, -14\%, and 11\%, respectively, and cost overruns for cost components are influenced by location and year of completion to different degrees. Monte Carlo models are developed and simulated to evaluate the feasibility of an Alaska in-state gas pipeline by assigning triangular distribution of the values of economic parameters. Simulated results show that the construction of an Alaska in-state natural gas pipeline is feasible at three scenarios: 500 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd), 750 mmcfd, and 1000 mmcfd.}, + isbn = {9781267189707}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Alaska in-state,Applied sciences,Compress station,Energy,Gas pipeline,Learning curve,Operations research,Petroleum engineering,Pipeline construction costs}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/4YL6JR9X/Rui - Comprehensive investigation into historical pipeli.pdf} +} + +@report{sanluisvalleydevelopmentresourcesgroup2024, + title = {San {{Luis Valley Statistical Profile}}}, + author = {{San Luis Valley Development Resources Group}}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://slvdrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-SLV-Statistical-Profile.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-09-07}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DI5GLTFP/2024-San-Luis-Valley-Statistical-Profile1.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YG9X26WK/2021-SLV-Statistical-Profile.pdf} +} + +@online{satoshi2010, + type = {Forum}, + title = {Bitcoin Does {{NOT}} Violate {{Mises}}' {{Regression Theorem}}}, + author = {Nakamoto, Satoshi}, + date = {2010-07-27}, + url = {https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=583}, + urldate = {2023-02-12}, + organization = {Bitcoin Forum}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PA84QLX7/index.html} +} + +@online{satoshinakamotoinstitute2008, + title = {Emails}, + author = {{Satoshi Nakamoto Institute}}, + date = {2008}, + url = {https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/}, + urldate = {2023-02-12}, + organization = {Satoshi Nakamoto Institute}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/G26Y2UR6/emails.html} +} + +@online{satoshinakamotoinstitute2008a, + title = {Cryptography {{Mailing List}} Email Series Authored by {{Satoshi Nakamoto}} from {{November}} 6 2008}, + author = {{Satoshi Nakamoto Institute}}, + date = {2008-11-07T05:15:40+09:00}, + url = {https://bitcoin.com/satoshi-archive/emails/cryptography/4/}, + urldate = {2023-02-12}, + abstract = {Satoshi’s reply on political problems in cryptography}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Satoshi’s Archive} +} + +@misc{sbd12009, + title = {{{Proposed plan of water management}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2009-06-15}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/bee01bba7/service_plan-Amended_Plan_Water_Management_Adopted_15Jun09_-BOD_date_of_approval.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZRSJFPAE/service_plan-Amended_Plan_Water_Management_Adopted_15Jun09_-BOD_date_of_approval.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12009a, + title = {Appendix 1 {{Annual Replacement Plan}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2009-05-11}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/1f4ced8b8/Appendix_1-Annual_Replacement_Plan.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KMG899Z7/Appendix_1-Annual_Replacement_Plan.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12011, + title = {{{Plan of water management}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2011-12-19}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/32924bce7/Plan_Water_Management_AMENDED_efficiency_Clean.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/67RLJPGD/Plan_Water_Management_AMENDED_efficiency_Clean.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12013, + title = {Producers {{Flow Chart}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2013-05}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/f4ad3928f/Producers_Flow_Chart_May_2013.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/PGHX62Y3/Producers_Flow_Chart_May_2013.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12013a, + title = {{{CREP Brochure}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2013}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/2084d928f/Brochure_CREP.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/NUZ2585V/Brochure_CREP.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12017, + title = {{{Plan of water management}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2017-01-16}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/1bb85e8ff/Budget+based+POWM+fee_16Jan17_draft.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BFEHE46J/Budget+based+POWM+fee_16Jan17_draft.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12019, + title = {{{Special Improvement District No}}. 1 {{of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District annual replacement plan}} 2019 {{plan year}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2019-04-12}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/da09c28a3/Sub1-2019_ARP-Final_1.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-12}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/NX5DHYMI/Sub1-2019_ARP-Final_1.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12020, + title = {{{Special Improvement District No}}. 1 {{of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District annual replacement plan}} 2020 {{plan year}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2020-04-13}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/a0dce1910/Sub1-2020_ARP_All.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-12}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/KGZE24NK/Sub1-2020_ARP_All.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12021, + title = {{{Special Improvement District No}}. 1 {{of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District annual replacement plan}} 2021 {{plan year}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2021-04-13}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/07e6ebe28/Sub1-2021ARP_Final_04152021_ALL.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-11}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UMHWTSCJ/Sub1-2021ARP_Final_04152021_ALL.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12022, + title = {{{Special Improvement District No}}. 1 {{of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District annual replacement plan}} 2022 {{plan year}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2022-04-11}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/3df2d7cb4/Sub1_2022ARP_Final.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-11}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TNDP32EF/Sub1_2022ARP_Final.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12022a, + title = {{{Fourth amended plan of water management}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2022-12-21}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/8aec4093a/221221_POWM4_Clean_approved_BOM.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-07-12}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/E8M44JX9/221221_POWM4_Clean_approved_BOM.pdf} +} + +@misc{sbd12023, + title = {{{Special Improvement District No}}. 1 {{of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District Annual Replacement Plan}} 2023 {{plan year}}}, + author = {{Subdistrict \#1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District} and {Davis Engineering Service, Inc.}}, + shortauthor = {{SBD1}}, + date = {2023-04-14}, + url = {https://rgwcd.org/files/6af1d8241/ARP+2023-+ALL+for+Website.pdf}, + urldate = {2023-06-23}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZEWJGCZJ/ARP+2023-+ALL+for+Website.pdf} +} + +@article{schilling2019, + title = {Some Simple Bitcoin Economics}, + author = {Schilling, Linda and Uhlig, Harald}, + date = {2019}, + journaltitle = {Journal of monetary economics}, + volume = {106}, + pages = {16--26}, + publisher = {Elsevier B.V}, + issn = {0304-3932}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.07.002}, + abstract = {•We provide a model of an endowment economy with two competing, but intrinsically worthless currencies (Dollar, Bitcoin) serving as medium of exchange.•We show a fundamental pricing equation, which in its simplest form implies that Bitcoin prices form a martingale.•“Mutual impatience” rules out Bitcoin speculation. Price volatility does not invalidate the medium-of-exchange function.•The Bitcoin block rewards are not a tax on Bitcoin holders: they are financed with a Dollar tax.•We discuss monetary policy implications, Bitcoin production via the proof-of-work competition, taxation of Bitcoin production, welfare implications and entry of new cryptocurrencies. We characterize the range of equilibria and provides specific examples. We provide a model of an endowment economy with two competing, but intrinsically worthless currencies (Dollar, Bitcoin). Dollars are supplied by a central bank to achieve its inflation target, while the Bitcoin supply grows deterministically. Our fundamental pricing equation implies in its simplest form that Bitcoin prices form a martingale. “Mutual impatience” implies absence of speculation. Price volatility therefore does not invalidate the medium-of-exchange function. Bitcoin block rewards are not a tax on Bitcoin holders: they are financed with a Dollar tax. We discuss monetary policy implications, Bitcoin production, taxation, welfare and entry, and characterize the range of equilibria.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Analysis,Bitcoin,Crypto-currencies,Cryptocurrency,Currency competition,Economic aspects,Endowments,Exchange rates,Foreign exchange,Monetary policy,Prices and rates,Taxation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/8XNWGALP/Schilling and Uhlig - Some Simple Bitcoin Economics.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SQLLAEXN/Schilling and Uhlig - 2019 - Some simple bitcoin economics.pdf} +} + +@article{schuerhoff2013, + title = {The Life and Death of {{Dutch}} Groundwater Tax}, + author = {Schuerhoff, Marianne and Weikard, Hans-Peter and Zetland, David}, + date = {2013-12}, + journaltitle = {Water Policy}, + volume = {15}, + number = {6}, + pages = {1064--1077}, + publisher = {IWA Publishing}, + location = {Oxford, United Kingdom}, + issn = {13667017}, + doi = {10.2166/wp.2013.112}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/1943070453/abstract/38DF9C6D1E654B78PQ/1}, + urldate = {2023-06-26}, + abstract = {We examine the Dutch national groundwater tax (GWT) - a ‘win-win, green’ tax that promised to reduce distortions by simultaneously reducing the income tax burden and improving environmental outcomes. We find no evidence of these impacts. Instead, we see that the GWT increased distortions by taxing a narrow base (a few drinking-water companies reliant on raw groundwater) and interfering with groundwater management programmes funded by an existing provincial groundwater fee. The Dutch government revoked the GWT for being fiscally inefficient and environmentally unhelpful on 31 December 2011, but this story provides some useful lessons.}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {1064-1077}, + keywords = {Fiscal policy,Green tax,Groundwater,Pigouvian tax,Regulation}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BAEFB479/Schuerhoff et al. - 2013 - The life and death of Dutch groundwater tax.pdf} +} + +@article{sears2018, + title = {Jevons’ {{Paradox}} and {{Efficient Irrigation Technology}}}, + author = {Sears, Louis and Caparelli, Joseph and Clouse, Lee and Pan, Devon and Strandberg, Gillian and Vuu, Linh and Lawell, C.-Y. Cynthia Lin}, + date = {2018}, + journaltitle = {Sustainability}, + volume = {10}, + number = {5}, + pages = {1590}, + publisher = {MDPI AG}, + location = {Basel, Switzerland}, + url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/2108740285/abstract/5CCF3548846A452CPQ/1}, + urldate = {2021-02-26}, + abstract = {Water is one of our world’s most essential natural resources, but it is also a resource that is becoming increasingly scarce. The agricultural use of groundwater is particularly important to manage sustainably and well. However, popular and well-intentioned water conservation and management policies, including those that encourage the adoption of more efficient irrigation technology, may have unintended and possibly perverse consequences if policy-makers do not account for water users’ behavioral responses to their policies. In particular, a Jevons’ Paradox may arise, whereby a technology that enhances the efficiency of using a natural resource does not necessarily lead to less consumption of that resource. In this paper, we discuss efficient irrigation technology, Jevons’ Paradox, and the possible perverse consequences of incentive-based programs for agricultural groundwater conservation.}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {1590}, + keywords = {agricultural groundwater,efficient irrigation technology,incentive-based conservation programs,Jevons’ Paradox,perverse consequences,unintended consequences}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JUZLSQX2/Sears et al. - 2018 - Jevons’ Paradox and Efficient Irrigation Technolog.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/MKALUE3S/Sears et al. - 2018 - Jevons’ Paradox and Efficient Irrigation Technolog.pdf} +} + +@incollection{shin2014, + title = {Modelling {{Asymmetric Cointegration}} and {{Dynamic Multipliers}} in a {{Nonlinear ARDL Framework}}}, + booktitle = {Festschrift in {{Honor}} of {{Peter Schmidt}}: {{Econometric Methods}} and {{Applications}}}, + author = {Shin, Yongcheol and Yu, Byungchul and Greenwood-Nimmo, Matthew}, + editor = {Sickles, Robin C. and Horrace, William C.}, + date = {2014}, + pages = {281--314}, + publisher = {Springer}, + location = {New York, NY}, + doi = {10.1007/978-1-4899-8008-3_9}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-8008-3_9}, + urldate = {2023-02-05}, + abstract = {We develop a cointegrating nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model in which short- and long-run nonlinearities are introduced via positive and negative partial sum decompositions of the explanatory variables. We demonstrate that the model is estimable by OLS and that reliable long-run inference can be achieved by bounds-testing regardless of the integration orders of the variables. Furthermore, we derive asymmetric dynamic multipliers that graphically depict the traverse between the short- and the long-run. The salient features of the model are illustrated using the example of the nonlinear unemployment-output relationship in the US, Canada and Japan.}, + isbn = {978-1-4899-8008-3}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {C12,C13,J64}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ZC77VJ3Z/Shin et al. - 2014 - Modelling Asymmetric Cointegration and Dynamic Mul.pdf} +} + +@report{shize2021, + type = {preprint}, + title = {Bitcoin’s Future Carbon Footprint}, + author = {Shize, Shize and Qin, Shize and Klaaßen, Lena and Gallersdörfer, Ulrich and Stoll, Christian and Zhang, Da}, + date = {2021-11-14}, + institution = {{Volume 15: Low Carbon Cities and Urban Energy Systems: Part IV}}, + doi = {10.46855/energy-proceedings-8232}, + url = {https://energy-proceedings.org/?p=8232}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YVITCCRU/Shize et al. - 2021 - Bitcoin’s future carbon footprint.pdf} +} + +@article{smeekes2020, + title = {An {{Automated Approach Towards Sparse Single-Equation Cointegration Modelling}}}, + author = {Smeekes, Stephan and Wijler, Etienne}, + date = {2020-07-22}, + journaltitle = {Cornell University Library}, + publisher = {Cornell University Library arXiv.org}, + location = {Ithaca, United States}, + issn = {2331-8422}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/2111972577?pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Working%20Papers}, + urldate = {2024-09-25}, + abstract = {In this paper we propose the Single-equation Penalized Error Correction Selector (SPECS) as an automated estimation procedure for dynamic single-equation models with a large number of potentially (co)integrated variables. By extending the classical single-equation error correction model, SPECS enables the researcher to model large cointegrated datasets without necessitating any form of pre-testing for the order of integration or cointegrating rank. Under an asymptotic regime in which both the number of parameters and time series observations jointly diverge to infinity, we show that SPECS is able to consistently estimate an appropriate linear combination of the cointegrating vectors that may occur in the underlying DGP. In addition, SPECS is shown to enable the correct recovery of sparsity patterns in the parameter space and to posses the same limiting distribution as the OLS oracle procedure. A simulation study shows strong selective capabilities, as well as superior predictive performance in the context of nowcasting compared to high-dimensional models that ignore cointegration. An empirical application to nowcasting Dutch unemployment rates using Google Trends confirms the strong practical performance of our procedure.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Automation,Cointegration analysis,Computer simulation,Econometrics,Economic models,Employment,Error correction,Error correction & detection,Methodology,Nowcasting,Performance prediction} +} + +@article{smith2017, + title = {Responding to a {{Groundwater Crisis}}: {{The Effects}} of {{Self-Imposed Economic Incentives}}}, + shorttitle = {Responding to a {{Groundwater Crisis}}}, + author = {Smith, Steven M. and Andersson, Krister and Cody, Kelsey C. and Cox, Michael and Ficklin, Darren}, + date = {2017-04-17}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + shortjournal = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists}, + volume = {4}, + number = {4}, + pages = {985--1023}, + publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, + issn = {2333-5955}, + doi = {10.1086/692610}, + url = {https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/692610}, + urldate = {2021-02-26}, + abstract = {Many globally important groundwater aquifers are under considerable stress as withdrawals, predominantly for irrigation, outpace recharge. Meanwhile, groundwater policy to address the common-pool resource losses remains in its nascent stage. This study analyzes a recent and unique bottom-up effort to self-impose a groundwater pumping fee in San Luis Valley, Colorado. Utilizing a difference-in-difference econometric framework, our results bring new and direct empirical evidence to the debate on the use of economic incentives in groundwater policy. We find that the price intervention has been effective, leading to a 33\% reduction in groundwater use, predominantly through reduced irrigation intensity. We also find, to a more limited extent, movement away from water-thirsty crops and reduced overall irrigated acreage. Given that financial incentives can produce substantial conservation within a groundwater commons in duress, price-based policies warrant further consideration as irrigators address diminishing and variable water supplies.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/CADFQZXH/Smith et al. - 2017 - Responding to a Groundwater Crisis The Effects of.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/D8JB72A7/Smith et al. - 2017 - Responding to a Groundwater Crisis The Effects of.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/9D4FL6HC/692610.html} +} + +@article{smith2018, + title = {Economic Incentives and Conservation: {{Crowding-in}} Social Norms in a Groundwater Commons}, + shorttitle = {Economic Incentives and Conservation}, + author = {Smith, Steven M.}, + date = {2018-07-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {90}, + pages = {147--174}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2018.04.007}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617304059}, + urldate = {2023-06-26}, + abstract = {Price-based interventions can be corrective where users extract from a common resource, but may also impact existing social norms, often crowding them out. In contrast, I find a pumping fee implemented by a group of irrigators in Southern Colorado effectively crowds-in pro-conservation norms, enhancing the financial incentive's impact. Using a unique, spatially oriented panel-data set of groundwater wells, I separate the direct role of increased pumping costs from the indirect effect transmitted through altered conservation norms. To quantify conservation behavior, I estimate how pumping at one well responds to pumping at nearby wells – using instrumental variables to address simultaneity bias – and interact that behavior with a difference-in-difference framework to assess the influence of the intervention. In the preferred specification, the fee directly accounts for approximately 74\% of the reduced pumping and the remaining 26\% comes from crowding-in conservation norms.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Climate change,Conservation,Groundwater,Irrigation,Social norms}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/L8FYWQQU/Smith - 2018 - Economic incentives and conservation Crowding-in .pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/CBNIHRDT/S0095069617304059.html} +} + +@article{stoll2019, + title = {The {{Carbon Footprint}} of {{Bitcoin}}}, + author = {Stoll, Christian and Klaaßen, Lena and Gallersdörfer, Ulrich}, + date = {2019-07}, + journaltitle = {Joule}, + shortjournal = {Joule}, + volume = {3}, + number = {7}, + pages = {1647--1661}, + issn = {25424351}, + doi = {10.1016/j.joule.2019.05.012}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2542435119302557}, + urldate = {2023-01-27}, + abstract = {Participation in the Bitcoin blockchain validation process requires specialized hardware and vast amounts of electricity, which translates into a significant carbon footprint. Here, we demonstrate a methodology for estimating the power consumption associated with Bitcoin’s blockchain based on IPO filings of major hardware manufacturers, insights on mining facility operations, and mining pool compositions. We then translate our power consumption estimate into carbon emissions, using the localization of IP addresses. We determine the annual electricity consumption of Bitcoin, as of November 2018, to be 45.8 TWh and estimate that annual carbon emissions range from 22.0 to 22.9 MtCO2. This means that the emissions produced by Bitcoin sit between the levels produced by the nations of Jordan and Sri Lanka, which is comparable to the level of Kansas City. With this article, we aim to gauge the external costs of Bitcoin and inform the broader debate on the costs and benefits of cryptocurrencies.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/3H4JMTWZ/Stoll et al. - 2019 - The Carbon Footprint of Bitcoin.pdf} +} + +@incollection{sun2015, + title = {Arps {{Decline Curves Analysis}}}, + booktitle = {Advanced {{Production Decline Analysis}} and {{Application}}}, + editor = {Sun, Hedong}, + date = {2015-01-01}, + pages = {31--65}, + publisher = {Gulf Professional Publishing}, + doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-802411-9.00002-8}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128024119000028}, + urldate = {2022-06-13}, + abstract = {The chapter presents the types, law, and theory of the Arps method, the methodology and cases of curve matching to estimate the recoverable reserves, and the power function analysis.}, + isbn = {978-0-12-802411-9}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Arps Type Curves,Example,Exponential Decline,Harmonic Decline,Hyperbolic Decline,Modified Hyperbolic Decline,Power Function Analysis}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/M8I6GTCI/B9780128024119000028.html} +} + +@article{sun2021, + title = {Estimating Dynamic Treatment Effects in Event Studies with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects}, + author = {Sun, Liyang and Abraham, Sarah}, + date = {2021-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Econometrics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Econometrics}, + series = {Themed {{Issue}}: {{Treatment Effect}} 1}, + volume = {225}, + number = {2}, + pages = {175--199}, + issn = {0304-4076}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.09.006}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440762030378X}, + urldate = {2023-04-17}, + abstract = {To estimate the dynamic effects of an absorbing treatment, researchers often use two-way fixed effects regressions that include leads and lags of the treatment. We show that in settings with variation in treatment timing across units, the coefficient on a given lead or lag can be contaminated by effects from other periods, and apparent pretrends can arise solely from treatment effects heterogeneity. We propose an alternative estimator that is free of contamination, and illustrate the relative shortcomings of two-way fixed effects regressions with leads and lags through an empirical application.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Difference-in-differences,Pretrend test,Two-way fixed effects}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/SJRWJIJ6/Sun and Abraham - 2021 - Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event stud.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/NCWZCYEC/S030440762030378X.html} +} + +@inproceedings{suter2004, + title = {The {{Importance Of Spatial Data In Modeling Actual Enrollment In The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program}} ({{CREP}})}, + booktitle = {2008: {{Agricultural}} and {{Applied Economics Association}}}, + author = {Suter, Jordan F. and Bills, Nelson L. and Poe, Gregory L.}, + date = {2004}, + series = {Selected {{Paper}}}, + publisher = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}, + location = {Denver}, + doi = {10.22004/ag.econ.20151}, + url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea04/20151.html}, + abstract = {This paper uses actual enrollment and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data in six geographically diverse states to demonstrate that enrollment rates in the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) are a function of the incentives offered. If aggregate county land use data were used, as has been done previously, incentives appear insignificant}, + eventtitle = {American {{Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting}}}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Environmental Economics and Policy}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/X2U38JT5/Suter et al. - 2004 - THE IMPORTANCE OF SPATIAL DATA IN MODELING ACTUAL .pdf} +} + +@article{suter2008, + title = {Do {{Landowners Respond}} to {{Land Retirement Incentives}}? {{Evidence}} from the {{Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program}}}, + shorttitle = {Do {{Landowners Respond}} to {{Land Retirement Incentives}}?}, + author = {Suter, Jordan F. and Poe, Gregory L. and Bills, Nelson L.}, + date = {2008-02}, + journaltitle = {Land Economics}, + volume = {84}, + number = {1}, + pages = {17--30}, + publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, + issn = {00237639}, + doi = {10.3368/le.84.1.17}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/27647803}, + urldate = {2023-07-09}, + abstract = {Previous research on incentive responsivness in voluntary land retirement programs has utilized either hypothetical contingent response methods or actual aggregate enrollment data, both of which suffer from potential biases. In this paper, we analyze program participation in the binary-choice setting of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) using data from six states. Our results suggest that landowners react positively to the incentives that are offered and that increases in one-time incentives, offered at the time of signup, are a more cost-effective means to increase enrollment than increases in the incentives offered on an annual basis.}, + keywords = {Abandonment of property,Conservation Reserve Program (U.S.),Dedication to public use,Land economics,Land reform,Land retirement,Land use,Landowners,Monetary incentives,Nature reserves,Real property}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YPMDT5HW/Suter et al. - 2008 - Do Landowners Respond to Land Retirement Incentive.pdf} +} + +@article{swanepoel2015, + title = {Estimating the {{Contribution}} of {{Groundwater Irrigation}} to {{Farmland Values}} in {{Phillips County}}, {{Colorado}}}, + author = {Swanepoel, G. D. and Hadrich, Joleen and Goemans, Christopher}, + date = {2015-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers \& Rural Appraisers}, + shortjournal = {Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers \& Rural Appraisers}, + pages = {166--179}, + publisher = {American Society of Farm Managers \& Rural Appraisers}, + issn = {0003116X}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/1690914034?pq-origsite=primo&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals}, + urldate = {2021-02-27}, + abstract = {Hedonic price analysis is applied to farmland sales in Phillips County, Colorado to examine trends in farmland values across different land types from 1999-2012. Results demonstrate that irrigated acres resulted in the highest farmland value while well depth decreased this value. The marginal value of an acre foot of water on irrigated farmland ranged from \$3-\$36 depending on well depth and the discount rate used. This highlights the potential long-term negative impacts that lowering groundwater tables have on agricultural enterprises that rely on wells for irrigation.}, + keywords = {GROUNDWATER flow,HEDONIC damages,HEDONISTIC consumption,IRRIGATION farming,VALUATION of farms}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/7GUG2JK5/Swanepoel et al. - 2015 - Estimating the Contribution of Groundwater Irrigat.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/BK8TBDTJ/Swanepoel et al. - 2015 - Estimating the Contribution of Groundwater Irrigat.pdf} +} + +@dataset{u.s.bureauoflaborstatistics2024, + title = {Consumer {{Price Index}} for {{All Urban Consumers}}: {{All Items}} in {{U}}.{{S}}. {{City Average}}}, + shorttitle = {{{CPIAUCSL}}}, + author = {{U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics}}, + shortauthor = {{BLS}}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}, + url = {https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL}, + urldate = {2024-04-17}, + abstract = {The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL) is a price index of a basket of goods and services paid by urban consumers. Percent changes in the price index measure the inflation rate between any two time periods. The most common inflation metric is the percent change from one year ago. It can also represent the buying habits of urban consumers. This particular index includes roughly 88 percent of the total population, accounting for wage earners, clerical workers, technical workers, self-employed, short-term workers, unemployed, retirees, and those not in the labor force. The CPIs are based on prices for food, clothing, shelter, and fuels; transportation fares; service fees (e.g., water and sewer service); and sales taxes. Prices are collected monthly from about 4,000 housing units and approximately 26,000 retail establishments across 87 urban areas. To calculate the index, price changes are averaged with weights representing their importance in the spending of the particular group. The index measures price changes (as a percent change) from a predetermined reference date. In addition to the original unadjusted index distributed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also releases a seasonally adjusted index. The unadjusted series reflects all factors that may influence a change in prices. However, it can be very useful to look at the seasonally adjusted CPI, which removes the effects of seasonal changes, such as weather, school year, production cycles, and holidays. The CPI can be used to recognize periods of inflation and deflation. Significant increases in the CPI within a short time frame might indicate a period of inflation, and significant decreases in CPI within a short time frame might indicate a period of deflation. However, because the CPI includes volatile food and oil prices, it might not be a reliable measure of inflationary and deflationary periods. For a more accurate detection, the core CPI (CPILFESL (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPILFESL)) is often used. When using the CPI, please note that it is not applicable to all consumers and should not be used to determine relative living costs. Additionally, the CPI is a statistical measure vulnerable to sampling error since it is based on a sample of prices and not the complete average. For more information on the consumer price indexes, see: Bureau of Economic Analysis. "CPI Detailed Report." (https://bls.gov/cpi/) 2013. Handbook of Methods (https://bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/cpihom.pdf) Understanding the CPI: Frequently Asked Questions (https://bls.gov/cpi/questions-and-answers.htm)} +} + +@dataset{BLS2024b, + title = {Producer {{Price Index}} by {{Commodity}}: {{Farm Products}}: {{Russet Potatoes}}}, + shorttitle = {{{WPU01130603}}}, + author = {{U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics}}, + shortauthor = {{BLS}}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}, + url = {https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU01130603}, + urldate = {2024-06-01} +} + +@dataset{BLS2024a, + title = {Producer {{Price Index}} by {{Commodity}}: {{Farm Products}}: {{Alfalfa Hay}}}, + shorttitle = {{{WPU01810101}}}, + author = {{U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics}}, + shortauthor = {{BLS}}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}, + url = {https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU01810101}, + urldate = {2024-06-01} +} + +@misc{unitedstatesdepartmentofagriculture2020, + title = {Average {{U}}.{{S}}. Farm Real Estate Value, Nominal and Real (Inflation Adjusted), 1970–2020}, + author = {{United States Department of Agriculture}}, + shortauthor = {{USDA}}, + date = {2020}, + url = {https://ers.usda.gov/webdocs/charts/55910/farmrealestatevalue2020_d.html?v=6230}, + urldate = {2024-04-17}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/ITW96XGV/farmrealestatevalue2020_d.html} +} + +@article{vasquez2013, + title = {A {{Hedonic Valuation}} of {{Residential Water Services}}}, + author = {Vásquez, William F.}, + date = {2013-12}, + journaltitle = {Applied Economic Perspectives \& Policy}, + shortjournal = {Applied Economic Perspectives \& Policy}, + volume = {35}, + number = {4}, + pages = {661--678}, + publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.}, + issn = {20405790}, + doi = {10.1093/aepp/ppt022}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/43695807}, + urldate = {2021-02-26}, + abstract = {This paper investigates the economic value of municipal, private, and community-managed water services in Guatemala through a hedonic analysis of rental housing prices observed in 2006. Hedonic models are jointly estimated with water service choices using a maximum simulated likelihood approach in order to control for potential endogeneity. Findings indicate that the value of piped water depends on the type of water utility. The estimated value of municipal services is at least 15 times as much as the average water bill, while value estimates are not significant for private and community-managed systems. Value differentials are discussed considering the performance of water utilities and their institutional arrangements.}, + keywords = {Guatemala,Hedonic analysis,Household preferences,Municipal services,Public administration,Rental housing,Service management,Water,Water utilities}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/M3VKTCPC/Vásquez - 2013 - A Hedonic Valuation of Residential Water Services.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/XSZYYGG4/Vásquez - 2013 - A Hedonic Valuation of Residential Water Services.pdf} +} + +@book{vonmises1963, + title = {Human Action: A Treatise on Economics}, + shorttitle = {Human Action}, + author = {Von Mises, Ludwig}, + date = {1963}, + edition = {[Scholar's ed.].}, + publisher = {Ludwig Von Mises Institute}, + location = {Auburn, Ala}, + isbn = {978-0-945466-24-6}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Commerce,Economics} +} + +@article{waggoner2021, + entrysubtype = {newspaper}, + title = {All Eyes Are on {{Subdistrict No}}. 1: {{Will San Luis Valley}} Farmers Save Their Aquifer and Themselves?}, + author = {Waggoner, Priscilla}, + date = {2021-12-10}, + journaltitle = {Center Post Dispatch}, + url = {https://centerpostdispatch.com/article/all-eyes-are-on-subdistrict-no-1}, + urldate = {2024-05-09}, + abstract = {ALAMOSA — From her family’s farm near Mosca, Erin Nissen can see the Great Sand Dunes in the distance. Whether through a window or from the porch, the towering 700-hundred-foot ridges of sand are always in view, a constant reminder of what she fears may come.}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/995TIQ4H/all-eyes-are-on-subdistrict-no-1.html} +} + +@article{walker1990, + title = {Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: {{Experimental}} Evidence}, + shorttitle = {Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource}, + author = {Walker, James M. and Gardner, Roy and Ostrom, Elinor}, + date = {1990-11-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, + volume = {19}, + number = {3}, + pages = {203--211}, + issn = {0095-0696}, + doi = {10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/009506969090069B}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using experimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns from appropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm the prediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasing investment capital available to appropriators.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/V92LRDSG/Walker et al. - 1990 - Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool r.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FFYXYI2C/009506969090069B.html} +} + +@article{walter2020, + title = {Environmental Policies and Political Feasibility: {{Eco-labels}} versus Emission Taxes}, + shorttitle = {Environmental Policies and Political Feasibility}, + author = {Walter, Jason M. and Chang, Yang-Ming}, + date = {2020-06}, + journaltitle = {Economic Analysis and Policy}, + shortjournal = {Economic Analysis and Policy}, + volume = {66}, + pages = {194--206}, + issn = {03135926}, + doi = {10.1016/j.eap.2020.04.004}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0313592619305879}, + urldate = {2023-07-24}, + abstract = {This paper examines the economic and political implications of two market-based policies, eco-certifications and emission taxes. We evaluate each policy’s effects on the environment, investment in clean technology, and social welfare under imperfect competition. We find that eco-certification reduces total damage to the environment, increases consumer benefits, and is socially desirable. However, polluting firms will never voluntarily accept the socially optimal eco-standard, leading to suboptimal certification programs. Unless the marginal damage to the environment from emissions is sufficiently low and demand is sufficiently large, environmental damage occurring under voluntary eco-certification is higher in comparison to alternative policies. We examine the welfare impacts of each policy to identify social preferences. Using realized market benefits to construct policy preferences, we show conditions under which the socially optimal environmental policy is unlikely to be politically feasible. Our results explain the popularity and suboptimal qualities of eco-certification programs.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/E99E5U9Q/Walter and Chang - 2020 - Environmental policies and political feasibility .pdf} +} + +@article{wanhongyang2005, + title = {Effectiveness of {{Conservation Programs}} in {{Illinois}} and {{Gains}} from {{Targeting}}}, + author = {{Wanhong Yang} and Khanna, Madhu and Farnsworth, Richard}, + date = {2005-12}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {87}, + number = {5}, + pages = {1248--1255}, + publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.}, + issn = {00029092}, + doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00814.x}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/3697702}, + urldate = {2023-07-07}, + abstract = {The article examines the effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in Illinois. The selection mechanisms used by the CRP and CREP are discussed and comparison of the programs' effectiveness in abating off-site sediment loadings in the La Moine watershed in Illinois are made. The authors also compare the efficiency of alternative targeting instruments to enroll a given land acreage in CREP from the eligible area in the La Moine watershed.}, + keywords = {AGRICULTURAL administration,AGRICULTURAL conservation,AGRICULTURAL development,AGRICULTURAL economics,AGRICULTURAL policy,AGRICULTURE,CONSERVATION of natural resources,ILLINOIS,WATERSHEDS}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/TF26R76F/Wanhong Yang et al. - 2005 - Effectiveness of Conservation Programs in Illinois.pdf} +} + +@article{wu2000, + title = {Slippage {{Effects}} of the {{Conservation Reserve Program}}}, + author = {Wu, JunJie}, + date = {2000}, + journaltitle = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, + volume = {82}, + number = {4}, + pages = {979--992}, + issn = {1467-8276}, + doi = {10.1111/0002-9092.00096}, + url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0002-9092.00096}, + urldate = {2023-07-10}, + abstract = {Each year, billions of dollars of public funds are expended to purchase conservation easements on farmland. One unintended impact of these programs is that they may bring non-cropland into crop production. Such a slippage effect can be caused by increased output prices and by substitution effects. This article shows that for each one hundred acres of cropland retired under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the central United States, twenty acres of non-cropland were converted to cropland, offsetting 9\% and 14\% of CRP water and wind erosion reduction benefits, respectively. Implications of these results for the design of conservation programs are discussed.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {conservation programs,environmental benefits,land use changes,Q150,Q240,Q280,slippage effects}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/NH2TFVZ2/Wu - 2000 - Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Progr.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/EV5736UN/0002-9092.html} +} + +@article{wunder2008, + title = {Taking Stock: {{A}} Comparative Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services Programs in Developed and Developing Countries}, + shorttitle = {Taking Stock}, + author = {Wunder, Sven and Engel, Stefanie and Pagiola, Stefano}, + date = {2008-05}, + journaltitle = {Ecological Economics}, + shortjournal = {Ecological Economics}, + volume = {65}, + number = {4}, + pages = {834--852}, + issn = {09218009}, + doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.010}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0921800908001432}, + urldate = {2023-07-18}, + abstract = {Payments for environmental services (PES) are an innovative approach to conservation that has been applied increasingly often in both developed and developing countries. To date, however, few efforts have been made to systematically compare PES experiences. Drawing on the wealth of case studies in this Special Issue, we synthesize the information presented, according to case characteristics with respect to design, costs, environmental effectiveness, and other outcomes. PES programs often differ substantially one from the other. Some of the differences reflect adaptation of the basic concept to very different ecological, socioeconomic, or institutional conditions; others reflect poor design, due either to mistakes or to the need to accommodate political pressures. We find significant differences between user-financed PES programs, in which funding comes from the users of the ES being provided, and government-financed programs, in which funding comes from a third party. The user-financed programs in our sample were better targeted, more closely tailored to local conditions and needs, had better monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality, and had far fewer confounding side objectives than governmentfinanced programs. We finish by outlining some perspectives on how both user- and government-financed PES programs could be made more effective and cost-efficient.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/UXTHB636/Wunder et al. - 2008 - Taking stock A comparative analysis of payments f.pdf} +} + +@article{yang2003, + title = {Water Scarcity, Pricing Mechanism and Institutional Reform in Northern {{China}} Irrigated Agriculture}, + author = {Yang, Hong and Zhang, Xiaohe and Zehnder, Alexander J.B.}, + date = {2003-06}, + journaltitle = {Agricultural Water Management}, + shortjournal = {Agricultural Water Management}, + volume = {61}, + number = {2}, + pages = {143--161}, + issn = {03783774}, + doi = {10.1016/S0378-3774(02)00164-6}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0378377402001646}, + urldate = {2023-07-24}, + abstract = {With water scarcity becoming an increasing constraint to food production in northern China, pricing mechanism has been given a high priority in dealing with the problem. Using selected irrigation districts in northern China as a case study, this paper probes the effectiveness of pricingbased water policies in addressing challenges facing irrigated agriculture under China’s current water management institutions. The examination shows that the rapid increase in irrigation cost during the past decade has failed to generate a force for water conservation. Over-exploitation of groundwater resources has even intensified with the shift to higher value-added but often more water intensive crops. Based on a normative analysis of water demand curves, the logic behind the reluctance for water authorities and farmers to conserve water is elaborated. The result suggests that pricing irrigation alone is not a valid means of encouraging water conservation under the current irrigation management institutions. Clearly defined and legally enforceable water rights and responsibilities for water operators and users in the irrigation system are the foundation underlying the incentives for conserving water and improving the irrigation efficiency.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/27Y6RMAT/Yang et al. - 2003 - Water scarcity, pricing mechanism and institutiona.pdf} +} + +@article{yang2004, + title = {Integrating {{Farmer Decision Making}} to {{Target Land Retirement Programs}}}, + author = {Yang, Wanhong and Isik, Murat}, + date = {2004-10}, + journaltitle = {Agricultural and Resource Economics Review}, + volume = {33}, + number = {2}, + pages = {233--244}, + publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, + location = {Durham, United Kingdom}, + issn = {10682805}, + url = {https://proquest.com/docview/214072399/citation/306B7E4818F146ADPQ/1}, + urldate = {2023-07-09}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {12}, + keywords = {Agricultural production,Agriculture,Agriculture--Agricultural Economics,Conservation,Cost analysis,Decision making,Farmers,Land use,Retirement,Riparian buffers,Risk aversion,Sediments,Technology adoption,Watersheds}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/WEJQAP67/Yang and Isik - 2004 - Integrating Farmer Decision Making to Target Land .pdf} +} + +@article{yeboah2015, + title = {Agricultural Landowners’ Willingness to Participate in a Filter Strip Program for Watershed Protection}, + author = {Yeboah, Felix Kwame and Lupi, Frank and Kaplowitz, Michael D.}, + date = {2015-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Land Use Policy}, + shortjournal = {Land Use Policy}, + volume = {49}, + pages = {75--85}, + issn = {0264-8377}, + doi = {10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.016}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837715002252}, + urldate = {2023-07-09}, + abstract = {Non point source (NPS) pollution remains a challenge to communities meeting watershed management objectives around the world. Installing agricultural best management practices (BMPs) such as filter strips is a widely accepted mechanism to control NPS pollution and agricultural runoff. Government programs in the form of payment for environmental services (PES) have been introduced to encourage BMP adoption for watershed protection. However, the voluntary nature of these programs makes landowners’ decision to participate in them critical to achieving program goals. Understanding the drivers behind landowners’ decisions to participate in watershed protection programs is essential for designing effective and efficient programs. This study examines agricultural landowners’ decisions to participate in a conservation program involving filter strips. Using responses from a survey of agricultural landowners in Michigan's Saginaw Bay watershed, the study examines key programmatic, socio-psychological, and demographic determinants of landowners’ participation decisions. The study results suggest that making contract durations shorter with enhanced rental payments, and educating landowners about program efficacy as well as on- and off-farm benefits of the conservation practice would enhance participation.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Conservation program,Filter strips,Landowner behavior,Watershed management}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/A4TW2UMM/Yeboah et al. - 2015 - Agricultural landowners’ willingness to participat.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/B5CBA7KI/S0264837715002252.html} +} + +@article{youngs1983b, + title = {Ground-Water Models: {{Volume I}}, Concepts, Problems and Methods of Analysis with Examples of Their Application. {{J}}.{{D}}. {{Bredehoeft}} et al. {{UNESCO Press}}, {{France}}, 1982. 235 Pp. {{Studies}} and Reports in Hydrology {{No}}. 34. 70.00 {{FF}}. {{ISBN}} 92-3-102006-4}, + shorttitle = {Ground-Water Models}, + author = {Youngs, E. G.}, + date = {1983-08-01}, + journaltitle = {Agricultural Water Management}, + shortjournal = {Agricultural Water Management}, + volume = {6}, + number = {4}, + pages = {410--411}, + issn = {0378-3774}, + doi = {10.1016/0378-3774(83)90061-6}, + url = {https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0378377483900616}, + urldate = {2024-09-25}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/FMYSC5PS/Youngs - 1983 - Ground-water models Volume I, concepts, problems and methods of analysis with examples of their app.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/J5IWIAJF/0378377483900616.html} +} +@book{burgette2017, + title = {Propensity {{Scores}} for {{Repeated Treatments}}: {{A Tutorial}} for the Iptw {{Function}} in the {{TWANG Package}}}, + shorttitle = {Propensity {{Scores}} for {{Repeated Treatments}}}, + author = {Burgette, Lane and Griffin, Beth and McCaffrey, Daniel}, + year = {2017}, + publisher = {RAND Corporation}, + doi = {10.7249/TL136.2}, + urldate = {2024-05-30}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/JGSQNMT9/Burgette et al. - 2017 - Propensity Scores for Repeated Treatments A Tutor.pdf} +} +@Manual{twang2023, + title = {twang: Toolkit for Weighting and Analysis of Nonequivalent Groups}, + author = {Matthew Cefalu and Greg Ridgeway and Dan McCaffrey and Andrew Morral and Beth Ann Griffin and Lane Burgette}, + year = {2023}, + note = {R package version 2.6}, + url = {https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=twang}, + } + +@report{emery1969, + title = {Hydrology of the {{San Luis Valley}}, South-Central {{Colorado}}}, + author = {Emery, Philip A.}, + namea = {Boettcher, Arnold J. and Snipes, R. J. and McIntyre, Harold J. and {Geological Survey} and {Colorado Water Conservation Board}}, + nameatype = {collaborator}, + date = {1969-06}, + series = {Hydrologic Investigations Atlas ; {{HA-381}}}, + institution = {United States Geological Survey}, + location = {Washington, D.C}, + url = {https://pubs.usgs.gov/unnumbered/70045464/report.pdf}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Hydrology,Maps,San Luis Valley (Colo. and N.M.),San Luis Valley (Colo. and N.M.)$$QHydrology} +} + +@jurisdiction{entz2004, + title = {{{Concerning the authority of the state engineer to administer underground water use in water division}} 3, {{and}}, {{in connection therewith}}, {{protecting senior water rights}}, {{preventing unreasonable underground water level declines}}, {{maintaining sustainable underground water supplies}}, {{and encouraging the use of ground water management subdistricts in water division}} 3.}, + citation = {{Colorado S. bill 04-222}}, + date = {2004}, + number = {04-222}, + url = {https://statebillinfo.com/bills/bills/04/222_enr.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-05-12}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/HSVVV6S2/222_enr.pdf} +} +@misc{ralphcurtis2005, + title = {An {{Interview}} with {{Ralph Curtis}}}, + author = {{The Colorado Foundation for Water Education}}, + namea = {{Ralph Curtis}}, + nameatype = {collaborator}, + date = {2005-09}, + url = {https://issuu.com/cfwe/docs/headwaters9}, + urldate = {2024-05-11}, + abstract = {Recently retired as manager of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District, Ralph Curtis spent 25 years shepherding the district through water grabs, droughts and aquifer declines. A native of the San Luis Valley and a life-long resident of Saguache, Curtis agreed to be inter- viewed by the Foundation in September 2005.}, + langid = {english} +} +@report{slvdev2024, + title = {San {{Luis Valley Statistical Profile}}}, + author = {{San Luis Valley Development Resources Group}}, + date = {2024}, + url = {https://slvdrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-SLV-Statistical-Profile.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-09-07}, + file = {/home/alex/Zotero/storage/DI5GLTFP/2024-San-Luis-Valley-Statistical-Profile1.pdf;/home/alex/Zotero/storage/YG9X26WK/2021-SLV-Statistical-Profile.pdf} +} + +@article{akerlofMarketLemonsQuality1970a, + title = {The {{Market}} for "{{Lemons}}": {{Quality Uncertainty}} and the {{Market Mechanism}}}, + shorttitle = {The {{Market}} for "{{Lemons}}"}, + author = {Akerlof, George A.}, + date = {1970}, + journaltitle = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, + volume = {84}, + number = {3}, + eprint = {1879431}, + eprinttype = {jstor}, + pages = {488--500}, + publisher = {Oxford University Press}, + issn = {0033-5533}, + doi = {10.2307/1879431}, + url = {https://jstor.org/stable/1879431}, + urldate = {2024-10-30}, + abstract = {I. Introduction, 488.--II. The model with automobiles as an example, 489.--III. Examples and applications, 492.--IV. Counteracting institutions, 499.--V. Conclusion, 500.} +} + diff --git a/supporting-files/symbols-and-abbreviations.tex b/supporting-files/symbols-and-abbreviations.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc953f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/supporting-files/symbols-and-abbreviations.tex @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +% You can add them any where in the text, but it is good to keep it in the same place. +% >>> Symbols >> General Nomenclature +\textbf{Acronyms} +\begin{acronym} + \acro{AF}{acre-foot} + \acro{API}{application programming interface} + \acro{ATE}{average treatment effect} + \acro{ATT}{average treatment effect on the treated} + \acro{ARP}{Annual Replacement Plan} + \acro{FSA}{Farm Service Agency} + \acro{PES}{payment for environmental services} + \acro{BTU}{British thermal unit} + \acro{WTI}{West Texas Intermediate} + \acro{HH}{Henry Hub} + \acro{CRP}{Conservation Reserve Payments} + \acro{CREP}{Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program} + \acro{GASP}{Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte River Basin, Inc} + \acro{GBM}{Generalized Boosted Model} + \acro{IPTW}{inverse probability of treatment weighting} + \acro{NPV}{net present value} + \acro{CPI}{consumer price index} + \acro{CSV}{Comma Separated Value file format} + \acro{CDSS}{Colorado Department of Support Services} + \acro{RGWCD}{Rio Grande Water Conservation District} + \acro{CSM}{Colorado School of Mines} + \acro{EC}{error correction} + \acro{USDA}{United States Department of Agriculture} + \acro{DID}[DiD]{difference-in-differences} + \acro{BTC}{Bitcoin} + \acro{BBL}{barrel of crude oil} \acro{ARDL}{autoregressive distributed lag model} + \acro{ADF}{augmented Dickey-Fuller} + \acro{NARDL}{nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model} + \acro{IRF}{impulse response function} + \acro{SVAR}{structural vector autoregression} + \acro{VAR}{vector autoregression} + \acro{AIC}{Akaike information criterion} + \acro{ASIC}{application-specific integrated circuit} + \acro{PPI}{Producer Price Index} + \acro{PSS}{Pesaran, Shin and Smith} + \acro{ACF}{autocorrelation function} + \acro{PACF}{partial autocorrelation function} + \acro{JB}{Jarque-Bera} + \acro{LM}[LM]{Lagrange multiplier} + \acro{ARCH}[ARCH]{autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity} + \acro{GOR}{gas-to-oil ratio} + \acro{POW}[PoW]{proof of work} + \acro{MMCF}{1,000,000 cubic feet of gas} + \acro{MCF}{1,000 cubic feet of gas} + \acro{TVD}{true vertical depth} + \acro{MD}{measured depth} + \acro{MTD}{measured total depth} + \acro{SLV}[San Luis Valley]{San Luis Valley} + \acro{SBD1}[Subdistrict One]{Subdistrict One of the Rio Grande Conservation District} + \acro{SBD2}[Subdistrict Two]{Subdistrict Two of the Rio Grande Conservation District} +\end{acronym}